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Foreword 
 
 
The importance of IT products to every sector of Australian society can hardly be 
overstated. IT products are woven into the fabric of our economy and society, and 
have driven rapid change in the way Australians communicate, the way we work, 
and the way we live.  
Australian consumers and businesses, however, must often pay much more for 
their IT products than their counterparts in comparable economies. In many cases 
Australians pay 50 to 100 per cent more for the same product.  
Consumer and business concern over IT price differences prompted the Minister 
for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Senator the Hon. 
Stephen Conroy, to refer the question of IT pricing in Australia to the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications for 
an inquiry and report.  
Evidence presented to this inquiry left little doubt about the extent and depth of 
concern about IT pricing in Australia. Consumers are clearly perplexed, frustrated 
and angered by the experience of paying higher prices for IT products than 
consumers in comparable countries.  
High IT prices make it harder for Australian businesses to compete internationally 
and can be a significant barrier to access and participation for disadvantaged 
Australians (in particular Australians with a disability). 
Based on the evidence received over a 12 month inquiry, the Committee has 
concluded that in many cases, the price differences for IT products cannot be 
explained by the cost of doing business in Australia. Particularly when it comes to 
digitally delivered content, the Committee concluded that many IT products are 
more expensive in Australia because of regional pricing strategies implemented by 
major vendors and copyright holders. Consumers often refer to these pricing 
strategies as the ‘Australia tax’. 
viii  
 
 
While the Committee recognises that businesses must remain free to set their own 
prices in a market economy, it has nonetheless made a range of recommendations 
that are intended to sharpen competition in Australian IT markets. The Committee 
hopes that these measures will increase downward pressure on IT prices and 
improve the access of Australian businesses and consumers to cheaper IT 
products.   
Given the ever-increasing importance of IT products to Australian society and the 
economy – in driving innovation, reducing isolation in regional and rural 
Australia, or improving the lives of Australians with a disability – it is essential 
that Australians get a fair deal. 
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Terms of reference 
 
 
Noting the estimated value of the internet to the Australian economy, and the 
importance of competitively priced IT hardware and software being made 
available to business, government and the community, the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications is 
asked to inquire: 
 Whether a difference in prices exist between IT hardware and software 
products, including computer games and consoles, e-books and music 
and videos sold in Australia over the internet or in retail outlets as 
compared to markets in the US, UK and economies in the Asia-Pacific; 
 Establish what these differences are; 
 Determine why these differences exist; 
 Establish what the impacts of these differences might be on Australian 
businesses, governments and households; and 
 Determine what actions might be taken to help address any differences 
that operate to the disadvantage of Australian consumers. 
 
 
  
 
List of recommendations 
 
 
2 Price discrimination and consumer impacts 
Recommendation 1 
The Committee recommends that the ABS develop a comprehensive 
program to monitor and report expenditure on IT products, hardware 
and software, both domestically and overseas, as well as the size and 
volume of the online retail market. 
Recommendation 2 
Considering the importance of IT products to education, and in the 
interests of greater transparency in this area, the Committee recommends 
that the Australian Government, in consultation with Universities 
Australia and CAUDIT, conduct a comprehensive study of the future IT 
needs of and costs faced by Australian Universities, in order to provide 
clearer financial parameters for negotiations. 
Recommendation 3 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider a 
whole-of-government accessible IT procurement policy, to be developed 
by relevant agencies including AGIMO, and in consultation with relevant 
stakeholder groups including ACCAN. 
4 Copyright, circumvention, competition, and remedies 
Recommendation 4 
The Committee recommends that the parallel importation restrictions 
still found in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) be lifted, and that the parallel 
importation defence in the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) be reviewed and 
 xiii 
 
 
broadened to ensure it is effective in allowing the importation of genuine 
goods. 
Recommendation 5 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government amend the 
Copyright Act’s section 10(1) anti-circumvention provisions to clarify and 
secure consumers’ rights to circumvent technological protection 
measures that control geographic market segmentation. 
Recommendation 6 
The Committee further recommends that the Australian Government 
investigate options to educate Australian consumers and businesses as to: 
 the extent to which they may circumvent geoblocking mechanisms 
in order to access cheaper legitimate goods; 
 the tools and techniques which they may use to do so; and 
 the way in which their rights under the Australian Consumer Law 
may be affected should they choose to do so. 
Recommendation 7 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government, in 
conjunction with relevant agencies, consider the creation of a ‘right of 
resale’ in relation to digitally distributed content, and clarification of ‘fair 
use’ rights for consumers, businesses, and educational institutions, 
including restrictions on vendors’ ability to ‘lock’ digital content into a 
particular ecosystem. 
Recommendation 8 
The Committee recommends the repeal of section 51(3) of the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010. 
Recommendation 9 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider 
enacting a ban on geoblocking as an option of last resort, should 
persistent market failure exist in spite of the changes to the Competition 
and Consumer Act and the Copyright Act recommended in this report. 
Recommendation 10 
That the Australian Government investigate the feasibility of amending 
the Competition and Consumer Act so that contracts or terms of service 
which seek to enforce geoblocking are considered void. 
 
xiv  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
1.1 On 18 May 2012, Senator the Hon. Stephen Conroy, Minister for 
Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, requested that the 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and 
Communications inquire into the pricing of information technology (IT) 
products in Australia.  
1.2 In his letter of referral, Minister Conroy highlighted ‘growing interest in 
the differentials that exist in prices for IT hardware and software sold in 
Australia,’ an interest which has intensified as the Australian currency 
gained value against the US dollar. 
1.3 The Minister noted the internet’s value to Australian business and 
consumers, and the considerable opportunities for economic expansion 
the digital economy presents. He also noted, however, the concern that 
when purchasing IT hardware or software, Australian small businesses, 
private consumers, and governments could face price disparities that may 
affect their international competitiveness. 
1.4 Consequently, the terms of reference for the inquiry required the 
Committee to investigate: 
 whether IT products sold in Australia are more expensive than those 
sold in comparable overseas jurisdictions, and if so, how much more 
expensive;  
 why any such differences may exist;  
 the impacts price differences may have on Australian consumers and 
businesses; and 
 what actions, if any, may be taken to mitigate those impacts on 
Australian consumers.  
1.5 For the purposes of the inquiry, the term ‘IT products’ includes both IT 
hardware and software, and covers games, consoles, e-books, music and 
video sold in Australia, either online or in retail outlets.  
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Context of the inquiry 
1.6 IT is omnipresent in businesses of any size or complexity, in schools and 
universities, and in millions of Australian homes. Information technology 
influences almost every aspect of Australia’s economy and society.  
1.7 IT products are at the heart of our financial and logistics systems, and 
support critical infrastructure, health, education and welfare systems. IT 
products are critical to research and innovation, economic competitiveness 
and Australia’s future social and economic prosperity.  
1.8 The internet has transformed the Australian economy over the past 20 
years, and is poised to play an even greater role in daily life as Australia’s 
engagement with the global digital economy broadens and deepens.  
1.9 According to a 2011 Deloitte Access Economics report, the internet made a 
direct contribution of approximately $50 billion – or 3.6 per cent of 
Australia’s Gross Domestic Product – to the Australian economy in 2010, a 
contribution of similar value to the retail sector or Australia’s iron ore 
exports. The direct contribution of the internet is forecast to increase by 
another $20 billion to roughly $70 billion by 2016.1  
1.10 Between 2010 and 2011, 6.2 million or nearly three quarters of Australian 
households had broadband internet access.2 In the same period 91.2 per 
cent of businesses had internet access, and 43.1 per cent had a web 
presence. 50.8 per cent of businesses placed orders via the internet, and 28 
per cent received orders over the internet.3  
1.11 More Australians now use internet banking than visit a bank branch. ‘As 
of December 2010, 45 per cent of Australians had used internet banking in 
the previous four weeks, overtaking the 44 per cent who visited a branch.’ 
Internet banking usage has risen from 1 per cent to 45 per cent in the last 
12 years.4 
 
1  Deloitte Access Economics, The Connected Continent: How the internet is transforming the 
Australian Economy, August 2011, executive summary, 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Australia/Local%20Assets/Documents/Services/ 
Corporate%20Finance/Access%20Economics/Deloitte_The_Connected_Continent_Aug_2011.
pdf, viewed 21 June 2013. 
2  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Media Release, 162/2011, 15 December 2011, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbyReleaseDate/180CCDDCB50
AFA02CA257522001A3F4B, viewed 20 June 2013. 
3  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Summary of IT Use and Innovation in Australian Business, 2010-11, 
26 June 2012, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Products/372A095FBDBCC2B9 
CA257A2800145B72?opendocument, viewed 21 June 2013. 
4  Roy Morgan, Research, Internet Banking Surpasses Branch Visitation, 23 May 2011, 
http://www.roymorganonlinestore.com/News/1346---UInternet-Banking-Surpasses-Branch-
Visitati.aspx, viewed 21 June 2013. 
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1.12 In 2012, online sales in Australia totalled more than US$35 billion. Over 10 
million Australians, almost half Australia’s population, made a purchase 
online in 2012, on average spending A$3,431 per person. This expenditure 
was on average 54 per cent higher than the United States and the highest 
in the world with the exception of the United Kingdom.5  
1.13 In its submission to the inquiry, the Department of Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) noted that IT 
hardware and software are a ‘key driver of productivity growth in our 
economy’, and that therefore: 
… [it] is important for Australia’s global competitiveness that 
Australia pays no more for the technology that underpins its 
success than it must. The ubiquity and affordability of technology 
is a key requirement for Australia’s competitiveness in the global 
economy and underpins everything from home finances to our 
export trade.6 
1.14 It is generally accepted that Australians have tolerated higher prices for a 
range of goods for much of their history. In general, higher prices have 
been attributed to:  
 Australia’s geographical remoteness 
 its comparatively small and scattered population, and 
 a historically weak Australian dollar. 
1.15 In recent decades, however, the internet has allowed Australian 
consumers to observe and participate in the global marketplace, and to 
become increasingly aware of prices in comparable overseas markets. 
Many consumers have also become aware of, and frustrated by, regional 
pricing strategies that prevent them from taking advantage of cheaper 
prices overseas. 
1.16 The Committee sought to explore any structural or commercial reasons for 
the significantly higher prices paid by Australians for IT products. These 
included claims by IT product vendors about higher business costs, taxes, 
Australian regulatory regimes and requirements unique to the Australian 
market.  
1.17 The Committee is aware that while regional pricing strategies may exist 
across many industries, they are particularly noticeable in relation to IT 
products, including those which are digitally delivered with identical 
content in different countries. In many cases prices are significantly higher 
 
5  ‘Online sales reach a trillion’, The Age, 11 April 2013, http://www.theage.com.au/small-
business/online-sales-reach-a-trillion-20130411-2hmks.html, viewed 21 June 2013.  
6  Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Submission 55, p. 1. 
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than what might be expected as a consequence of any costs arising from 
delivery in the Australian market. 
Conduct of the inquiry 
1.18 The terms of reference of this inquiry were very broad. IT products now 
permeate every aspect of the Australian economy and society. No single 
government department or agency is responsible for relevant policy or 
regulation. Business and consumer groups offered a wide range of 
perspectives, but none dealt with the totality of issues raised by the terms 
of reference. 
1.19 To familiarise itself with current policies and issues relevant to the 
inquiry, the Committee requested briefings from DBCDE, the Attorney-
General’s Department, the Department of Finance and Deregulation, the 
(then) Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary 
Education, the Treasury, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, and the Productivity Commission. 
1.20 In the inquiry’s initial stages the Committee sought submissions from the 
public and invited a broad range of IT companies, business and industry 
bodies to make submissions. The inquiry received 133 submissions, 
15 supplementary submissions and 5 exhibits. The inquiry generated 
significant interest in the community, and this has been reflected in high 
levels of media coverage. 
1.21 More than half of the submissions received were from consumers, most of 
whom expressed frustration at what they characterised as unfair prices for 
IT products. The majority of consumer submissions reported high prices 
for computer games, software, hardware, e-books and digitally 
downloaded music. 
1.22 The Committee held eight public hearings: in Sydney on 30 July 2012 and 
in Canberra on 19 September, 5 October, 31 October, 28 November 2012, 
and on 13 February, 13 March and 22 March 2013. The Committee heard 
evidence from consumer groups, government agencies, and industry 
groups representing IT companies, publishers, retailers, and record 
labels.7 
 
7  Transcripts of the Committee’s public hearings can be found at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_C
ommittees?url=ic/itpricing/hearings.htm. 
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Engagement with industry 
1.23 From the beginning of the inquiry, the Committee expressed the 
reasonable expectation that relevant IT industry organisations and 
companies would take an active role in the inquiry through submissions 
and participation in public hearings. In offering an opportunity for 
participation in a public inquiry, the Committee hoped that business and 
industry bodies would seek to engage with and respond to some of the 
observations and concerns raised quite openly and regularly by 
consumers. In this manner, the Committee anticipated a rigorous and fair 
examination of issues of clear concern to Australian consumers.  
1.24 From the outset, the Committee experienced the frustration felt by 
consumers in seeking an answer to legitimate queries. Some large 
companies stated they would be represented by an industry body, while 
the industry body stated it could not represent the views of individual 
members. While various ‘peak bodies’ took this approach, it was most 
acutely stated by the Australian Information Industry Association (AIIA).8 
1.25 Communications between the Committee and various industry bodies and 
individual companies continued for several months. While some material 
was provided at various stages in written submissions, and in response to 
specific requests, it was of limited benefit to the inquiry and in the 
Committee’s view did little to address consumers’ concerns. The 
Committee continued to extend written invitations to various individuals 
and organisations to attend hearings; these were repeatedly declined.  
1.26 On 29 October 2012 the Chair, Mr Nick Champion MP, in updating the 
House on the progress of the inquiry, stated: 
To one degree or another, there has been a real unwillingness to 
submit evidence in public or to appear before the Committee on 
the part of both industry associations and major companies in the 
area of IT. The committee detects a deep reluctance and resistance 
on the part of the relevant companies to discuss in public the 
issues that the Committee is considering or to publicly defend 
their business models and pricing structures. The committee 
would, of course, be willing to hear in camera matters that were 
commercially sensitive—which is a common practice amongst 
committees—but the Committee’s offer to do so has not been 
taken up. Rather, the industry seems to employ the tactic of giving 
either little or limited cooperation to the Committee, particularly 
in public testimony. This stands in stark contrast to what has 
 
8  Suzanne Campbell, Committee Hansard, 30 July 2012, pp. 2, 5. 
6 AT WHAT COST? IT PRICING AND THE AUSTRALIA TAX 
 
happened in other inquiries which have investigated areas of 
commercial sensitivity in that these inquiries received cooperation 
and information from industry participants…It is not good 
enough for the industry to simply stonewall the inquiry—or, for 
that matter, to ignore interested consumers who have a legitimate 
public interest in IT pricing. It would be far better for companies to 
defend their business model and their pricing structure in public 
before the Committee. The committee has offered these companies 
more than once the chance to appear. We would give them a fair 
hearing; they have my public commitment on it. The companies’ 
failure to appear leaves the Committee with an unenviable choice 
between compelling the attendance of individuals to give evidence 
and reporting without hearing in detail from industry. The choice 
between one or other of these alternatives can only be averted by 
the IT industry’s following the first rule of good public relations: 
always turn up and put your case.9 
1.27 The Committee resolved that the companies be required to provide 
evidence in general terms on how IT is priced in Australia. The Committee 
took the view that the Parliament has a duty to inform itself about all 
manner of issues in the Australian community and that if necessary, 
parliamentary committees should be prepared to require the attendance of 
witnesses in order to secure relevant evidence.  
1.28 Therefore on 7 February 2013, the Committee took the unusual action of 
summonsing the following individuals to appear before the Committee at 
a public hearing on 22 March 2013: 
 Mr Tony King, Vice President, Apple Australia  
 Mr Paul Robson, Managing Director, Adobe, Australia and New 
Zealand, and 
 Ms Pip Marlow, Managing Director, Microsoft Australia. 
 Structure of the report 
1.29 The report is divided into four chapters. Chapter 2 of the report provides 
some definitions of ‘international price discrimination’, and considers the 
growing consumer awareness of its presence. It then provides a context 
for reflecting the evidence which suggests that, across a range of 
categories, IT products in Australia are more expensive than those sold in 
comparable overseas markets. The chapter then outlines some of the clear 
 
9  Committee Hansard, 29 October 2012, p. 12170. 
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impacts of higher IT prices on Australian consumers, businesses and 
institutions. 
1.30 Chapter 3 presents some explanations for higher prices as advanced by 
industry and IT vendors, including about some of the increased costs of 
doing business in Australia. The question of responsibility for setting 
prices in the Australian market is discussed, including the roles of 
businesses and rights holders. Aspects of industry approaches to pricing 
are considered, including the legitimate ability to set prices ‘according to 
what the market will bear.’ Some views of major IT vendors are included 
in this chapter, as well as some responses from Australian consumers. 
1.31 Chapter 4 examines aspects of Australia’s copyright system, with a focus 
on competition in digital copyright markets. It also examines potential 
international agreements, and concludes with a discussion of the remedies 
available to Australians affected by international price discrimination. 
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 2 
Price discrimination and consumer impacts 
2.1 The terms of reference for this inquiry ask the Committee to investigate 
whether IT products sold in Australia are more expensive than those sold 
in comparable overseas jurisdictions, and, if so, the reasons for these price 
differences, and their impacts on Australian consumers. 
2.2 This chapter will focus on the nature of price discrimination and how it 
operates. Definitions will be followed by a brief discussion of increasing 
consumer awareness of pricing, as well as changing technologies such as 
the increasing cloud services offered, and means by which ‘geoblocking’ 
occurs. The Committee then canvasses the incidence of price 
discrimination across various product categories (including software, 
hardware, and products available as digital downloads), as described in 
evidence to the inquiry, noting concerns about the reliability of data on 
these issues. The Committee also considers the impacts of higher prices on 
various groups in our community, including those on low incomes, and 
those who live with disability. 
What is International Price Discrimination? 
2.3 The Treasury’s submission to the inquiry defined international price 
discrimination in these terms:  
Geographic price discrimination occurs when a business charges 
different prices for the same product in two or more different 
locations. International price discrimination is when geographic 
price discrimination occurs across country borders. 
To maximise profit, many businesses do not sell based simply on a 
mark-up of what the product cost to produce, but rather price 
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according to what they consider the market can bear, that is, 
according to the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay.1  
2.4 Mr Geoff Francis, General Manager of the Treasury’s Competition and 
Consumer Policy Division, further noted that:  
… there are two conditions that must be present for price 
discrimination to be effective. Firstly, the willingness to pay for a 
particular good or service must vary between different groups of 
consumers in order for a business to benefit from price 
discrimination. Secondly, the business must be able to separate 
these groups of consumers in order to prevent them from 
arbitraging the price differential.2 
2.5 The Productivity Commission in its 2011 Retail Industry Report described 
international price discrimination as: 
...a common and generally legal business strategy to maximise 
profits and performance. It is sustained through sufficient demand 
from consumers, lack of competitive rivals, and the ability for 
market and/or consumer segments to be kept separate (that is, 
there are often restrictions on those that are charged a cheaper 
price to prevent them reselling their goods to other consumers 
who are charged higher prices).3 
2.6 Price discrimination is not restricted to the IT sector, and is not a new 
feature of the Australian economy. According to Mr Francis, Australians 
have faced price discrimination for many years: 
… price discrimination is not actually a new phenomenon, and it 
is not surprising that Australians may find prices for products 
somewhere else in the world that are lower than the prices they 
find in Australia. As you know, it is common for people to shop 
overseas while on holiday because they believe that the prices may 
well be lower on certain items when they are overseas.4 
2.7 Ms Suzanne Campbell, CEO of the Australian Information Industry 
Association (AIIA), argued that variations in price are to be expected 
internationally: 
…price comparisons across categories of consumer goods clearly 
show price disparities are not technology industry-specific. To 
 
1  Treasury, Submission 85, p. 6. 
2  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31 October 2012, p. 10. 
3  Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry, 
2011, p. 155. http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/113761/retail-
industry.pdf, viewed 25 June 2013. 
4  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31 October 2012, p. 9. 
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give an indication of the range of price variation globally, the latest 
Big Mac index, compiled by the Economist magazine, shows a 
difference of 426 per cent between the lowest price of $1.89 in 
India and the highest of $8.06 in Switzerland.5 
2.8 Treasury observed in its submission that, in spite of any negative 
connotations which may be associated with the term, price discrimination 
is not necessarily objectionable in all cases: 
[Price discrimination] allows businesses to maximise the profits 
earned in each respective market – something that should not be 
considered inherently ‘bad’, and which their shareholders would 
reasonably expect in order to maximise the return on their 
investment.6 
Greater consumer awareness 
2.9 Although arguably a feature of the Australian economy across many 
markets and across many decades, international price discrimination has 
become more of a concern for consumers and businesses in recent years. 
2.10 Rising rates of internet use have increased Australians’ awareness of 
overseas prices generally and of price differences for similar goods and 
services in Australia. Many Australians purchase goods directly from 
overseas suppliers with considerable savings even when distribution costs 
are taken into account.  
2.11 At the same time, as the Australian currency rose to parity (and for a time 
beyond) with the US dollar, Australian consumers became increasingly 
aware of higher prices for essentially identical IT products.  
2.12 In his evidence to the Committee Mr Francis noted the internet’s effect on 
consumer purchasing habits:  
Increasingly, price transparency due to the internet has made such 
price differentials far more obvious than they were in the past, but 
it is also giving Australian consumers access to international 
markets without having to travel. I think these price differentials 
have always existed but they are now far more obvious due to the 
availability of the internet and due to the availability for 
consumers to potentially use the internet to effectively shop 
overseas while at home.7 
 
5  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 1. 
6  Treasury, Submission 85, p. 6. 
7  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31 October 2012, p. 9. 
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2.13 Mr Les Andrews, Assistant Commissioner at the Productivity 
Commission, noted the effect that the internet has had on consumer 
perceptions of value: 
… people have always been aware of the fact that if you went to 
Hong Kong or Singapore on holiday you could buy things more 
cheaply there and come back with your bargains. But the internet 
every day exposes people to different prices and I think that 
makes people far more aware of the differences.8 
2.14 This growing awareness has featured prominently in the numerous 
submissions by consumers to the Committee. Mr Dane Weber, to give one 
example, gave his perspective on the increased access to markets and price 
transparency:  
… many other consumers like myself have grown up with items 
costing the way they do now. They were that way in the past, so it 
is natural to assume they would be the same. The reason for this 
difference would be taking advantage of the status quo: the 
Australian consumer has not known any better. … We seem 
willing to pay this much, because that’s the way it has always 
been. But now we have access to international prices, and 
purchases are fast and simple. Our higher dollar has made savings 
of 50 per cent possible and people are taking advantage of that.9 
Changing technologies 
2.15 The Committee acknowledges that added to increasing consumer 
awareness of IT pricing is an increase in the means of delivery of services 
and products to consumers. The Committee notes that the prospective 
shift towards digital delivery, and subscription models, are discussed in 
many submissions to the inquiry, and there has been extensive 
commentary suggesting that these developments are changing the 
relationship between IT vendors and consumers in significant ways. While 
consumer and industry perspectives on technology are discussed 
throughout this report, the Committee presents a brief overview of some 
of these issues, by way of introduction.  
 
8  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 August 2012, p. 3. 
9  Dane Weber, Submission 8, p. 2. 
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Cloud computing and subscription models 
2.16 In the course of the Committee’s inquiry numerous references were made 
to the development of cloud computing. Indeed one large IT vendor, 
Adobe, announced a major shift to subscription-only delivery of its latest 
products. The term ‘cloud computing’ can refer to a broad range of 
technological developments. Essentially, the ‘cloud’ is a network of 
connected computers which can be used to provide shared computing 
resources for specific applications (e.g. software services like email, web 
applications, or synchronisation services) and which are accessed 
remotely, either through a web browser or via a particular service’s 
application programming interface (API).10 
2.17 Cloud services may enable consumers and businesses to reduce their up-
front IT costs by paying for access to and use of shared computing 
resources rather than purchasing IT assets outright. Customers may 
benefit from the faster upgrades and cross-device synchronisation that the 
cloud makes possible, while the growth of an access-oriented ‘subscription 
economy’ can provide significant cost savings, and steadier revenue 
streams, to IT vendors.11 
2.18 The Australian Industry Group (Ai Group) noted that large numbers of 
Australian businesses had already adopted or intended to use cloud 
services in the near future.12 While industry groups and major vendors are 
vigorously promoting the transition to cloud-based services, the platform 
can involve significant disadvantages. Subscription services may not be 
financially beneficial in the long term.  
2.19 Cloud services are an integral part of digital ecosystems – they provide the 
infrastructure through which information on multiple devices is 
synchronised, they can be used for backups, and sharing of content. While 
some cloud services are multi-platform, a large number are provided by 
specific vendors as a means of deepening consumers’ dependence on a 
given ecosystem or service. 
2.20 Cloud-based subscription services also have the potential disadvantage 
that ongoing access to content acquired through them may depend on 
continuing to pay the subscription fee, and on the ongoing existence of the 
 
10  Knorr, Eric and Galen Gruman, ‘What cloud computing really means’, 7 April 2008, InfoWorld 
http://www.infoworld.com/print/34031, viewed 13 June 2013. 
11  ‘How the Subscription Model with change your business applications,’ Forbes, 20 January 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danwoods/2012/01/20/how-the-subscription-economy-will-
change-your-business-applications/; and ‘The Subscription software revolution’, 
SmartCompany, 9 May 2013, http://www.smartcompany.com.au/tech-head/055441-the-
subscription-software-revolution.html, viewed 13 June 2013. 
12  Australian Industry Group, Submission 56, p. 2. 
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provider. Should a customer cease paying, or should its operator decide to 
cease providing the service, access to content could be affected. The 
Committee also heard evidence that cloud services can serve to increase a 
consumer’s dependence on a given ecosystem or service, which can also 
affect pricing as well as increasing a vendor’s or publisher’s control.13 
Issues concerning the control of intellectual property are discussed in 
chapter 4. 
Geoblocking 
2.21 As discussed earlier, Australian consumers are increasingly conscious of 
differential pricing imposed by IT vendors and rights holders, and to 
avoid international price discrimination, often prefer to purchase 
products, particularly digitally delivered products, at cheaper overseas 
prices. International price discrimination can only be effective when 
vendors are able to maintain the separation of markets, and thereby 
prevent customers from accessing cheaper prices elsewhere. 
2.22 Historically, international markets were easily segmented by their 
geography, trade barriers, and the comparatively high cost of transporting 
goods. In the past two decades however, barriers to the formation of 
global markets have been greatly eroded; the internet has provided direct 
access to overseas markets without the need to travel; and as global 
communication networks have matured, digital delivery of content and 
services has become commonplace.  
2.23 In response, global IT firms and content providers have erected virtual 
barriers between markets, which permit different prices to be set in 
different locations. The methods vendors have adopted to differentiate 
between regions and keep customers separate are broadly referred to as 
‘geoblocking’, defined by the Department of Broadband, Communications 
and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) as: 
… the name for a variety of techniques used to verify a user’s 
location and provide related content on that basis. It is most 
commonly used for content delivery, such as films and television 
programs, and to verify a purchaser’s location at point of sale. A 
person’s location can generally be derived from their computer’s 
IP address, but at the sale stage can be verified using the person’s 
credit card details or mailing address.14 
 
13  Nicholas Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 6. 
14  Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Submission 55, p. 11. 
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2.24 Mr Hamish McCormick, First Assistant Secretary of the Office of Trade 
Negotiations in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 
described geoblocking as: 
… the use of internet addresses, credit card numbers or other 
means of electronic identification to block internet sales and 
downloads of electronic products—for example music, games and 
computer programs—based on the geographic location of the 
consumer.15 
2.25 Geoblocking may effectively restrict consumers’ ability to compare prices 
and accordingly make purchases. The Committee is aware of cases in 
which firms include conditions in their product’s terms of service (which 
customers must consent to in order to use the product) that prevent 
customers from using the product outside the region in which it was 
sold.16 The Committee heard that geoblocking can be enforced by onerous, 
multilayered conditions. In the case of IT hardware, geoblocking may be 
the result of exclusive distribution agreements, in which manufacturers 
assign the rights to distribute their products in a given territory.  
2.26 The practical effect of geoblocking from the Australian consumer’s 
perspective is to restrict access to a cheaper global marketplace. According 
to views expressed in submissions, many Australian consumers see 
themselves as limited to a national market characterised by markedly 
higher prices for IT products and services. Consumers’ perspectives on 
geoblocking are discussed later in this chapter; responses from industry 
are considered in chapter 3; and proposed remedies are canvassed in 
chapter 4 of this report. 
Warranties 
2.27 The issue of warranties for IT products arose in various contexts in the 
course of the Committee’s inquiry. Australia’s national warranty regime 
was raised as a factor in explanations for the higher cost of IT products in 
Australia, and it was also suggested that overseas IT purchasing can 
involve inadequate or no warranty protection for consumers. Warranties 
in the sense of consumer protection are examined in this section. 
Warranties are cited by business as a cost, and this is considered in 
chapter 3. Options for international warranty harmonisation are 
considered in chapter 4. 
2.28 Australia has a national consumer protection regime. Under the 
Australian Consumer Law (ACL) which is located in schedule 2 to the 
 
15  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 28 November 2012, p. 1. 
16  See, for example, Charles Gutjahr, Submission 43, p. 6. 
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Competition and Consumer Act 2010, consumers have the same protections, 
and businesses the same obligations and responsibilities, across Australia. 
The ACL, in effect from 1 January 2011, provides consumers with a 
comprehensive set of rights in relation to the goods and services they 
acquire.17 DBCDE told the Committee that: 
Warranties in Australia can be more rigorous and provide greater 
protections than those in other countries. The Australian Consumer 
Law, a schedule of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, can 
provide different and in some cases stronger protections than that 
found in US or UK law.18 
2.29 Mr Matthew Levey of consumer organisation Choice noted that some 
importers of IT products maintained ‘extremely strong refund/return 
polic[ies]’ and that such practices show that ‘it is quite possible to operate 
here profitably, sell a lot of products and still offer significant price 
savings’.19 Some concerns were expressed in submissions about the 
limitations of warranties for products purchased overseas, in terms of 
consumer risk and the provision of service and repair for such goods, and 
a need to provide a greater degree of certainty and security for 
consumers.20  
2.30 The Australian Communications Consumer Action Network (ACCAN), a 
consumer organisation focussed on the communications sector, argued 
that uncertainties about warranty protection inhibited consumers from 
seeking to access lower prices overseas and was consequently a factor in 
maintaining higher IT product prices in Australia: 
I think it is something that can prevent consumers from shopping 
overseas and accessing those lower prices, which we know that 
some people are doing anyway. … The more businesses realise 
that Australians are doing this, I think that could have an impact 
in terms of competition and bringing prices down. However, we 
are concerned about whether Australian Consumer Law or any 
consumer law will apply to those purchases. It is very hard; there 
are no legal examples we can really refer to, to our knowledge, in 
 
17  Further details on Australian warranties can be found on the Australian Competition and 
Consumer website: http://www.accc.gov.au/business/treating-customers-fairly/warranties 
and Consumer Guarantees: A guide for business and legal practitioners, 2010, 
http://transition.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=964215&nodeId=e16d444b734b11d
82b151a17f657780a&fn=Consumer%20Guarantees%20a%20guide%20for%20businesses%20an
d%20legal%20practitioners.pdf. 
18  Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Submission 55, p. 9. 
19  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 24. 
20  See for example, Choice, Submission 75, p. 37, and Erin Turner, Committee Hansard, 
19 September 2012, p. 6.  
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these cases.21 Not every consumer at the moment feels competent 
about shopping online. … Knowing that there is an international 
warranty for a purchase can go to help ease some of that stress and 
nervousness.22 
2.31 The Committee is also aware of consumers’ concerns about warranties for 
the increasing variety of goods (physical and digital) bought online, 
including for example the devices and software upgrades bought by 
Australians living with disability. The Committee acknowledges that 
consumer concerns about warranty and ongoing servicing costs can have a 
role in purchasing decisions. 
Evidence about price differences 
2.32 As noted in chapter 1, of the submissions received, more than half were 
from consumers or consumer groups, and a significant proportion were 
from small businesses. The vast majority of these submissions expressed 
concern at the high price of IT hardware and software. Since calling for 
submissions in May 2012, the Committee has received information on 
more than 500 products. Given the fluidity of the IT market, many price 
comparisons discussed may no longer be accurate. 
2.33 The Committee understands that, for thorough and statistically valid 
conclusions on IT pricing, data would need to cover reasonable time 
periods and cross multiple jurisdictions. The Committee notes the views of 
Mr Les Andrews from the Productivity Commission that even if such data 
were available, it is likely that some of it would be commercially sensitive 
and therefore unlikely to be published.23 The Committee considers, 
however, that the examples received in submissions, many of which 
contain detailed lists of products compared over time, represent a series of 
‘snapshots’ of IT prices, providing an indication of Australian consumers’ 
recent experience in purchasing IT products.  
2.34 Some submissions provided price comparisons across a range of products, 
while others focused on a particular IT product or vendor. The 
Committee’s analysis of the evidence received across all product 
categories revealed the following results: 
 
21  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 19 September 2012, pp. 6-7. 
22  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 19 September 2012, p. 11. 
23  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 August 2012, p. 4. 
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 Professional software: submissions compared more than 150 products. 
The comparisons showed an average price difference of 50 per cent, 
with a median price difference of 49 per cent. Of the major vendors: 
⇒ Adobe products showed an average difference of 42 per cent, with a 
median difference of 49 per cent 
⇒ Microsoft products were on average 66 per cent more expensive, 
with a median difference of 67 per cent, and  
⇒ Autodesk products were on average 51 per cent more expensive, 
with a median difference of 46 per cent. 
 Hardware: more than 50 products were compared. On average 
Australian prices were 46 per cent more expensive than the US, while 
the median difference was 26 per cent. 
 Music: more than 70 products were compared. Australian prices were, 
on average, 52 per cent more expensive, while the median difference 
was 67 per cent. 
 Games: submissions compared the prices of more than 70 products. The 
average price difference was 84 per cent, while the median difference 
was 61 per cent.  
 E-books: submitters compared the prices of more than 120 e-books. 
Price comparisons of books sold both in Australia and the US revealed 
average price differences of 16 per cent, while the median difference 
was 13 per cent.24 
2.35 In addition to the Committee’s own analysis of material included in 
submissions, a submission from Choice compared the prices of more than 
200 products in several categories, finding that Australian consumers 
experience an average price difference of more than 50 per cent (compared 
to US customers) when purchasing IT hardware, software, music, and 
games.25 Before looking at the examples provided in many submissions 
across a range of different products, the Committee notes that other 
submissions raised concerns about the validity and reliability of such 
comparisons. 
2.36 The Committee acknowledges that drawing conclusions on the basis of 
simple price comparisons can be problematic. The Productivity 
Commission 2011 report on The Economic Structure and Performance of the 
Australian Retail Industry, noted that price comparisons may fail to capture 
‘many aspects of the product and retailer-specific considerations that are 
valued by consumers’. These aspects may include: 
 
24  Analysis prepared by Committee, based on submissions received throughout inquiry. 
25  Choice, Submission 75, p. 4. 
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 the time it takes for a consumer to receive the product (i.e. delivery 
times) 
 the potential for consumers to negotiate final prices in-store, often using 
online retailers’ prices as leverage 
 the level of after-sales service available on the product 
 compatibility in Australia, and  
 the extent of close substitutes for products.26 
2.37 The Productivity Commission’s observations were supported by Treasury 
in its submission to this inquiry:  
… there may be other aspects of the product and the consumer’s 
experience that may not be captured by price comparisons.27 
2.38 In submissions and in appearances before the Committee, industry 
representatives have questioned the utility of price comparisons and 
identified a range of non-financial factors that are not captured by price 
alone. Ms Campbell expressed doubts about the utility of ‘snapshot’ or 
‘spot’ price comparisons: 
… spot comparisons are not useful, as prices differ from one 
country to another for a range of reasons and across channels for 
many different reasons.28 
2.39 In its submission, the Ai Group also expressed concerns about price 
comparisons, arguing that snapshot price comparisons: 
 do not capture prices paid by consumers who ‘negotiate a lower price 
in store compared to advertised price’ 
 ‘do not take into account price discounts from the sale of bundled 
goods’ or discounts obtained during contractual negotiations, and 
 do not capture ‘non-price’ factors like after-sales service, convenience or 
reliability, that may affect a consumer’s decision to make a purchase.29 
2.40 In its submission, Microsoft expressed reservations about the utility of 
price comparisons of its products: 
We note that the Committee’s inquiry is based upon an effort to 
compare absolute prices for particular product lines offered in 
different jurisdictions. Microsoft respectfully submits that any 
such attempted comparisons are of limited use, as prices differ 
 
26  Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry, 
2011, p. 145. 
27  The Treasury, Submission 85, p. 3. 
28  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 1. 
29  Australian Industry Group, Submission 56, p. 2. 
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from country-to-country and across channels due to a range of 
factors. There is a need to compare like with like.30 
2.41 In relation to comparisons of prices for digitally downloaded music, the 
Australian Recording Industry Association argued that:  
… the methodology required to be able to make an informed and 
useful comparison of retail prices for recorded music in Australia 
and other countries raises significant design issues and collecting 
the necessary data is a considerable challenge.31 
Availability of data 
2.42 The Committee accepts that its inquiry has not been assisted by statistical 
data which would allow for a systematic analysis of comparative IT 
pricing, and notes that the Productivity Commission experienced a similar 
problem in the course of its 2011 report on the Australian retail industry. 
The Commission noted that while the United States had been collecting 
official data for e-commerce retail sales for over a decade, and while the 
United Kingdom had been collecting official data on internet retail sales 
since late 2006, no comparable statistics are available in Australia. The 
Commission observed that, ‘given the growing importance of this part of 
the retail industry, it is important that more precise statistics are 
available’.32  
2.43 The Commission’s 2011 report recommended that the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS) monitor and report online expenditure both 
domestically and overseas by Australian consumers. The Commission 
further recommended the ABS consider options to enable the 
disaggregation of online spending and employment associated with 
‘multi-channel’ establishments (i.e. retailers that sell products through 
physical shopfronts and via the internet) and ‘pure play’ online retailers.33  
2.44 The Committee followed up this issue with the ABS, which advised that it 
does not measure prices paid for IT goods and services which are 
purchased overseas and that consequently ‘does not have the data 
required to enable a comparison of prices paid for IT products in Australia 
and overseas’. The ABS acknowledged the Productivity Commission’s 
concerns that the ABS’ data collection and statistical analysis ‘do not 
accurately cover the importation of products purchased from overseas 
 
30  Microsoft, Submission 67, p. 2. 
31  Australian Recording Industry Association, Submission 93, p. 3. 
32  Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry, 
2011, p. 89. 
33  Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry, 
2011, p. 89. 
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retailers’. The ABS advised that it has been working with the Australian 
Customs and Border Protection Service to develop indicators for this 
activity ‘based on Customs audits and numbers of parcels’.34  
2.45 The Committee also wrote to the Australian Customs and Border 
Protection Service which responded that detailed data is provided to the 
ABS on imported goods valued in excess of A$1000: 
This data includes information on such things as the tariff 
classification, value and origin of the goods but does not include 
any information on the method of the purchase, for example, 
whether the goods were purchased online. The ABS will have 
information provided by Customs and Border Protection that will 
enable them to provide information on the value of IT purchases 
above the entry threshold.35 
2.46 Given the growing importance of IT products and the online economy 
more broadly, the Committee is of the view that there is a need for more 
precise and comprehensive statistics that provide government, business 
and consumers a better understanding of Australia’s digital economy. 
 
Recommendation 1 
 The Committee recommends that the ABS develop a comprehensive 
program to monitor and report expenditure on IT products, hardware 
and software, both domestically and overseas, as well as the size and 
volume of the online retail market. 
Evidence by product category 
2.47 While the Committee acknowledges views that ‘snapshot’ comparisons 
can be of limited use, it does not accept Microsoft’s claim that the inquiry 
is ‘based on an effort to compare absolute prices’. The Committee has 
made every effort to seek information from a range of sources (including 
repeatedly, from large IT vendors, as noted in chapter 1) to provide a 
thorough foundation on which to base its observations and conclusions. 
The Committee has not sought to make generalisations, or accept all 
evidence without question. The Committee accepts that the wide range of 
personal accounts from consumers, as well as evidence from peak bodies 
 
34  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Correspondence, 10 July 2012, p. 1. 
35  Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Submission 88, pp. 2-3. 
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and consumer advocacy organisations, demonstrates a level of concern 
which should be reflected fairly in this report. The following sections 
consider hardware, software, and digital downloads, including games, 
music, and books, before looking at impacts on consumers across 
Australian society. 
Hardware 
2.48 The Committee did not receive extensive examples of price differences for 
IT hardware, but notes the submission from Choice which compared the 
prices of twenty-five computers manufactured by Apple and Dell. The 
Dell products – a range of laptop and desktop computers – were on 
average 41 per cent more expensive in Australia than in the US, with 
differences ranging from 18 per cent to more than 80 per cent.36  
2.49 The prices for Apple products were much closer to parity – the majority of 
Apple’s iPad, iMac and Macbook lines were generally 10 to 15 per cent 
more expensive in Australia. As Choice noted:  
The average price difference for Apple’s computer products is 
12 per cent. This is only marginally higher than the 10 per cent 
GST rate, and therefore it could be claimed that Apple’s Australian 
hardware prices are more or less at parity with the US.37 
2.50 The Committee heard of several examples of specialist consumer 
electronic products, and also various ‘consumables’ which also appear to 
be subject to significant price differences. Mr Douglas Linacre compared 
the costs for Epson printers and printer cartridges and found differences 
of more than 100 per cent.38 Mr Phil Festa described a price difference of 
between 40 and 50 per cent on a brand of electronic ‘fish finders’, 
suggesting that this is because only one Australian wholesaler holds 
distribution rights.39 The Committee also received several inquiries from 
consumers who wished to provide submissions describing their 
experiences of price discrimination with purchasing electronic goods, 
including cameras and electrical equipment, but the Committee has 
maintained its focus on IT-specific goods.40 
2.51 In his submission, Australian web developer Mr Daniel Myles stated that 
price differences exist in IT and gaming hardware. For Lenovo and 
Alienware laptops, Mr Myles claims there are price differences from 60 to 
 
36  Choice, Submission 75, p. 23. 
37  Choice, Submission 75, pp. 23-24. 
38  Douglas Linacre, Submission 103, pp. 1-2. 
39  Phil Festa, Submission 20, p. 1. 
40  See, for example, Daniel Myles, Submission 33, p. 17, regarding costs for digital cameras and 
accessories. 
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100 per cent; for Sony’s PlayStation Vita or the PlayStation 3 console, there 
are price differences of 40 per cent; and the Nintendo 3DS costs 45 per cent 
more in Australia than in the US.41 
2.52 As noted earlier in this chapter, ‘geoblocking’ is a term which can be 
applied to the means by which Australian consumers are restricted from 
accessing a cheaper global marketplace. The Committee heard several 
examples of geoblocking in sales of IT hardware and software products. In 
the case of IT hardware, geoblocking may be the result of exclusive 
distribution agreements, in which manufacturers assign the rights to 
distribute their products in a given territory. Evidence suggests that 
Australian consumers’ access to global markets for IT hardware may in 
fact be shrinking as more manufacturers implement such agreements.42 
Competition issues are considered in chapter 4 of this report. 
Software and digital downloads 
2.53 Evidence presented to the Committee suggests that price discrimination is 
most acute in the case of digitally delivered content – including software, 
music, games, and books. In these sectors the products delivered are 
essentially identical when downloaded in Australia, the United States or 
elsewhere. Digital delivery also means that there are no costs for 
packaging, shipping and physical delivery, and many consumers question 
the reasons for large price differentials between Australian and overseas 
markets. This section therefore reflects evidence received on software 
pricing in general, as well as products available as digital downloads. 
2.54 Choice compared the prices of more than fifty software products, focusing 
on Microsoft and Adobe, comparing Australian and US prices, using data 
collected in 2008 and in mid-2012. Across more than thirty Microsoft 
software products, Choice data showed consistently higher prices in 
Australia for substantially identical products, with Australians paying an 
average 49 per cent more than US customers. According to Choice, 
Microsoft Office products, including Microsoft Word, Excel, and Access 
were more than 30 per cent more expensive in Australia, while the various 
iterations of Microsoft’s popular Windows 7 operating system were 40 to 
50 per cent more expensive.43 
2.55 In relation to Adobe software, the Choice submission also revealed 
significant price differences, although Adobe’s prices displayed more 
variability. Adobe’s standard Creative Suite 6 products showed a 
 
41  Daniel Myles, Submission 33, pp. 10, 16-17. 
42  Andrew Boisen, Submission 3, p. 1. 
43  Choice, Submission 75, pp. 16-18. 
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relatively consistent price differential of 60 to 65 per cent.44 ACCAN also 
noted price disparities for Adobe products, finding that, on average and 
assuming the Australian dollar is at parity with the US dollar, Adobe’s 
range of standard, perpetual-license products were 48 per cent more 
expensive in Australia.45  
2.56 Choice noted that Adobe also sells discounted ‘student edition’ licenses 
which permit tertiary students to purchase its software at substantially 
reduced prices. When student editions were taken into account, Choice 
data showed a price difference of only 17 per cent.46 
2.57 Many consumer submissions raised the issue of geoblocking practised by 
Apple, both in relation to its own hardware and for content licensed 
through its iTunes store.47 To maintain the separation of national markets, 
Apple requires a mailing address and credit card at the point of purchase. 
2.58 The Committee was advised that, in addition to requiring its resellers to 
verify a customer’s location at the time of purchase, Autodesk, a leading 
3D design software vendor, requires customers to make contact after 
purchase to obtain a license key. In this way geoblocking is maintained 
even if a customer initially circumvents the reseller’s efforts at market 
segmentation.48 
Professional software 
2.59 In relation to professional software, Mr Myles’ submission shared 
concerns expressed by Choice and ACCAN: significant price differences 
exist in relation to Adobe software, Microsoft software and some Apple 
products, although Apple’s move toward more equitable prices for its 
hardware is noted.49 Impacts of geoblocking apply in this sector, as 
indicated in submissions. 
2.60 Mr Nic Watt, Creative Director of Nnooo, an Australian video game 
developer, drew the Committee’s attention to significantly higher prices 
for Autodesk’s Maya 2013 3D visualisation software. Nnooo must also 
purchase Adobe software to create and edit images and vector graphics: 
As a games developer for PlayStation (Sony), Wii U (Nintendo) 
and Nintendo 3DS we have to use one of these packages to be able 
to create and export our 3D artwork into our games. 
 
44  Choice, Submission 75, pp. 18-19. 
45  ACCAN, Submission 74, pp. 14-16. 
46  Choice, Submission 75, pp. 18-19. 
47  See, for example, Daniel Myles, Submission 33, p. 14; Kyle Ridley-Smith, Submission 61, p. 1; 
Paul Barker, Submission 70, p. 1. 
48  Nnooo, Submission 114, p. 2. 
49  Daniel Myles, Submission 33, pp. 10-15. 
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Like Autodesk there are no serious competitors and so for making 
textures (images to put onto a 3D model) for use in games we are 
required to use their products… 50 
2.61 According to Mr Watt, Australian businesses must pay nearly 45 per cent 
more for Autodesk software, in an industry without significant 
competition.  
[Autodesk] have in the last 7 years purchased the three main 3D 
visualisation packages used for making films, TV and video games 
… the net result of this is that we have to buy the software from 
[Autodesk] Australia and they control the pricing. We cannot buy 
a competing product as in our industry they own the major ones.51 
2.62 Mr Ron Rennex characterised the price differential for Autodesk’s 
computer assisted design software AutoCAD as ‘appalling’.52 Mr Paul 
Bicknell noted the price differentials for a digitally downloaded copy of 
Autodesk’s computer-aided-design software Autocad LT: 
I have recently bought 5 licences for Autocad LT. Again delivered 
over the net Australian price $1775.00 per licence. Yet if I was in 
America I could buy these licences for $1200. The cost of me doing 
business in Australia was nearly $3000 based on the location of 
where I was clicking the buy button from.53 
2.63 Cybertext Consulting, a specialist technical writing and online 
documentation firm based in Western Australia, uses Adobe products. 
According to Managing Director, Ms Rhonda Bracey:  
As someone living in Australia, I cannot buy these downloadable 
products from the Adobe store at the US prices –Adobe will not 
take my Australian credit card, nor will it accept my Australian 
address. When I try to enter these details, the Adobe website 
forces me to the Australian Adobe online store webpages, where 
the prices are incredibly inflated over those available to US 
customers.54 
2.64 The Choice submission highlighted the largest price difference unearthed 
in the course of the inquiry. Australian software developers who wished 
to purchase Visual Studio Ultimate software with full Microsoft Developer 
Network membership were charged A$20,775, whereas American 
developers could obtain the same products for US$11,899, a difference of 
 
50  Nnooo, Submission 114, p. 4. 
51  Nnooo, Submission 114, pp. 2, 4. 
52  Ron Rennex, Submission 104, p. 1. 
53  Paul Bicknell, Submission 39, pp. 1-2. 
54  Cybertext Consulting, Submission 35, p. 3. 
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more than $8,600. Choice noted that ‘[f]or this amount, it would be 
cheaper to employ someone for 46 hours at the price of $21.30 per hour 
and fly them the US and back at your expense – twice’.55 
Other specialist software 
2.65 ACCAN noted price disparities in products designed to facilitate disabled 
access (braille readers, assistive devices, etc.). ACCAN examined prices for 
HumanWare assistive devices, noting: 
 HumanWare’s BrailleNote range of products showed consistent 
increases of 20 to 30 per cent, with prices difference of up to $2,300.  
 SmartView video magnifiers ranged from 4 per cent more expensive 
(i.e. close to parity) to nearly 30 per cent more expensive. 
 The DeafBlind Communicator products were approximately 25 per cent 
more expensive in Australia.56 
2.66 Mr Barry Napthine drew the Committee’s attention to price disparities 
faced by Australians who wish to purchase software to assist the visually 
impaired. Mr Napthine’s screen reading JAWS (Job Access with Speech) 
software is regularly updated with new features. To gain access to these 
updates, JAWS customers may purchase a ‘Software Maintenance 
Agreement (SMA) which permits them to access a number of updates. 
Mr Napthine said:  
My complaint is very simple. If I lived in America the cost would 
be considerably less. In America the cost of an SMA was in 
December last year $120, I paid to Vision Australia $205. Given 
that at the time the Australian dollar was about parity with the 
American dollar I find the price difference hard to accept.57 
2.67 Submitters also drew the Committee’s attention to large price differences 
faced by businesses which use geographical information system (GIS) 
software. GIS software is used by a wide range of businesses, including 
mining companies, engineers, local councils, environmental organisations, 
and various other institutions. Submissions from users of GIS software 
noted that prices for ArcView, a leading GIS software package sold by 
ESRI, are significantly higher for Australian businesses. According to 
Mr Pierre Rousseau: 
In April 2012 I was quoted $4000 for a package (ArcView) that is 
sold for $1500 in the U.S. When I queried the sales person on the 
matter he was clear that it was a matter of regional pricing and 
 
55  Choice, Submission 75, p. 19. 
56  ACCAN, Submission 74, p. 17. 
57  Barry Napthine, Submission 25, p. 1. 
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that their license conditions do not permit me to buy the software 
in the United States, which compelled me to pay the asking price.58 
2.68 Mr Greg Keeley noted that similar price discrepancies exist for users of 
other GIS software:  
Good examples are MapInfo and ArcInfo ….common GIS software 
used for example by most mining companies, local councils and 
planners in Australia…In the case of MapInfo, it is only available 
from Pitney Bowes in Australia and at much higher prices than 
elsewhere on the planet. If you attempt to buy it from outside 
Australia the supplier will refuse to send it to an Australian 
address.59 
2.69 J Mahuika drew the Committee’s attention to price differentials charged 
by the providers of online training courses:  
As an alternative to classroom-based training, many training 
courses can be purchased online, including training provided by 
companies for their own software products. 
I have found examples of public courses where the Australian 
price is higher than the US price by between 27 per cent and 50 per 
cent. In these examples, the courses appear to be the same delivery 
format, topics and duration, but are displayed on ‘Country’ 
specific web pages with differences in the course code (where the 
Australia course code has the suffix ‘AU’) and pricing.60 
2.70 Price differences were also noted for software and hardware for children’s 
use. Mr Greg Bell described products by Leapfrog, which sells portable 
gaming devices and downloadable applications for them, which can be 
accessed through its proprietary gateway Leapfrog Connect. Mr Bell said:  
I recently purchased an app called ‘Explorer™ Game App: Globe: 
Earth Adventures’ for $45, by nominating Australia as my country 
during the checkout procedure. A quick internet search for the 
same app shows it is $25 in the United States.61 
Ongoing subscription costs 
2.71 Submissions to the inquiry also drew the Committee’s attention to price 
differentials in a range of product categories where subscriptions must be 
purchased. Mr James Rudd, for example, highlighted large price 
 
58  Pierre Rousseau, Submission 110, p. 1. 
59  Greg Keeley, Submission 102, p. 1. 
60  J Mahuika, Submission 68, p. 1. 
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differences faced by software developers when purchasing subscriptions 
to Microsoft’s TechNet and the Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN). A 
Microsoft TechNet subscription provides licenses to nearly all Microsoft 
applications. IT professionals may require such a subscription to develop 
or maintain professional skills; businesses may require one for use in 
creating a ‘development environment’ to safely test new software or 
changes to their IT operating environment.  
2.72 Mr Rudd found that TechNet subscriptions cost approximately 75 per cent 
more in Australia when compared to the equivalent US price.62 In relation 
to MSDN subscriptions, which provide access to Microsoft programming 
tools for software developers, Mr Rudd said: 
The prices of MSDN subscriptions are significantly higher than 
that of TechNet subscriptions, but the price difference of paying 
75 per cent more than the USA remains the same. This means for 
Visual Studio Ultimate 2010 with MSDN, you will be paying 
A$20,775 in Australia and US$11,899 in the United States, or 
US$10,518 through Amazon.63 
2.73 Mr David Poole highlighted the fact that Australian consumers of digital 
news content can face significantly higher costs. Mr Poole noted that 
Australian subscribers to The Economist magazine pay 23 per cent more 
than subscribers in the UK, and 77 per cent more than subscribers in the 
US. Although The Economist produces several regional editions, Mr Poole 
notes that they contain substantially identical content.64 Mr Leonard 
Cronin raised similar concerns in relation to New Scientist magazine 
subscription costs.65 
Music 
2.74 Downloadable music was a prominent theme of complaints about price 
discrimination. It is undisputed that the internet has transformed the way 
in which consumers can buy, store and listen to music. Although many of 
the consumer concerns described in submissions focus on Apple iTunes, 
the Committee extended its consideration to other suppliers of digital 
music, in recognition of the fact that the contemporary music market is 
diverse and rapidly expanding. After canvassing consumer concerns, 
responses from music industry and IT representatives will be considered 
in chapter 3. 
 
62  James Rudd, Submission 40, p. 3. 
63  James Rudd, Submission 40, p. 1. 
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2.75 Launched in 2003, iTunes, an online digital media storefront developed by 
Apple, has been the biggest music vendor in the US since April 2008, and 
the biggest music vendor in the world since February 2010.66 By February 
2013, the store had sold over 25 billion songs. On average 15,000 songs are 
downloaded per minute from a catalogue of over 26 million songs that are 
available in 119 countries.67  
2.76 Individual songs are priced at several ‘tiers’ in the Australian and US 
iTunes stores. In the US store, songs can be priced at US$0.69, $0.99, or 
$1.29. In Australia, the equivalent tiers are A$1.19, $1.69 and $2.19. The 
majority of the price comparisons for individual tracks sold through the 
iTunes store showed prices of US$1.29 and A$2.19 respectively – a mark-
up of 67 per cent.68 
2.77 Choice compared the prices of 50 individual songs and 20 ‘classic’ albums 
in the Australian and US iTunes stores. The data showed that songs were, 
on average, 51 per cent more expensive in Australia, while the median 
price difference for the songs was 67 per cent. The Choice data showed a 
similar mark-up for a selection of 20 ‘classic’ albums. Prices in the 
Australian iTunes store ranged from A$8.99 to $29.99, though the majority 
of albums were priced at $16.99. In the US store, prices ranged from 
US$7.99 to $16.99, with a majority of albums priced at or around the $9.99 
mark. On average Australians were charged 51 per cent more for an 
album.69 
2.78 Choice’s Mr Matthew Levey referred to the ‘dominance of iTunes in the 
Australian market, as in any market that has a player of that size, is a 
factor [influencing prices], but we would also suggest that prices for 
recorded music have been artificially high in Australia for a long time’.70  
2.79 The Committee is aware of music subscription services, from free music 
access (i.e. advertising supported models) to paid subscriptions which 
deliver music to multiple platforms (i.e. mobile devices and computers). 
Further, a plethora of web and streaming services such as YouTube, 
Soundcloud and Bandcamp, offer access to music in various forms. 
 
66  Apple Media Releases, 3 April 2008, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03iTunes-
Store-Top-Music-Retailer-in-the-US.html; and 25 February 2010, 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2010/02/25iTunes-Store-Tops-10-Billion-Songs-
Sold.html.  
67  Apple Media Release, 6 February 2013, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2013/02/06iTunes-
Store-Sets-New-Record-with-25-Billion-Songs-Sold.html. 
68  Choice, Submission 75, pp. 7-10. 
69  Choice, Submission 75, pp. 10-11. None of the albums compared in the Choice submission is a 
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2.80 A common theme of these consumer complaints was incredulity as to the 
size of price differences between Australia and the United States for 
identical music downloaded from a digital shopfront. This perspective 
was summed up by Choice which, in its written submission, observed 
that:  
It is important to note that these products are identical and are 
delivered directly to consumers through a means which bypasses 
many production and overhead costs, such as rent, distribution 
and labour…. Choice does not believe that a price difference of 
50 per cent is justifiable.71 
2.81 Scepticism is not confined to consumer advocacy groups. The Committee 
also noted the Productivity Commissions’ conclusion in its retail industry 
report that argues justifying higher prices for digitally delivered content 
are ‘not persuasive’.72 
Games 
2.82 Choice compared the prices for a number of computer games, again 
finding substantial price differentials. The submission compared the prices 
of 20 recent and new-release games sold on EB Games’ Australian website 
against the same company’s US website. Only one game – The Elder Scrolls 
V: Skyrim – was at parity with the US, while the majority of games were 
between 40 per cent to 90 per cent more expensive on the Australian 
website.73 
2.83 Digitally distributed games showed even larger price differences. The 
Choice submission highlighted price differentials for games sold through 
‘Steam’, a popular online-only games platform, and showed consistently 
higher prices in Australia compared to the US for substantially identical 
digitally delivered content. The worst price differentials on Steam can be 
200 to 300 per cent more expensive in Australia. Choice highlighted the 
ten products with the biggest price differences: 
The average price difference for these 10 games is 232 per cent, 
even though, like the iTunes products, they can be delivered with 
minimal rental, labour and distribution costs.74 
2.84 Mr Myles’ submission echoed Choice’s concerns, identifying price 
differences in digitally downloaded games, particularly those distributed 
 
71  Choice, Submission 75, p. 12. 
72  Productivity Commission Inquiry Report: Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian 
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73  Choice, Submission 75, pp. 13-15. 
74  Choice, Submission 75, p. 13. 
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through the Steam store and through Electronic Arts’ competing Origin 
store.75 Mr Dane Weber observes that: 
… ‘Steam’ …provides a virtual storefront and service for 
publishers to sell their content. Publishers are allowed to set their 
price, and given different currencies, can price their products 
accordingly. As such, the Australian Steam store frequently suffers 
extreme price discrimination by publishers, occasionally having 
games pulled to be re-priced higher.76 
2.85 Valve Corporation, the US-based company which owns Steam, does not 
set game prices on Steam (except for games it publishes itself). As 
Mr Dmitry Brizhinev noted:  
Valve, the owners of Steam, are not directly responsible for these 
prices. Instead, they allow the publisher of the game to choose 
what price they want the game to be sold at. In particular, games 
that Valve itself publishes are always sold at fair prices in the US 
and in Australia. It is also worth noting that Steam prices are 
unaffected by GST and it costs almost nothing to produce a purely 
digital copy, so it makes even less sense for them to be higher.77 
2.86 Steam is not the only digital delivery platform that charges Australian 
consumers more for games. Mr Scott Sutherland pointed out that 
Australian consumers buying direct from the publishers’ website can also 
be forced to pay higher prices.78 The price disparities for digitally 
delivered content are, as Mr Matthew Kermeen observed, ‘highly 
perplexing’ to many consumers:  
… purchasing games online via a service such as Steam 
(http://www.steampowered.com) or console-based marketplace 
platforms such as Microsoft’s Xbox Live or Sony’s Playstation 
Network Store, the localisation and distribution costs should be 
void. However in a recent example, the game Max Payne 3 
launched at US$49.99, available via download from Steam. An 
Australian customer purchasing this exact same game via Steam is 
expected to pay A$89.99, almost double the price for the exact 
same product, delivered in the exact same manner.79 
2.87 In some cases price disparities in relation to digitally delivered games are 
so large that it can be substantially cheaper for Australian consumers to 
 
75  Daniel Myles, Submission 33, pp. 6-9. 
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purchase a physical copy of new release games from a UK-based online 
store and have it shipped 15,000km to Australia. Mr Scott Nelson, for 
example, recounts finding a then new-release game, Mass Effect 3, on sale 
at Electronic Arts’ ‘Origin’ digital store for A$79.99, while a physical copy 
could be purchased and shipped to Australia from the UK-based 
ozgameshop.com for A$38.99.80 
2.88 The Steam store displays Australian prices based on a customer’s IP 
address, so that by default Australians will not see cheaper US prices. 
Steam enforces regional pricing through the use of credit card information 
so that Australian consumers cannot easily circumvent their geoblocking 
by using a virtual private network (VPN) to obscure their geographical 
location. Steam also uses its Terms of Service agreement as the basis for 
blocking the accounts of consumers who circumvent its geoblocking 
mechanisms.81 Mr Scott Sutherland outlines a different kind of 
geoblocking experience with: 
I tried to buy a copy of a new game in May called ‘Diablo 3’. The 
fastest way to get this game is to purchase it from their website. 
On the US website the game is advertised for US$60 = A$58. But 
when I go to buy I am redirected to the Australian website and the 
game is A$80.82  
Books 
2.89 While impacts on library users are considered in a later section of this 
chapter, this section describes some general observations made in 
evidence about e-books, which are also susceptible to price discrimination. 
Many submissions highlighted higher costs faced by Australian 
consumers. The Australian Digital Alliance and the Australian Libraries 
Copyright Committee (ADA/ALCC), for example, compared the prices of 
a random sample of 48 books. It found that: 
On average, it appears Australian libraries pay approximately 
58 per cent more for print books than they are priced in the US, 
and 44 per cent more for e-books. For some e-books, libraries in 
Australia may be charged as much as 191 per cent more than that 
e-book is priced in the US.83 
2.90 After analysing the price of 35 titles from the New York Times best seller 
list, Mr Jeff Burgess noted that:  
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… there is good evidence of a pattern of price discrimination 
against e-book buyers in Australia…. many of the Australian 
e-book prices are substantially higher than the e-book price in 
other countries/regions. This is despite the fact that the e-book is 
listed, sold on, and downloaded from the same USA-based 
website and servers for every country/region.84 
2.91 Mr John Dulley, on behalf of a group of Australian customers of the 
American e-book vendor Amazon, compared the prices of 100 popular 
e-book titles sold on Amazon.com. He found that when all publishers 
were taken together, Australians paid 16 per cent more than consumers in 
the US, and 32 per cent more than consumers in the UK. His results 
showed high variability between publishers: Harper Collins books were 
cheaper in Australia, while Penguin and Pan Macmillan books were 
38 per cent and 26 per cent more expensive respectively. Independently 
published books – known as ‘indies’ – were significantly cheaper, 
according to Mr Dulley, with prices ‘virtually the same in all countries’.85 
2.92 Ms Julie Jester noted that e-book prices have risen significantly faster in 
Australia, subsequent to the ‘agency agreement’ which gave publishers 
price-setting control:  
Initially average e-book prices in the Australian region were close 
to prices in most other regions in the world. The Agency 
Agreement, introduced in April 2010, caused minor price 
increases, particularly on new releases.  
The Australian region price increases, in December 2011, took 
e-book prices to well above most of the other regional prices, 
making Australian e-books the highest priced e-books in the 
world. Furthermore many e-books are now priced higher than the 
paper editions.86 
2.93 Dr Andrew Leigh MP noted in his submission that there are also 
significant limitations on Australian consumers’ ability to purchase e-book 
readers, and, further, that Australian consumers can access a more limited 
selection of titles than consumers in other jurisdictions.87 
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Impacts on consumers 
2.94 This chapter has noted the enormous impact of the internet and other IT 
developments on Australians’ lives. It has also discussed aspects of 
international price discrimination, which while not new, are continuing to 
impact on charges levied on Australian consumers for a range of products 
and services. This section will review evidence from individuals and 
community organisations which suggests that the price differences 
described above have tangible, and negative, impacts on people’s lives. 
2.95 The Committee notes the irony inherent in digital development, an area 
identified and discussed at length in other forums.88 While Australians are 
aware that the internet, including the National Broadband Network 
(NBN), will have a transformative impact on the economy and society, 
including the circumstances of the most isolated and socially 
disadvantaged people, access to web-based services is all-important. If 
people are experiencing isolation, social disadvantage, financial 
difficulties, or other challenges, perhaps even relating to their business, 
and are not able to access affordable IT, their situation is likely to get 
worse. 
2.96 The Committee notes that its terms of reference ask it to consider the 
impacts of IT pricing on business, government and households; but there 
are many other groups within the community who have expressed their 
interest in the issues considered by the inquiry. The Committee 
acknowledges the input from those groups, including those who have 
presented the Committee with personal experiences to clearly illustrate 
the challenges faced by many in our community.  
Consumers with low incomes 
2.97 ACCAN’s submission to the Committee observed that: 
Hardware and software has become essential to participation in a 
modern society. A computer and additional software is often 
needed to search for a job and self-administration for government 
income support payments is being moved online. Australians who 
cannot afford high prices for IT products will be restricted in the 
way they participate in our increasingly digital economy.89 
2.98 Care Inc, a Canberra-based financial counselling service, observed in its 
submission that its clients who are experiencing financial hardship have 
 
88  The nature of the ‘digital divide’ and the ‘digital dividend’ have been well canvassed, and the 
current inquiry does not seek to duplicate or revise earlier observations and conclusions.  
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little capacity to access IT products. ‘A new computer’ (even second hand) 
is often stated by clients of financial counselling as something on the ‘wish 
list’.90 
2.99 Care Inc noted that access to IT products can be a barrier for people 
experiencing financial hardship, and particularly for those consumers who 
have medical and other health issues. While some people are able to access 
the internet through their local library or employment service providers, 
these environments are shared, often require ‘bookings’ and the 
organisation of transportation and ‘do not reflect the way that technology 
is used in our community’.91 
2.100 Care Inc notes that low income earners or people who cannot access credit 
through the mainstream market may attempt to avoid expensive upfront 
IT costs by resorting to rental or lease agreements; contracts which are 
‘enormously expensive’, thereby paying significantly more in the longer 
term.92  
2.101 The Committee acknowledges ACCAN’s observation that ‘the cost of 
hardware and software is a major concern for not-for-profits’,93 
organisations with limited and often low income who seek to provide 
services to support individuals in need of assistance. Connecting Up is an 
Australian not-for-profit organisation which seeks to build the capacity of 
the not-for-profit sector by ‘reducing their IT costs, providing educational 
material and practical workshops and events’.94 
2.102 Connecting Up draws on partnerships with key IT product providers to 
provide, subject to eligibility criteria, ‘industry-standard software and 
hardware at a greatly reduced cost’. The products are provided through 
existing Charity Licensing schemes or through direct negotiations with 
technology vendors, including Microsoft, Adobe and Symantec. 
Connecting Up note that through this discount program, ‘not-for-profit 
[organisations] can save up to 50 per cent off their products’.95 
2.103 According to Connecting Up, not-for-profit organisations would benefit 
from a greater awareness that they can potentially access free or 
discounted technology. Connecting Up also notes the increasing 
importance of access to high-speed broadband as cloud services develop, 
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and further argues that not-for-profits may need government grants to 
assist in the acquisition of IT infrastructure.96  
Higher education sector 
2.104 Australia’s 39 universities have a combined enrolment of more than one 
million students, and employ more than 100,000 staff. ‘University 
expenditure accounts for 1.6 per cent of GDP, which in turn benefits 
students, staff, industry, and the wider community.’97 Over the past few 
decades, the education sector has become ever more reliant on information 
technology. Monash University noted that, for higher education 
institutions and the students that they educate, IT is of increasing 
importance to daily operations.98 
2.105 It is estimated by the Council of Australian University Directors of 
Information Technology (CAUDIT) that ‘collectively, CAUDIT member 
institutions spend approximately A$1.5 billion on ICT products and 
services annually’.99 The Committee would have liked to have heard more 
from the Australian higher education sector in relation to IT procurement, 
to provide a greater range of views, but is aware of some reluctance to 
participate in this inquiry for fear of jeopardising ongoing and future 
contract negotiations with major IT vendors. 
2.106 According to Monash University’s Annual Report 2012, Monash 
University spends approximately $32 million each year on IT products 
and services.100 Of this IT operations budget, approximately 10 per cent is 
spent on software from some 100 suppliers. Monash stated that there is 
‘clear anecdotal evidence’ that software costs are higher for the Australian 
higher education sector than for comparable institutions overseas.101 
Monash described how it had ‘carried out some sample price assessments 
with a UK comparator university and concluded that, on average and on 
current exchange rates and eliminating sales tax difference, our 
underlying unit costs for hardware are 20 to 30 per cent higher’.102 
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2.107 In explaining why IT costs for higher educational institutions in Australia 
might be more expensive the Monash University submission stated that:  
From the perspective of the individual student or indeed 
individual university, these differentials are created by well-
known commercial forces. These forces add up to asymmetry of 
information and bargaining power between the vendor and the 
consumer.103 
2.108 As noted earlier in this chapter, the presence of cloud computing has 
impacts for users. Monash University noted that while cloud services can 
indeed offer flexibility for consumers and IT vendors, subscription 
services may have downsides: 
The emergence of cloud approaches has increased the range of 
options available to customers and at the same time created new 
opportunities for vendors to achieve step changes in their value 
proposition. It would be naïve not to recognise that although 
cloud solutions may reduce headline costs to the customer, 
vendors would not pursue the approach if it did not improve their 
returns (creating artificially high costs to customer).104 
Impacts on students 
2.109 Monash University’s submission to the Committee also highlighted 
financial pressures on university students who ‘manage finite and often 
limited resources whilst studying’: 
At Monash, approximately 12 per cent of the domestic 
undergraduate student population come from a low socio-
economic background. For this cohort, meeting living and study-
related costs can be very challenging.105 
2.110 Monash noted that universities are increasingly using ‘… electronic 
delivery of content and collaboration environments. In light of these 
changes, the need for students to have easy access to contemporary IT 
tools increases, as do the attendant financial challenges.’106 Monash further 
noted: 
The proportion of students affected by difficulty in paying for 
communications costs is higher than one might imagine, with 
43 per cent of respondents to a recent National Union of Student 
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survey stated that they struggle to pay communication costs from 
their normal income.107 
2.111 Monash University is concerned that for ‘…some talented prospective 
students from low socio-economic backgrounds, the costs of IT in 
Australia will add to their decision not to take up Higher Education’.108 
The Committee notes Monash’s suggestion that options be examined to 
allow students to purchase necessary IT equipment through an 
arrangement such as Higher Education Loan Program, and would be 
interested to see any progress in this area. 
 
Recommendation 2 
 Considering the importance of IT products to education, and in the 
interests of greater transparency in this area, the Committee 
recommends that the Australian Government, in consultation with 
Universities Australia and CAUDIT, conduct a comprehensive study of 
the future IT needs of and costs faced by Australian Universities, in 
order to provide clearer financial parameters for negotiations. 
People living with disability 
2.112 While the evidence provided to the Committee is largely anecdotal, the 
Committee accepts that concerns expressed by individuals were genuine, 
and reflect a growing awareness that many IT products, hardware and 
software, designed for people with disability are expensive, and often cost 
significantly more in Australia than overseas.109 Mr Wayne Hawkins of 
ACCAN told the Committee that: 
… the higher price that consumers in Australia pay is detrimental 
to all consumers, but there is a significantly higher impact on 
vulnerable consumers and particularly consumers with disability. 
The research that is available shows us that Australians living with 
disability are overrepresented in the low income socioeconomic 
groupings, and these higher prices significantly impede their 
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access to all of the vital services that are now being provided 
online with telecommunications.110  
2.113 Such products include optical character recognition software systems used 
to scan printed materials, screen readers that provide either speech or 
braille output, magnification software to enlarge text, adapted keyboards, 
on-screen keyboards and voice recognition software and alternative 
communication programs.111 The way in which Ms Faye Galbraith 
described the importance of modern IT hardware and software to support 
children with disability to communicate, play games, and participate in 
education, showed the Committee the necessity of such assistive devices: 
There are a multitude of apps available to assist kids with 
disabilities, to communicate, play and learn. … It’s important to 
mention that for some of us, technology isn’t a desirable object, it’s 
an absolute necessity. It promotes communication, inclusion and 
independence.112 
2.114 Mr Hawkins outlined his own experiences arising from the comparatively 
high cost of IT products to assist people with disability, describing vastly 
different prices for screen reading software which is available as a digital 
download.113  
2.115 ACCAN argued in its submission that many people with disabilities are 
amongst the most economically disadvantaged members in our 
community. The requirement for specialist equipment to support their 
disability makes it more likely that they will be unemployed and on a 
Disability Support Pension.114 A member of Blind Citizens Australia 
contributing to the ACCAN submission to the inquiry noted that: 
It is not unreasonable to conclude that high prices for disability IT 
equipment has contributed to the high levels of unemployment 
experienced by people with disability and made social interaction 
and study more difficult. Any effort to align prices to the lower 
rates seen in other markets could play a role in increasing 
employment or social inclusion for this disadvantaged group.115 
2.116 IT products are important, indeed essential, to people with disability. 
However ACCAN pointed out that: 
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Unlike other countries, there is no legislated right for people with 
disabilities to have access to technology they require for daily 
living that can assist them in participating in the community.116 
2.117 The Committee heard from ACCAN that even where IT products are 
purchased overseas, local warranty and service arrangements are 
important considerations: 
If [consumers with disability] can save a couple of thousand 
dollars from what the price is in Australia by buying it overseas 
then that is fantastic, but when they do that they do not have 
backup warranty and service agreements, so then they are 
disadvantaged if something goes wrong with the equipment.117 
2.118 The submission of the ADA/ALCC urged the Committee to ‘take into 
account not only the prohibitive costs of IT hardware and software for 
Australians with disabilities, but other ways in which digital content 
providers may restrict (or exclude outright) their enjoyment of content’.118 
2.119 ACCAN argued that Australia’s small domestic market disadvantages 
individual consumers who need specialised IT products: 
In most cases consumers lack any choice when shopping for 
disability specific hardware and software … This is also the case 
for other disability specific pieces of hardware and software and is 
likely due to the fact that specialised equipment is aimed at a small 
section of the market in Australia, which is a small domestic 
market compared to the USA or UK.119 
2.120 Similarly Ms Galbraith expressed concerns: 
We hear many excuses for anti-competitive practice by disability 
equipment suppliers and IT retailers alike: a narrower market by 
nature of a smaller population; higher shipping costs; a virtually 
non-existent manufacturing industry.120 
Legal considerations and international obligations  
2.121 ACCAN suggested to the Committee that employment opportunities can 
be lost for people with disability because of the high cost to employers of 
making modifications to IT systems in the workplace: 
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Unfortunately, the high cost of much disability related equipment 
means that potential employers, educational institutions and 
service providers may be able to claim ‘unjustifiable hardship’ 
under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 and therefore 
attempt to legally refuse to hire, educate or provide services to 
people with disability.121 
2.122 In their evidence to the Committee both ACCAN and Dr Matthew 
Rimmer of the Australian National University highlighted Australia’s 
obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities.122 Dr Rimmer observed in his submission to the 
Committee: 
Lamentably, Australia’s copyright regime fails to adequately 
address the problem of disability discrimination, particularly in 
respect of copyright works in a digital form.123 
2.123 Dr Rimmer in his submission pointed out that ‘those with disabilities and 
their carers suffer problems in respect of access to knowledge’. He argues 
that under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, Australia has an obligation to ensure disabled persons are not 
discriminated against by copyright law and have access to ‘cultural 
materials’.124 Dr Rimmer noted the estimation by Disability Discrimination 
Commissioner Graeme Innes that ‘only 5 per cent of all books in Australia 
are published in accessible formats such as large print, audio or braille, 
while in developing countries it is just 1 per cent’.125 
2.124 ACCAN noted that while the Australian Government is committed to its 
own National Disability Strategy and a whole-of-government Social 
Inclusion Agenda, it does not have a comprehensive public procurement 
policy for accessible IT and that this undermines Australia’s commitment 
to its obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.126 
Public Procurement Policy 
2.125 ACCAN noted that public procurement of IT products, especially 
hardware and specialised software, would greatly assist people with 
disabilities, both in terms of affordability and access, and claimed that 
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‘Australia lags behind the majority of OECD countries, which have 
included IT accessibility criteria in their public procurement regimes.’127 
At the present time the Australian Government has no such policy in 
place, and ACCAN has called for its introduction. Such a policy, ACCAN 
claims, could be accessed by eligible persons, especially people with 
disability, either at discounted prices or as a benefit.128 
2.126 ACCAN argued that this program would also ultimately encourage more 
employers to hire disabled persons. Currently the price of the IT 
infrastructure required for disabled persons can in some instances be 
prohibitive for employers thus disadvantaging the disabled.129 
2.127 Although the Committee was not able to fully explore the issue of public 
procurement as a remedy for reducing the costs of accessible IT products 
for persons with disabilities, the Committee recommends that the 
Australian Government give consideration to adopting a whole-of-
government accessible IT procurement policy to improve the quality of life 
for people with disabilities and their carers. Noting the report Accessible 
Communications Tapping the Potential in Public ICT Procurement Policy, by 
the University of Wollongong and GSA Information Consultants in 
consultation with ACCAN,130 the Committee considers that such a scheme 
should be undertaken by relevant agencies including AGIMO (the 
Australian Government Information Management Office) and involve 
consultation with relevant stakeholder groups including ACCAN. 
 
 
127  ‘Accessible Communications: Tapping the potential in public ICT procurement policy’ 
Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, http://accan.org.au/files/Accessible_ 
Communications_Report_Accessible.doc, viewed 13 June 2013. 
128  Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, Submission 74, p. 12. 
129  Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, Submission 74, p. 12. 
130  ‘Accessible Communications: Tapping the potential in public ICT procurement policy’ 
Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, http://accan.org.au/files/ 
Accessible_Communications_Report_Accessible.doc, viewed 13 June 2013.  
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND CONSUMER IMPACTS 43 
 
Recommendation 3 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider a 
whole-of-government accessible IT procurement policy, to be developed 
by relevant agencies including AGIMO, and in consultation with 
relevant stakeholder groups including ACCAN. 
Library users 
2.128 As the ADA/ALCC noted, almost half of all Australians are members of 
public libraries, with some 114 million visits to libraries registered in 2009-
2010. Libraries often cater for low income earners such as the unemployed, 
students, pensioners, persons with disabilities, as well as people from non-
English speaking backgrounds.131 Most public libraries in Australia now 
offer internet access, providing access to digital information, government 
services, and subscription-only publications.132 
2.129 The ADA/ALCC submission explained that the provision of e-books 
presents many challenges for libraries, including the contracting away of 
rights available under Australian copyright law, lack of ability to access 
new release material, evolving business models that see pricing regimes 
changing regularly and lack of certainty about long term access to 
material.133 
2.130 The ADA/ALCC observed that:  
… there are few publishers offering an outright purchase model 
for e-book titles, and that in early 2012, Penguin Books without 
notice withdrew licensing for its e-book catalogue to Australian 
libraries via the aggregator Overdrive.134 
2.131 As well as noting the higher costs for e-books, discussed earlier in this 
chapter, the ADA/ALCC highlighted problems with access. Publishers 
may refuse to license e-books to libraries, or may withdraw access to their 
e-book catalogue. ADA/ALCC also highlighted recent licensing 
agreements that force libraries to purchase multiple copies of an e-book, 
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even if they require fewer copies.135 According to the ADA/ALCC 
submission: 
Some publishers currently refuse to license/sell e-books to 
Australian libraries at all – at any price. Further, e-books are 
generally only available to Australian libraries for as long as the 
publisher is willing to license them (or until the publisher goes out 
of business…) … 
Australian publisher Allen & Unwin recently amended their 
e-book licensing arrangements with large public library services 
and library consortia, mandating the purchase of multiple copies 
of any e-book, even where only one copy is desired. Until recently, 
the State Library of Western Australia (SLWA) could license one 
copy of an Allen & Unwin title for the WA public library network 
(restricted to single user access). The amended licensing 
arrangements mean SLWA would have to purchase 12 copies of 
any e-book (current release or backlist title), with a resultant 
impact on budget. Even if SLWA only wanted one copy of a 
particular e-book title, they would effectively pay 12 times the list 
price. These price differentials will adversely affect acquisitions 
policy in libraries; in particular, the breadth of e-books available to 
library users.136 
2.132 Representatives of the Australian publishing industry acknowledged that 
the availability of e-book licences to Australian libraries, costs and 
associated terms and conditions governing access to content by library 
users is in a state of flux. According to Mr Ross Gibb of Macmillan 
Australia: 
We are still trying to come up with the model for libraries. There 
are various products out there. The US have been struggling with 
this one—does the library buy the book once, have it forever and 
lend it as many times as it wants? That is not going to create much 
income for the publisher, nor particularly for the author. So we are 
trying to look at subscription models or models that allow a 
reasonable amount of usage and wherever it might go from there. 
There are time periods being set and different models being 
experimented with. I do not think there is an answer anywhere 
yet.137 
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2.133 For those who prefer to keep their reading collections on their own 
devices, rather than access them via a public library, the Committee noted 
with concern comments made by Mr Gibb, of Macmillan Australia, about 
ongoing access to cloud-based e-book services: access to a consumer’s e-
book library would continue for, ‘[a]s long as your e-reseller is going to 
maintain your library—so hopefully they stay in business’.138 
Small business owners 
2.134 As with many other sectors of society, business has become increasingly 
reliant on the use of IT products over the last few decades. Evidence 
presented to the Committee suggests that certain types of small 
businesses, such as those using niche software, may be significantly 
impacted by the higher cost of IT products, and particularly 
disadvantaged when ‘locked in’ to a particular suite of products. While 
large companies and governments may be able to negotiate more 
competitive prices for IT products, small business may be less able to shop 
around for alternative cheaper IT products; submissions expressed 
concern about barriers to choice and competition, and noted the 
consequent impact of higher prices on their international competitiveness. 
2.135 Mr Nic Watt, Nnooo’s Creative Director, argued that the layer of costs the 
company is forced to absorb significantly affects its international 
competitiveness: 
Australian [companies] in the film, TV and video games business 
are being unfairly financially penalised in comparison with their 
American counterparts. This makes it more expensive to do 
business in Australia and makes it hard to compete on a global 
stage.139  
2.136 Other software developers face similar problems and are obliged to absorb 
higher input costs. Mr James Rudd, an IT professional, noted in his 
submission that the suite of development tools provided to business by 
Microsoft can be significantly more expensive in Australia. Mr Rudd 
concluded that: 
These differences in price can significantly raise the cost of 
becoming an IT Professional or Developer and staying up to date 
on current technology. They disadvantage Australian businesses 
that use Visual Studio and MSDN to develop software by having a 
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much higher yearly fee for their development software compared 
to similar US businesses.140 
2.137 Freelance web designer Mr Peter Larkin argued that the competitive 
impact of higher IT prices is felt quite widely: 
A major impact is felt within the multimedia/web design 
community here, as local businesses find it hard to compete with 
our US counterparts given the tools (Adobe software) is so much 
more expensive for us to buy than it is for US-based 
companies…our ability to compete on a global level is 
compromised.141 
2.138 Australian Commercial and Media Photographers (ACMP) noted that 
many small businesses in the photographic industry consider they have 
no choice other than to purchase Adobe software and consequently have a 
keen sense of international price discrimination : 
Adobe provides an easily documentable but single example of 
how price differences, changed policies and new delivery models 
can create an added financial burden to our industry, which is 
significantly higher than our overseas counterparts. 
We believe that in an ever tightening market the price differences 
across the entire spectrum of equipment, software and 
consumables is making it increasingly difficult for the Australian 
photographic industry to operate their micro or small businesses 
and potentially affects the industry’s ability to compete equally on 
the world stage.142 
2.139 The ACMP position was supported by submissions from individual 
photographers, including Mr Christopher Shain: 
The photographs I produce are used all over the world and I 
compete with similar photographic businesses from other parts of 
the world, I’m not sure why my business costs are higher in 
Australia when the product and service are identical.143 
2.140 Mr Russell Zimmerman, Executive Director of the Australian Retail 
Association, acknowledged that it was possible for small businesses to 
source cheaper products overseas. However, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, warranty and support issues arise that are potentially more 
important for business than for individual consumers: 
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If [business] know they can get something at a cheaper price from 
overseas rather than buying it [here] and providing they feel that 
they can get some support services on it, they would. But then you 
have to understand that retailers also depend upon those kinds of 
products to make their businesses operate. So they would make 
sure there are some kinds of support services available before 
buying it. … If you have bought from overseas and no-one is going 
to help you then you would be reluctant to go down that path. … 
The consumer out there would say, ‘I am prepared to take the risk 
on those goods. I'll buy them from overseas and bring them in. I'll 
have to risk the warranty.’ It is a very valid selling point, and it is a 
point that we emphasise to our members, but it does not always 
work.144 
2.141 In terms of cloud computing costs, architect Mr Nicholas Fox noted in his 
submission that subscription-based cloud services are not an economical 
proposition for every customer, even when sold at a favourable 
introductory price: 
I generally upgrade the Adobe product every two or three years. 
This is a common practise among other users I know. Adobe are 
trying to get all of their users onto the Cloud, which will cost 
almost as much per year as a subscription or about three times the 
cost of my usual upgrades. For me this is not a fair or equitable 
solution.145 
2.142 The Committee notes recent media reports indicating that customers 
wishing to access Adobe’s full Creative Suite will not be permitted to 
purchase perpetual licenses as of its next release. The only way to access 
the range of products will be via a Creative Cloud subscription.146 Media 
reports indicate that consumer reaction to the decision has been mixed.147  
Impacts for Government procurement 
2.143 The Committee received evidence that the Australian Government also 
faces comparatively high prices for its IT products. AGIMO, part of the 
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Department of Finance and Deregulation, coordinates whole-of-
government procurement of IT hardware and software. AGIMO’s 
submission to the inquiry explained that ‘[e]xpenditure on procurement 
by departments and agencies is optimised by aggregating the volumes of 
goods and services purchased to attract better prices and value for 
money’.148 
2.144 In 2009 AGIMO entered into the Microsoft Volume Sourcing Arrangement 
(VSA) that provided pricing and licensing conditions for the supply of 
Microsoft products to the Australian Government over a four year period. 
The VSA provides for a volume discount from Microsoft’s government 
retail price in Australia. AGIMO advised that there are over 250,000 users 
and 290,000 devices covered by the VSA and that the arrangement was 
projected to achieve cost savings in excess of $90 million over its life.149 
2.145 AGIMO also emphasised that the Australian Government has nonetheless 
been obliged to pay significantly higher prices than counterparts overseas: 
At the time of signature, the exchange rate from the Australian 
dollar to the US dollar was $0.64. … At that time, the base 
Microsoft Australian Government prices were calculated as being 
about 13 per cent higher than equivalent US prices. Given 
variations between the US and Australian situations, this appeared 
reasonable.  
Following the improvement in the exchange rate over the past 
three years …the difference in the base government price means 
that the US Government is paying some 50 per cent less than the 
base government price in Australia. The Singapore Government 
prices also appear to be some 50 per cent below those charged to 
the Australian Government.150 
Committee comment 
2.146 After reviewing the evidence in submissions from consumers and 
industry groups, the Committee is of the view that in many cases 
Australian consumers are paying much more for IT products than 
consumers overseas. While the Committee notes the concerns of industry 
groups that price comparisons may not capture elements of consumers’ 
experience in purchasing IT products, the Committee is of the view that 
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the evidence before it is strongly indicative of a pattern of higher prices 
paid by Australian consumers.  
2.147 The Committee would have liked to have received more input from 
industry groups and IT providers in order to more effectively address the 
specific concerns expressed by consumers, however it notes that the 
evidence it received is consistent with other studies and inquiries where IT 
pricing has been considered. In particular the Committee notes Choice 
price comparisons conducted in 2008 and 2011,151 the Productivity 
Commission’s 2009 review of parallel import restrictions on books,152 and 
its 2011 report into the retail industry.153 
2.148 The Committee also notes that there is a range of reasons and methods by 
which Australian consumers are forced to pay higher prices for identical 
goods sold more cheaply in international markets. Some claim there is a 
lack of competition (either a limited range of purchasing options, or a 
limited range of distributors or licenses), and some describe price 
increases based on location, identified via credit card or other details 
which indicate that the purchase is being made in Australia. Submissions 
indicate that many consumers are acutely aware that they are being forced 
to pay higher prices for IT products based on their geographical location 
alone.  
2.149 In the Committee’s view, limited access to IT products in an increasingly 
interconnected society is a significant contributor to the social isolation 
and economic marginalisation of Australians, including those who are 
living with disability.  
2.150 Many submissions from consumer groups and individual consumers have 
argued that higher Australian IT prices reflect deliberate regional pricing 
strategies employed by major IT companies and content rights holders to 
maximise profit in the relatively small but affluent Australian market. 
Unsurprisingly, alert consumers have adopted various strategies to 
circumvent geoblocking and access lower prices overseas. While these are 
discussed in chapter 4, the Committee acknowledges that most, if not all, 
of these circumvention methods may violate the terms of service put in 
place by vendors and service providers. Some of them may even breach 
copyright, which may expose Australian consumers to civil and even 
criminal sanctions. 
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 3 
Explanations for IT price differences 
3.1 In chapter 2, the Committee concluded that Australian consumers and 
businesses do pay higher prices for many IT products when compared to 
comparable products sold in the United States. The terms of reference for 
this inquiry ask the Committee to investigate possible reasons for these 
price differences. 
3.2 The Committee has never entertained the notion of a single explanation 
for higher IT prices. The Committee has sought to examine the reasons 
given by business, consumers and other observers for the higher prices 
paid by Australian consumers for IT products and services. 
3.3 It is clear that a range of factors are involved and that these vary in effect 
from product to product. However, the Committee does consider it 
possible to draw conclusions about the validity and relative importance of 
the main explanations for the pattern of IT pricing in Australia.  
3.4 Industry groups and the majority of IT companies have argued that higher 
prices are caused by a range of factors which vary significantly depending 
on the market and the product and services in question. In addition to 
arguing that price comparisons are an unreliable measure of the value 
they provide to consumers, industry groups have argued that price 
differentials for a number of IT products are narrowing. 
3.5 Mr Russell Zimmerman, Executive Director of the Australian Retail 
Association (ARA) noted that there was evidence of ‘a substantial 
deflation in electronics and of software price reductions’, much of which 
could be attributed to changes in the value of the Australian dollar. 
Mr Zimmerman nonetheless noted that: 
… there are still clear disparities on many products and services. 
The real question is what do we believe is causing these? We 
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believe some of the reasons for this are tariff application and 
parallel importing, regulation, wages and supply chain.1 
3.6 The Australian Information Industry Association (AIIA) attributes high 
prices to general factors such as ‘local costs of doing business, retail 
support requirements, distribution chains and statutory and regulatory 
imposts’, as well as shipping costs, ‘training and marketing costs, again 
directly related to the cost of staff … [and] distribution costs, particularly 
in terms of import tariffs and coverage across a low density geography’.2 
Ms Suzanne Campbell, CEO of the AIIA, argued that prices for a range of 
IT products were falling:  
The Canon Consumer Digital Lifestyle Index—2nd Half 2011 reports 
that the average selling price for digital devices at Australian retail 
stores continued to fall, dropping 13½ per cent across all reported 
categories. This price decline sharply contrasts with overall 
inflation of 3.1 per cent.3 
The Committee notes that Ms Campbell’s claim does not address whether 
prices for these products were falling relative to prices in the US, just that 
they were falling. 
3.7 Initially, this chapter considers some general issues relating to price 
discrimination, including who sets prices of IT products. The Committee 
notes that there is no single agreed position among industry bodies. 
Several general reasons proposed by industry are then explored, namely 
claims about: 
 differences in advertised prices 
 relative market size 
 wages and occupancy costs 
 warranties and green schemes 
 exchange rates 
 channel partners, and 
 localisation costs. 
3.8 The chapter then considers some responses from representatives of major 
industry sectors and vendors to claims made by consumers, especially 
with regard to digitally delivered content. The chapter then concludes by 
surveying a range of industry views about how business operates in the 
current IT environment. 
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Responsibility for international price discrimination 
3.9 The Committee heard a range of evidence in relation to who sets prices for 
IT products, although few substantive submissions on this issue were 
received from individual IT retailers, nor did the ARA directly address the 
issue. While not seeking to revisit the comprehensive 2011 report of the 
Productivity Commission into the Retail Industry, the Committee notes 
that price discrimination can occur at various levels, against retailers at the 
distribution level: 
Specifically, this discrimination is in the form of brand owners or 
international suppliers/manufacturers charging higher prices to 
Australian retailers relative to the prices they charge to similar 
retailers in other regions. These comparatively higher international 
supplier prices are then passed on to consumers.4 
3.10 The Committee also notes the observation in the Productivity Commission 
report that: 
It is clear that international price discrimination is being practised 
against some Australian retailers, to the detriment of Australian 
consumers.5 
Addressing perceptions of price discrimination 
3.11 As noted earlier, the Committee is aware of many areas where industry 
explanations for significant price differences generally relate to the cost of 
doing business in Australia. These are described below, before a more 
detailed discussion of matters relating to digitally delivered content. 
Advertised prices 
3.12 The Committee acknowledges that some confusion about pricing exists 
because of different rules in various jurisdictions about including tax in 
advertised prices. In Australia, advertised prices must include GST, while 
in the United States advertised prices do not include sales taxes, which 
may differ across state jurisdictions. Mr Tony King, Vice President of 
Apple Australia, advised that: 
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When comparing prices it is important to remember that the US 
retail prices do not include sales tax. Here in Australia, of course, a 
price includes a 10 per cent GST. That fact alone is responsible for 
a great deal of confusion and has resulted in some inaccurate 
conclusions regarding our pricing.6  
Market size 
3.13 In broad terms, industry groups and IT companies argue that Australia’s 
economy is smaller than many comparable markets and that Australia is 
therefore a higher-cost environment in which to do business. 
Mr Zimmerman observed that: 
Australia is really a very small player in the global retail 
landscape, less than two per cent. In this respect, Australia is not 
able to leverage the same economies of scale as is often enjoyed by 
other markets such as the US or UK.7 
3.14 The Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 
(DBCDE) acknowledged that while Australian consumers are heavy users 
of technology, the small size of the Australian market may contribute to 
higher prices than in larger markets overseas: 
In comparison with other regions, Australia is not a major market 
for software and hardware. With a relatively small population, it 
cannot support the level of competition found, for example, in the 
US, which has about 14 times the population and about 15 times 
Australia’s GDP.8 
3.15 Microsoft noted that, while it only provides ‘guidance’ on recommended 
retail pricing to its channel partners, its guidance:  
…is impacted by market forces including but not limited to the 
size of the market, which affects supply and demand...9 
Wages and occupancy costs 
3.16 Industry submissions argued that wage and occupancy costs contribute to 
higher overall costs faced by companies selling IT products in Australia, 
especially products distributed through retail distribution channels.  
3.17 The AIIA submission pointed to higher wages as a driver of higher costs 
in Australia. The AIIA argued that wages have ‘risen dramatically’ in 
 
6  Tony King, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 22 March 2013, p. 1. 
7  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 27. 
8  Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE), Submission 
55, p. 4. 
9  Microsoft, Submission 67, p. 3. 
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recent years – both in absolute terms and in terms of purchasing power, as 
the Australian dollar has risen against the US dollar:  
As a result, Australian wages are relatively high compared with 
workers in comparable markets. The average full-time wage in 
Australia at the end of 2010 was $66,594 a year. Converting this to 
other currencies the 2010 exchange rate gives an average wage in 
Australia of US$68,370, £42,580 or €48,500. In comparison, the 
average full-time average wage in these countries/regions was: 
USA: US$44,980; UK: £25,355; Germany: €42,535.10 
3.18 The Australian Home Entertainment Distributors Association also 
highlighted Australia’s higher labour costs: 
 Minimum hourly adult wage: (currency conversion as at 
29 May 2012): 
⇒ UK is £6.08 = A$9.682 
⇒ US is $7.25 = A$7.373 
⇒ Australia is $16.514.11 
3.19 The Committee notes, however, that hourly and average wage figures are 
not an accurate indicator of total labour costs. In its 2011 Retail Industry 
Report, the Productivity Commission concluded that ‘comparisons of 
minimum wages provide no real insight into relative retail industry 
labour costs in different countries’.12 The Commission noted that a range 
of factors contribute to total labour costs in addition to wages, including, 
for example, paid leave and contributions to pension and insurance funds. 
3.20 On that basis, the Commission conducted its own analysis of hourly 
labour costs in a number of European countries in addition to Australia 
and the US. It found that, when wages and benefits (including paid leave, 
employer contributions to pension and insurance funds and government 
social insurance) were taken into account, hourly labour costs (converted 
to constant Australian dollar equivalents and also to US dollar Purchasing 
Power Parity equivalents to adjust for relative purchasing power) were 
lower in Australia than in the US. When calculating labour costs as a 
proportion of retail sales, however, Australia was slightly more expensive 
than the UK and the US.13 The Commission therefore came to the 
conclusion that labour costs were indeed higher in Australia as a 
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13  Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry, 
2011, C.6-C.7. 
56 AT WHAT COST? IT PRICING AND THE AUSTRALIA TAX 
 
proportion of revenue, even if they were comparable or lower in absolute 
terms. 
3.21 Retail rents and occupancy costs were also cited as factors affecting the 
cost of doing business in Australia. The AIIA argued that rent costs, while 
‘not usually directly related’ to AIIA members’ expenses, nonetheless 
affect IT pricing, because a significant proportion of their services are sold 
through channel partners. Ms Campbell said that rents ‘have a profound 
effect’ on channel partners: 
… a very significant part of their operations is in both the retail 
outlet and more specifically and generally in wholesaling 
operations. These costs are real and they are understood to be 
contributing significantly to the increase in costs in Australia.14 
3.22 Mr Zimmerman of the ARA argued that while there had been some recent 
reductions in retail occupancy costs, retailers were nonetheless forced to 
pay too much rent for business premises:  
It is very well documented that rents in Australia are artificially set 
high against places like the US and Europe.15 
3.23 The Productivity Commission highlighted research in its 2011 Retail 
Industry Report that indicated that:  
… labour costs and rental expenses can be as high as 70 per cent of 
the Australian retail industry’s operating costs — high by global 
standards.16 
Warranties 
3.24 Several submissions to the inquiry made the claim that the warranty 
provisions of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) contribute to high IT 
prices in Australia. Ms Campbell, of the AIIA, stated that warranty costs in 
Australia are as high as anywhere in the world, characterising the 
warranty scheme created by the ACL as:  
… a very expensive scheme. The warranty provisions speak to the 
reasonable life of the product. That could be three years in the case 
of some of our members’ products. That makes the provision of 
warranty for those products very expensive in this market.17 
3.25 Ms Campbell added that: 
 
14  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 4. 
15  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 28. 
16  Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry, 
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17  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 6. 
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One of my members has reported that, from their experience, our 
consumer warranty environment is the most expensive that they 
are dealing with in the world.18 
3.26 In its submission to the inquiry, DBCDE observed that: 
Warranties in Australia can be more rigorous and provide greater 
protections than those in other countries. The Australian 
Consumer Law, a schedule of the Competition and Consumer Act 
2010, can provide different and in some cases stronger protections 
than that found in US or UK law. Where goods are faulty, this may 
result in higher costs for importers than they might face if they 
operated in other markets.19 
3.27 Ms Molly Lai of Pioneer Computers referred to warranty protection costs: 
Strong consumer protection in Australia means high support costs 
for IT vendors. Consumers see it as their rights to return for refund 
or replacement even when it is not the manufacturers’ fault. In 
light of the new Australian Consumer Law calling for 
compensation for consequential losses … IT vendors are finding it 
very hard to do business in Australia.20 
‘Green’ schemes 
3.28 DBCDE also pointed out that IT vendors may incur higher costs as a 
consequence of so-called ‘green schemes’ that are designed to encourage 
the recycling of used televisions and IT equipment: 
Commonwealth, State and Territory and local government 
schemes to cover the costs of recycling IT goods can contribute to 
the costs of hardware products bought in Australia. For example, 
the National Television and Computer Recycling Scheme can 
contribute to the costs of providing goods to the Australian 
market, as it places responsibility on manufacturers and importers 
to partake in product stewardship arrangements at their own 
expense.21 
3.29 The Australian Industry Group (Ai Group) also attributed higher local 
costs to environmental regulations, noting that higher costs were in part a 
result of: 
 
18  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 4. 
19  Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Submission 55, p. 9. 
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… environmental regulation such as minimum energy efficiency 
requirements and the new National Television and Computer 
Recycling Scheme, which imposes significant costs on suppliers of 
equipment subject to the scheme.22 
3.30 Ms Molly Lai also noted that the National Television and Computer 
Recycling Scheme, ‘making importers and manufacturers bear the burden 
of recycling’ has an impact for IT vendors.23 
Exchange rates 
3.31 Many consumers have expressed frustration that, in their view, IT product 
prices have not declined in response to the appreciation of the Australian 
dollar. In addition to submissions to this inquiry, the Committee is aware 
of substantial public comment in social media and on the internet where 
consumers consistently raise this issue. 
3.32 The Committee has received evidence suggesting that prices may take 
some time to match changes in the exchange rate. As DBCDE noted in its 
submission there can be a number of reasons for this ‘sticky’ pricing (in 
which there is a delay between currency value changes and the 
consequent adjustment in prices): 
These delays can reflect inefficiencies in the supply process or 
where some importers buy stock well ahead of time in order to 
protect against currency fluctuations. To some extent, these delays 
are fixed, for example where the discrepancy is caused by an 
overstock of goods purchased at an earlier, higher price, or where 
the price is fixed through a long-term contract. The stability may 
also reflect lower competition in the Australian market and/or 
strategies where vendors seek to add value to products rather than 
reduce prices.24  
3.33 Ai Group noted that a number of factors can affect exchange rate pass-
through: 
 Supply contracts may be in place that have fixed exchange rates 
built into them. 
 The lag time between the placement of orders for imported 
products and the sale of the product in Australia can 
encompass a number of fluctuations in the spot price.  
 Many business costs are not affected by the exchange rate (for 
example, domestic labour, freight, transport, storage and 
regulatory costs).  
 
22  Australian Industry Group, Submission 56, p. 5. 
23  Molly Lai, Submission 6, p. 1. 
24  Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Submission 55, p. 6. 
EXPLANATIONS FOR IT PRICE DIFFERENCES 59 
 
 As suppliers and retailers generally offer a large number of 
individual products it would be impractical to constantly reset 
these prices based on frequent movements in the spot price.  
 The desirability for consumers, suppliers and retailers of having 
relatively consistent pricing of goods, smoothing out 
fluctuations in the exchange rate.25 
3.34 Major IT vendors stated in submissions that their priority was to provide 
consistent, efficient and fair pricing rather than to respond to exchange 
rate fluctuations. For example, in its submission, Microsoft said that: 
Microsoft’s global policy is to provide consistent and predictable 
local pricing while maintaining reasonable alignment of local 
currencies relative to the US dollar.26  
3.35 Adobe said that its policy was to set balanced prices: 
Both suppliers and customers would like to be able to enjoy the 
benefits of favourable currency movements and avoid the costs of 
unfavourable currency movements. However, fair and efficient 
pricing needs to strike a balance between upward and downward 
currency movements. 
 Since most of our business is derived from the local ecosystem, 
Adobe has an AUD price list which ensures our distributors can 
always purchase from Adobe in AUD. This leaves the foreign 
exchange rate risk to be carried by Adobe.27 
3.36 Apple also emphasised consistency in pricing: 
Foreign currency is an important variable in how product prices 
are compared between countries. It is not uncommon for 
macroeconomic factors to cause foreign currencies to fluctuate 
dramatically during a product’s life cycle. Over the period of time 
a particular Apple product is in the market, it may appear to be 
either priced higher or lower in a local market when compared to 
the price in the United States or elsewhere… The company’s 
typical practice in such circumstances is to keep local prices the 
same, whether unfavorable [sic] or unfavorable to the company, 
until replacement products are introduced. This is less disruptive 
for local customers and local business channels than if Apple were 
to reprice products up and down on an unpredictable basis in 
response to all such fluctuations.28 
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Channel partners 
3.37 Industry groups argued that another factor in higher Australian IT prices 
was the margin set by channel partners. The term ‘channel’ refers to the 
various conduits through which goods or services are delivered from 
producers to consumers.  
3.38 Microsoft, for example, does not sell directly to Australian consumers, but 
rather through various kinds of ‘channel partner’. According to Microsoft 
Australia’s Managing Director, Ms Pip Marlow:  
We work on a model where we have a channel and that channel is 
a little differentiated… we talk about the volume reseller channel. 
They are our large-account resellers, value-added resellers. They 
sell our volume licensing, enterprise agreements, select 
agreements, open agreements. We would then have our OEM 
[original equipment manufacturer] partners. If you are using a 
Toshiba, we would license our software to Toshiba to preinstall 
into the product. You would acquire the product through that. 
[Finally], we have our retail areas. That would be something like 
Harvey Norman or JB Hi-Fi, through to a small, single-proprietary 
business who would sell what is known as retail product.29 
3.39 Channel partners, Ms Marlow continued, can deliver different value-
added services to their customers:  
… [D]ifferent areas of the channel will deliver different services to 
the customers as they consume that product. It might be, as I said, 
Toshiba and their channel adding desktop management support 
for your hardware. It might be a volume licensing reseller adding 
deployment services or software asset management services. It 
might be a retailer helping the consumer and being their trusted 
adviser as they make IT decisions, and they would deal with 
support and management of that. Through each channel you 
would see different types of value-added services that they would 
put on as they are sold to the customer.30 
3.40 Channel partners of major IT companies are, for the most part, based in 
Australia. Industry groups argued that the costs incurred in moving 
products through the channel are partly responsible for price differences. 
The Committee learned from the AIIA that: 
Some members have brought to our attention the fact that they do 
not set the retail price of their products. These are set through their 
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partner channel and hence are also influenced by channel specific 
market factors and cost pressures.31 
3.41 Adobe, itself a member of the AIIA, observed that: 
It is important to understand that around 85 per cent, the vast 
majority of Adobe sales, flow through local channel partners. 
Adobe’s local channel ecosystem is estimated to employ around 
3,000 people in Australia…. Since we conduct most of our business 
through our 500-plus local channel partners, the majority of the 
costs of the ecosystem as a whole are incurred locally and in local 
currency.32  
3.42 Adobe Australia’s Managing Director Mr Paul Robson further noted that 
the prices of digitally downloaded products sold directly by Adobe are 
‘aligned’ with the prices of physical media distributed through the 
channel, so as to protect channel partners’ business: 
… in relation to the electronic version of that [product], there is an 
exact equivalent of a physical product of it that is sold by our 
partners in a channel format. So the pricing generally is aligned to 
make sure that the partners can continue to run and operate a 
business in this country. Where there is not a product that is an 
exact equivalent, and that is the case for the cloud based product, 
the pricing is in line with that seen in other markets.33 
3.43 Microsoft also attributed at least some of the higher prices for its product 
to locally-ba sed channel partners:  
Microsoft provides guidance on recommended retail pricing… 
Microsoft does not, however, set the final ‘to-the-customer’ price. 
The channel and value-added partners who deliver those products 
to customers ultimately determine retail pricing.34 
Localisation costs 
3.44 DBCDE noted that IT companies may incur costs in tailoring their 
products for the Australian market. This can include adapting a product to 
suit local laws and regulations or to better meet Australian consumers’ 
expectations: 
Products which provide customised features based on unique 
national characteristics, such as local accountancy practices, a 
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person’s accent or even the voltage and plug requirements for 
electricity, will generally require additional research and/or 
development work to be sold in Australia.35 
3.45 The Ai Group further argued that higher costs may be incurred in 
complying with local regulations: 
In addition to general business regulatory costs such as taxation 
and OHS, Australian governments at the State and Federal level 
regulate IT products to ensure that they are safe, reliable and 
minimise their environmental impact. These regulations and 
standards impact on price and may differ from other markets. The 
sector specific regulations that apply to Australian IT products can 
include electrical safety requirements [and] labelling requirements 
for radiocommunications and telecommunications equipment 
such as the A-Tick and C-Tick Marks.36 
3.46 However, in evidence before the Committee, Mr King downplayed the 
significance of localisation costs, at least in relation to Apple hardware 
sold in the Australian market:  
The product cost may vary slightly market by market. For 
example, a computer coming to Australia has a slightly different 
plug to connect to our sockets, etcetera, compared to a product 
going to the United States. There may be elements like that that 
would vary on a product bill of material country by country, but 
they will be small variations. … [T]he product costs would be 
broadly similar. There may or may not be some puts and takes but 
I think it will be broadly similar across markets.37 
3.47 Mr Robson placed particular emphasis on the importance of providing 
consumers and businesses with IT products tailored to local and 
individual needs: 
One of the great drivers of the internet is the ability for 
organisations to provide a personal and relevant experience. It is 
an interesting dynamic. When you actually look at what customers 
are demanding, it is experiences that are personalised, bespoke. As 
one of our technology sets in our digital marketing business, we 
work with customers every day to sell them technology that 
provides them a personalised, bespoke experience. In a global 
marketplace the risk for organisations is to become less relevant, to 
lose the relevance of interaction with an existing customer. To 
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drive that relevancy organisations seek to provide a personalised 
and bespoke experience.38 
3.48 Specifically questioned on how Adobe localises its products for the 
Australian market, Mr Robson responded: 
When we look at relevancy around personalisation, that is in 
relation to the redirection of customers when they access our 
website. When customers access the Adobe.com website they can 
choose to see whichever website they wish to see. We 
automatically try to get them to look at the Australian site, for a 
number of different reasons. There is local content. There is 
information in relation to local user groups and communities that 
use our technology that they can learn from and contribute to. 
There is information that is relevant to the local market in relation 
to Australian based pricing and other content and information. 
That content is a richer and more personalised experience for an 
Australian customer than they would get if they accessed a 
webpage that was in another language or for another country. … 
with relation to relevance and personalisation, the personalisation 
was not of the product; it was the experience when online.39 
3.49 The following exchange subsequently took place between Mr Robson and 
the Committee:  
Mr Husic: … What is the local experience, then, that people are 
obtaining? What is the benefit of it?  
Mr Robson: There is access to user groups, communities, 
information, local pricing, local offers et cetera.  
Mr Stephen Jones: Chat sites and blog sites?  
Mr Robson: Exactly, yes, user communities where—  
Mr Stephen Jones: How much are you suggesting we should be 
paying for access to blog sites?  
Mr Robson: No, I am talking about the personalised experience 
when a customer is online with adobe.com. We seek to provide a 
personalised environment where they can interact with other users 
of our technology. That is how we go to market. One of our key 
interactions with our customer base is to allow them to talk 
amongst themselves and to work with us and to provide input 
into future innovation.40 
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3.50 The Committee notes the evidence from industry that localisation 
represents an additional layer of cost incurred by some international IT 
companies selling into Australia. However, the Committee is of the strong 
view that in many product categories, particularly in relation to digitally 
delivered content, localisation costs would be negligible at best and 
certainly not account for the types of price differentials presented in 
evidence to the Committee. 
Responses by product category 
3.51 As noted in chapter 2, evidence was received across a range of products 
including hardware, software and digital downloads including music, 
games and books. The Committee acknowledges there are challenges 
when assessing industry explanations for pricing, because some evidence 
in submissions and at hearings makes little distinction between hardware, 
and digital downloads; some evidence refers to an overall approach by 
business. To that end, responses on certain product categories are 
considered below, before an assessment of some broader business 
principles. 
Hardware 
3.52 Noting the above observation, that evidence received is often made across, 
or on behalf of, a business which sells both physical and downloadable 
products, the Committee acknowledges the claims by Microsoft and 
Apple on their hardware prices. Apple’s Mr Tony King observed that 
prices for recently released Apple hardware and software products are 
now near parity with prices in the United States: 
Setting aside the daily ups and downs of currency exchange rates, 
our Apple product prices here in Australia are not materially 
different from the Apple products sold in the United States. In fact, 
today the price for the new iPad with retina display and the iPad 
Mini are within one to five per cent of the prices in the US. The 
same is true of Apple’s own software titles offered on the Mac 
App Store, including Final Cut Pro, Logic, iPhoto, iMovie and 
GarageBand. These products are all priced in Australia within one 
to three per cent of the prices in the United States.41 
3.53 Ms Marlow, noting that variations in the price of Microsoft products 
should be expected since the company does not endeavour to set a single, 
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global price, observed that the Australian price for some recent Microsoft 
products has been much closer to the US price: 
[Microsoft Office] Home and Premium costs $119 here, including 
GST, and $99 in the US without tax. Office 365 Small Business 
Premium costs $13.50 a month here, $15 a month in the US. Office 
Home and Business for small business costs $299 here, including 
GST, and $219 in the US…. Office Home and Student 2013, which 
is the current version of the software, is $169.00 ERP here 
including GST and $139.00 in the US. So our price includes GST 
and the US price is without that … . But ultimately we do not have 
a global price and the prices may be different in the US or other 
jurisdictions.42  
3.54 As noted earlier in this chapter, while the Committee accepts views that 
prices may be generally lower, it notes that in some cases, the relative or 
proportional differential may be unchanged. That is, while costs are 
becoming lower in Australia, they are becoming lower everywhere; 
Australians are still bearing a proportionally high cost burden. 
Software and digital downloads 
3.55 Much of the evidence from IT vendors on software made little or no 
distinction between physical and digitally downloaded products. Further 
to the above consideration of explanations for higher prices for Australian 
consumers, the Committee sought to better understand the distinctions 
made for products which are essentially identical. 
3.56 As outlined in chapter 2, many consumers expressed concern at price 
disparities for digitally delivered content, including software, music, 
games and books. The Committee considers this to be an area of special 
interest as many of the justifications for higher prices made by industry 
groups are arguably less relevant to digitally downloaded products. Many 
products sold online, for example, would appear to incur significantly 
reduced wage costs, much lower occupancy costs, and undergo little or no 
localisation (none at all in the case of music, movies and many e-books). 
The Committee is therefore especially interested in why these products 
still cost Australians more. 
3.57 The Committee has heard differing views on the pricing of these kinds of 
digitally delivered content. For the most part, consumers expressed 
frustration and disbelief at having to pay significantly more for a 
substantially identical downloaded product, when in their view the 
vendor incurred no higher costs in providing it. A representative sample 
 
42  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 22 March 2013, p. 40. 
66 AT WHAT COST? IT PRICING AND THE AUSTRALIA TAX 
 
of the views of concerned consumers expressed in submissions is 
presented below. Mr Stephen Delvecchio argued in his submission that 
digital distribution removes any reason for differential pricing: 
The argument of increased costs due to shipping physical goods 
from overseas died the day we entered the digital age – many 
years ago. There is absolutely no reason why I should be charged 
up to $50 more for the exact same 1’s & 0’s that are purchased 
from the exact same store just because I happen to have an 
Australian accent. The word absurd doesn’t even come close to 
describing it.43 
3.58 Mr Samuel Lymn argued that: 
… in all cases, when discussing digital product pricing, one can 
make no claim about increased costs for the retailer on the basis of 
things associated with preparing a physical product for sale. The 
fact that the product is digital completely eliminates such 
considerations.44 
3.59 According to Mr Duncan Wallace: 
It could be argued that shipping and costs of operating physical 
retail stores in Australia cause prices to be higher. However, this 
does not apply to digital downloads of software.  
In most cases, the customer is downloading exactly the same 
software, from exactly the same servers as other customers around 
the world. The customer also bears the expense of any bandwidth 
costs for the actual download.45 
3.60 Although the above are only three examples of many received, in this 
section the Committee canvasses the arguments made by IT companies 
and vendors in response to specific sectoral claims. The Committee 
acknowledges the view of Microsoft that even in the case of digitally 
distributed content, a vendor’s costs may remain high: 
Software that is delivered via an online portal offers the potential 
for reduced transaction costs for vendors in the way of distribution 
costs. Nevertheless the costs of providing the services - including 
establishing, maintaining, supporting and advertising the services 
- needs to be recovered and a profit from those operations 
derived.46 
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Music 
3.61 The Committee heard conflicting views on who controls the price 
Australians pay for music, movies, books and other copyright content. 
While many submissions were highly critical of Apple’s Australian iTunes 
store pricing, Apple argued that the prices of music sold through that 
store is dependent on the wholesale prices set by the music labels: 
The pricing of music, movies and TV shows on iTunes is 
determined by various factors. Prices are heavily influenced by the 
wholesale price set by the labels and studios, royalties payable for 
the use of musical compositions and the incorporation of local 
taxes.47 
3.62 Mr King told the Committee that: 
The iTunes store is a digital media store. Apple must pay the 
rights holders of the digital content—the record labels, movie 
studios and TV networks—to distribute content in each of the 
territories in which the iTunes store exists. The pricing of this 
digital content is based on the wholesale prices which are set 
through negotiated contracts with the record labels, movie studios 
and TV networks. In Australia they have often set a higher 
wholesale price than the price of similar content in the United 
States.48  
3.63 After many attempts to seek input from the Australian Recording Industry 
Association (ARIA), the Committee was advised that: 
ARIA has no relevant information on how music prices are set in 
the Australian market. ARIA is not involved in the setting of 
wholesale or retail prices in the music industry - ARIA does not 
supply music to retailers or consumers. Nor does ARIA have 
access to information about how record companies or music 
retailers set their prices. It would therefore be inappropriate for 
ARIA to comment on price.49 
3.64 In its efforts to establish reasons for the apparently vastly higher costs to 
Australian consumers to access digitally downloaded music, the 
Committee had sought information from the Australian royalty collecting 
agencies, the Australasian Performing Rights Association and 
Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society Ltd (APRA-AMCOS). 
The Committee heard from Mr Richard Mallett, Head of Revenue, that: 
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… it is public knowledge that out of each sale of a single track 
download the DSPs [Digital Service Providers] will generally keep 
up to 30 per cent, the record labels will receive between 60 and 70 
per cent and APRA-AMCOS receives nine per cent. APRA-
AMCOS’s rate in Australia is similar to tariffs in operation in other 
territories. For example, in the UK and Europe it is eight per cent, 
in Canada it is nine per cent and in the USA it is US9.1c, which is a 
fixed rate irrespective of sale price.50 
3.65 Given the ‘public knowledge’ of this matter, the Committee was therefore 
surprised to hear from the Managing Director of ARIA, Mr Dan Rosen, 
that in relation to the division of the revenue obtained from music sales: 
I think that is something that is split between the retailer and 
wholesaler. I do not know the details of that split. Then, within 
that, I do not know how they split that up. I would assume each 
artist has their own relationship and have a contract with their 
label on how that gets divided… 
I think you would need to speak to a range of retailers, because 
there is an enormous number of different retailers in Australia, 
and a range of rights holders. Some of those rights holders would 
be in Australia and some of them would be overseas.51 
3.66 The Committee continued to seek accurate and transparent advice as to 
pricing, and invited submissions from rights holders. Universal Music 
Australia (UMA) maintained in its submission that prices were set by the 
retailer: 
The retail price charged to consumers by Australian digital 
providers is set by the particular digital provider. UMA has no say 
in the setting of that retail price. UMA provides its content to 
retailers according to wholesale price rate cards. UMA has rate 
cards that apply to physical records and rate cards that apply to 
digital content. The rate cards set out the prices of the different 
album and track pricing tiers with multiple tiers being offered. 
Rates for campaign discounts, which are commonly demanded by 
digital retailers as a condition for including particular products 
within a promotional campaign, are also included. There are 
further categories for deluxe products, compilations and video 
products.52 
 
50  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 17. 
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3.67 Representatives of the Australian music industry also claimed that, even 
though much of their product is digitally distributed, the industry still 
incurs costs which must be recovered. ARIA argued that:  
… the contention that digitally delivered content by a local 
company with an international parent is identical and should 
therefore cost consumers the same in Australia as in the US or 
some other country is unfounded.53 
3.68 According to ARIA, Australia-based national affiliates ‘must run as a 
viable business in their own right to optimize their activities in the 
interests of their shareholders (be they overseas parent entities or domestic 
individuals)’.54 Mr Rosen stated that record labels incur many costs in 
producing music and that the idea that digitally delivered products are 
cost-free is an ‘incorrect assumption:’ 
I think that is a misconception because in Australia these 
businesses are running with local costs—wages, property and, 
importantly, marketing. There is also what we in the music 
industry call A&R. This is the R&D of the music industry which 
goes into sourcing local talent… This is an incredibly important 
part of what the label members do in Australia. It is a costly 
exercise and it is something that they are doing in this country.55 
3.69 Universal Music Australia outlined its costs in this way: 
UMA invests heavily in Australian artists as well as providing 
significant funding to a number of independent Australian labels. 
In addition, the company carries substantial labour and operating 
costs. All of these investment and operating expenses must be 
covered by UMA’s local revenues. In addition, once an artist’s 
album has been recorded, UMA must invest heavily in the 
marketing and promotion of such album. It is vital to an album’s 
success for UMA to achieve local media support including radio 
play, videoclip play and online exposure. UMA also invests 
heavily in television and radio marketing campaigns.56 
3.70 As mentioned in chapter 2, the Committee is aware of the emergence of 
streaming services in the music market. In October 2012, Mr Rosen 
advised the Committee that eight or nine services, including Spotify, had 
been launched in the previous 12 months.57 
 
53  Australian Recording Industry Association, Submission 93, p. 2. 
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3.71 Apart from describing the growing number of choices for consumers to 
access content, music industry organisations have argued that the cost of 
music in Australia has fallen significantly over the past decade, as have 
revenues of record companies and the music industry more generally. 
UMA argues that recorded music in Australia is ‘cheaper than ever’.58 
3.72 UMA claimed that revenue had more than halved in the period 2003-2011, 
as a result of the ‘prevalence of illegitimate music downloading and 
streaming platforms’, which has led to a decline in the willingness of 
consumers to pay for music.59 ARIA cited the ‘abundance of free or near-
free services’ as a factor driving down prices, but considered the impact of 
copyright infringement to be of primary importance: 
Australian consumers have access to a plethora of unchecked and 
unregulated web-based suppliers that offer a very wide range of 
pirated music at no charge. Digitalisation has enabled piracy on a 
massive scale, so much so that the wholesale revenues of record 
companies have been almost halved in the last 11 years … Piracy 
accounts [for] a significant amount of the music consumed in 
Australia today.60 
3.73 Copyright issues are considered further in chapter 4.  
Games 
3.74 As discussed in chapter 2, submissions from many consumers referred to 
the often significant price disparities imposed on Australian gamers when 
purchasing through digital distribution platforms like Steam.  
3.75 Mr Matthew Kermeen found it ‘highly perplexing’ that games should cost 
so much more in Australia when purchased through digital distribution 
platforms. Mr Kermeen expressed frustration at paying ‘almost double the 
price for the exact same product, delivered in the exact same manner’, 
when localisation and distribution costs should be close to nil.61 
3.76 In relation to the game Diablo 3, which cost more than 30 per cent more in 
Australia than in the US, Mr Zhiliang Huang wrote that: 
There is no difference in the way the game is delivered (by 
download) between a U.S. buyer and an Australian buyer.  
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The game will [also] be played [on a] U.S. server and there is no 
difference in the way the game will be played (on battle.net) 
between an U.S. buyer and an Australian buyer.62 
3.77 Mr Mark Sinclair summed up consumer frustrations in this way: 
The big issue many Australian gamers have is the variation in 
price that we pay compared to other gamers in other parts of the 
world, no transport costs are necessary, every time a purchase is 
made you are only copying a file from a server, no additional 
production of disk or packaging is required, no additional cost to 
steam is incurred because we are across the Pacific, transport of 
the product is covered by the Australian consumer by our 
download allowance in the contract we have with our internet 
service provider, we also have a free trade agreement with the US. 
We are buying a product from this company in exactly the same 
manner as a US citizen, yet we Australian customers can pay up to 
double the price.63 
3.78 The Committee notes no representatives from the gaming industry chose 
to address this issue.  
Books 
3.79 Consumers who purchased e-books expressed their concerns about price 
discrimination. As Mr Daniel Myles said: 
Australians are downloading the e-books from exactly the same 
place as the rest of the world. It’s not as if the books sent to us 
through our internet connections magically increase in cost 
depending on where in the world it moves to. It’s just bytes of 
data, 1s and 0s, identical and completely oblivious to a consumer’s 
geographical location.64 
3.80 Ms Julie Jester concurred, noting that: 
e-books do not have the costs associated with printing, 
distribution and retailing. Once an e-book is formatted, a single 
copy can be stored on a server anywhere in the world and 
distributed electronically at a trivial cost.65 
3.81 Mr Jeff Burgess noted, in relation to licensing books from Amazon, that: 
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There is no such thing as ‘an Australian Amazon website’. Buyers 
from every country, including Australia, all buy and download 
e-books from the same USA-based Amazon internet book store at 
www.amazon.com. There is therefore no technical reason for 
higher pricing of e-books for Australians.66 
3.82 Representatives of the Australian publishing industry indicated that 
publishers have ongoing costs regardless of the format their books are 
published in. Mr Ross Gibb of MacMillan Publishers Australia said: 
… e-books cost so little to produce, so why are they not cheaper 
than what they are? In our business an e-book is just another 
format; it is not a separate stand-alone product. So the full cost of 
paying the author, commissioning writers and content, editing, 
designing, and marketing all still exist. These costs will not go 
away, even as the e-book market grows.67 
3.83 Mr Gibb told the Committee: 
Today in the US, a market that is about three, possibly four years 
ahead of our market—it is very hard to tell with technology—
e-books account for 16 per cent of total book sales. So 84 per cent 
of the book market remains in paper and the costs to maintain that 
business still exist. It is true there is no print cost in producing an 
e-book and there is no freight cost but digitising content, file and 
data storage, file distribution by third parties, and managing and 
combating piracy bring new costs to the business.68 
3.84 As in the case of digital music, the Australian Publishers Association 
(APA) also emphasised the regional nature of markets: 
Profit margins on each e-book sold can also vary from country to 
country, depending on factors such as royalty structures, hosting 
costs, technical support provided by a publisher and the extent to 
which a book needs to be adapted and enhanced to suit each 
country (a particular concern in relation to educational 
publishing). [M]ost publishing of Australian titles is done on the 
basis that costs must be recovered in Australia, as the largest 
market for Australian titles.69 
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Policies and approaches to pricing 
3.85 Noting discussion to this point about impacts on costs in Australia, the 
Committee took a general approach to ascertain overall views of 
businesses to issues which may affect pricing decisions. Matters 
considered include observations on pricing models; elements of 
competition and choice; and managing a market (including through 
subscription models and geoblocking). The Committee notes Mr King’s 
views that price discrimination begins at the wholesale level, and his 
argument that Apple would lower prices if it could: 
When you boil it all down, where may a price differential arise? It 
is in the difference in the wholesale price to the retailer. The other 
costs are either variable in nature, such as the GST, or comparable 
in nature like the publishing fees or the iTunes store management 
costs… 
We would love to see lower content prices, be it for songs, movies 
or TV shows. That would drive a wonderful use of our products 
within the Australian market. I want to make it absolutely clear 
that it is in our best interests to see that take place.70 
Approaches to regional pricing 
3.86 Mr King responded to a question about price discrimination and 
companies charging ‘what the market will bear’ in the following terms:  
We do, and have, for as long as I can remember run an overall 
model where we offer equivalent pricing on our products around 
the world. We establish that equivalent price at the time we 
introduce a product to a market. … Simply put, we offer an 
equivalent pricing model rather than the model you are 
suggesting about what a market may bear. We start with a US 
denominated price. We do take into consideration some costs of 
doing business in a market. That may be in the area of freight. The 
per unit freight charge of an iMac, for example, is more expensive 
to bring into the Australian market than it is to other markets.71 
3.87 Mr King subsequently explained that Apple ‘set[s] our prices worldwide 
from Cupertino with input from the local team for factors that may be 
relevant for the Australian market. We have a global equivalent pricing 
model that is established at a worldwide level.’72 
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3.88 Asked whether Apple sets prices charged by its channel partners in 
Australia, Mr King, responded:  
We establish a price on the Apple online store and through our 
retail stores for a product, but our partners are free to set their 
prices as they see fit in the market. Indeed, in any given week or 
month we see very highly competitive offers taking place with our 
channel partners across Australia. We have 6,000 sites that are 
within our rich ecosystem, and our partners are constantly driving 
innovation around the way that they provide value to customers. 
That will manifest itself in anything from a bundle to an offer and 
in some cases a discount, but that pricing is purely in the court of 
the retailer. It is their decision.73 
3.89 A different approach to pricing was set out by Adobe’s Mr Paul Robson. 
In his evidence to the Committee, Mr Robson outlined a pricing strategy 
which is not global but regional in nature:  
… Adobe seeks to set prices in this market here in Australia that 
provide a consistent contribution, taking into account the cost of 
doing business in this region and allowing us to run a regional 
operation. We do this in most markets around the world while at 
the same time trying to provide some uniformity across those 
regions.  
…If customers do not feel that they are getting good value, they 
simply will not buy our products. Price is the key to competitive 
advantage which in turn underpins the global trading system.74 
3.90 Ms Marlow also outlined Microsoft’s explicitly regional pricing approach:  
At Microsoft, whilst we operate in over 100 countries around the 
world, we do not operate on a single global model. In fact, the 
countries that we operate in are very different, and therefore the 
way that we compete and the way that we deliver products and 
services every day in those countries can be unique. In those 
spaces, we work to make sure that we understand our customer’s 
needs and the competition and, therefore, have a unique strategy, 
be it in the different countries or given the different competitive 
landscape that we have.…  
[W]e do not operate under a single global market model and there 
are a range of factors that do impact the way that we go into 
market. They may start with cost structure, customer perceptions, 
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partner choices but most importantly the competition that we have 
in market.75 
3.91 Ms Marlow later elaborated on this point: 
We do not operate on a standard price because we do not believe 
that every market is the same. We may be selling to an emerging 
market, for example, where the cost of living, the availability of 
technology, the ability of customer perception and the competition 
might be completely different. … We do not set them on a global 
market. We know that, in the end, because we are living with 
competition, our customers will vote, as I said before, with their 
wallets. If we make the price too high in that particular market, 
they have choice and they will look elsewhere. We respond to 
that.76 
3.92 The Committee received evidence from the Australian Home 
Entertainment Distributors Association (AHEDA) stating that: 
The terms of the Inquiry seem to suggest that there are regional 
retail price differentials which are attributable to the pricing 
practices of international suppliers (ie wholesale pricing). 
However, retailers set their own pricing and average retail DVD 
prices suggest that they are broadly on par with those in Europe.77 
Competition 
3.93 Asked whether it was Microsoft’s approach to charge whatever a regional 
market would stand, Ms Marlow responded: 
In a market where there is supply and demand in a free economy, 
yes, absolutely.78 
3.94 Competition within a free market, and the ability of consumers to make 
their own purchasing decisions was a common theme of IT vendors. 
Ms Marlow described the company’s operation in a global free market: 
We would say that, in the free market, you are going to see 
pressures come from competition and different areas, and we will 
continue to compete.… 
I believe we are not operating in a global economy where 
organisations need to have a global price. I believe companies 
should be able to lawfully set prices differently across the market 
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that works for their business strategy, works with the different 
investments they make in those different markets, works based on 
the competitors they have in those markets and on the customer 
perceptions in those markets in a true supply-and-demand 
manner.79 
3.95 Both Microsoft and Adobe argued that consumers and businesses can 
always turn to other products if their customers believe their prices are too 
high. Ms Marlow said: 
[S]mall businesses in this country have choice. There are a plethora 
of products they can use. There are other products that they can 
use today for similar functions, and they have a choice to make. 
We operate in the market very lawfully. We are out there 
competing every day on price and on the service of product. …  
If we price our products too high, then our customers will make 
different choices.80 
3.96 Asked by the Committee about customer perceptions of Microsoft 
charging Australian users of one Microsoft product more than 70 per cent 
more than users in the United States, Ms Marlow argued that the key issue 
was customer perception of Microsoft’s products: 
We look to measure our customer’s delight and satisfaction with 
our company’s products in a lot of ways. Often that is through 
sales. Every day we are out there selling our product, making sure 
that as you are using the variety of hardware that you have in 
front of you now that we are an eligible and competitive offering 
for our customers. Ultimately, the choice and the decision for 
customer satisfaction and delight is for the customer. I think the 
role of a free market and a company is to be able to then go out 
and compete every day to do that, to make sure that we through 
our products, through our support mechanisms and the things 
that we do every day when we are competing are the moment of 
value for our customers.81 
3.97 However, in response to the suggestion that software vendors create 
‘digital handcuffs’ that prevent consumers and businesses from switching 
to a competitor, Ms Marlow said: 
Most of our software programs are built with interoperability in 
mind, so you can use tools to transfer data and technology. … We 
have to keep building on those products, keep making sure we 
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compete and innovate, keep making sure that we deliver the value 
they want, because they do have those choices in this market.82 
3.98 However consumer groups argued that market forces are rather less than 
perfect in relation to IT products. As the Australian Communications 
Consumer Action Network (ACCAN) observed in its submission to the 
Committee:  
Software has different economic properties to many other 
products. Due to compatibility issues, unless there are uniform 
standard allowing multiple software products to access and edit 
files from different programs, the value of software increase with 
the number of people using that product. Market power then 
tends to reside in a few powerful organisations.83 
3.99 ACCAN elaborated, using Adobe’s software products as an example: 
Adobe has significant market power due to its importance to 
creative industries. It also structures products in such a way that 
requires regular investment (through purchasing upgrades and 
linking products) that make the cost of switching to another piece 
of software more expensive. This market power would appear to 
allow Adobe to undertake international price discrimination to the 
detriment of Australian small business, many of whom have little 
choice about what product they are able to purchase.84  
Managing markets 
Cloud and subscription services 
3.100 In evidence to this inquiry, industry groups highlighted the utility cloud 
services offer for consumers and businesses, especially the potential to 
reduce IT support costs for businesses and consumers by outsourcing 
hardware and software maintenance and support. According to the 
Australian Industry Group (Ai Group), for example, cloud computing 
enables monthly or annual pay-as-you-go pricing models for customers 
which can be scaled up or down flexibly depending on customer 
demand.85 AIIA CEO Ms Suzanne Campbell similarly argued that the 
cloud provides pricing advantages for Australian consumers and 
businesses:  
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Cloud presents opportunities. In relation to pricing, cloud based 
pricing for a product means that consumers no longer need to 
secure a licence to own the product outright; they can use it on an 
as-required basis—pay as they go or pay per month. So that is one 
innovation that comes with cloud. More generally, as a business 
model, the enabling capacity of cloud relates to lower capital costs, 
easier access to platforms—and is a particularly significant 
opportunity for SMEs.86 
3.101 Mr Robson repeatedly expressed Adobe’s view that its cloud-based 
subscription service – called ‘Creative Cloud’ – provided significant 
advantages for Adobe customers including more frequent software 
updates instead of an annual or biannual version release (as is the case 
when purchasing perpetual-license software): 
… Creative Cloud provides access to continual updates, 
enhancements and new features of our technology over time… if 
you bought a copy of Photoshop prior to there being a new 
operating system in the marketplace or prior to there being a new 
piece of hardware, such as a tablet or a smartphone, the 
technology that you purchased would support the technology that 
was available in the market at that point in time. It is a snapshot of 
the tech landscape. But by being able to provide a Creative Cloud 
offering it allows us to then provide enhancements and updates to 
customers throughout all innovation across the technology 
landscape. So as other vendors bring hardware or new operating 
systems to the market our customers get recurring updates and 
enhancements to our technology.87 
3.102 Mr Robson went on to highlight special features available to customers via 
Adobe’s cloud services: 
We add features to Creative Cloud that we technically could not 
offer otherwise. Some features exist in Creative Cloud that you 
would not get access to if you were to buy a box product, 
including collaborative services that allow you and I, for instance, 
to share files and information. It allows us to provide storage to 
our customers. It allows online storage. It allows them to easily 
share that content with other parties. It also allows them to sync 
across multiple devices.88 
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3.103 Mr Robson argued that price differentials for new Adobe products are 
much lower than in the past. In particular Mr Robson highlighted prices 
for Adobe’s ‘Creative Cloud’ subscription-based service: 
Creative Cloud was launched in April 2012 and we have been 
monitoring and reviewing its performance in markets since its 
launch. Last month we made the decision to change the monthly 
price of creative cloud to $49.99 on an annual subscription basis. 
This brings the price in Australia broadly in line with the price in 
the United States. Historically the price of our student and teacher 
offering for this cloud based service has been lower in Australia 
and New Zealand than in most markets around the world and is 
priced at $24.99.89 
Geoblocking 
3.104 The practice known as ‘geoblocking’ has been discussed earlier. The 
Committee notes that many major IT companies regard geoblocking as a 
legitimate tool which allows them to set prices in regional markets. 
Mr Robson explained that:  
I am sure you are all aware that geoblocking is a well-established 
and legal practice seen across many industries. At Adobe we do 
direct our customers to country-specific websites via what we call 
‘automatic redirection’. We do this for a variety of reasons, 
including the ability to recover the costs of delivering a local, 
personalised and relevant experience for customers. Our 
customers expect to see marketing, discounts, post-sales support 
and other information that is customised to their local market. We 
also do it to ensure that we comply with local legal requirements.90 
3.105 Ms Marlow outlined Microsoft’s approach to geoblocking in the following 
terms: 
We do use geoblocking as a lawful mechanism to manage our 
business, as some of our competitors and other companies do. 
…We use geoblocking in a number of different ways. We would 
use it to ensure we comply with local ratings for games. In 
different jurisdictions and geographies games will have different 
ratings, so we will make sure that we manage to that. We would 
use it to manage licensing arrangements on content, which differ 
from geography to geography. We would use it to make sure that 
we can adapt our business strategies, which might be different 
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from geography to geography. And we would do it to understand 
what is happening in our own local geographies to make sure that 
we can make investment decisions to support the consumer 
demand in those different types of geographies.91 
3.106 Issues surrounding the use of technological protection measures (TPMs) 
and geoblocking will be explored in further detail in chapter 4. 
Consumer views on cost claims 
3.107 The Committee heard evidence from consumers and consumer groups 
which disputed industry evidence in relation to higher costs. The Choice 
submission made the following assessment of the likely impact of these 
costs on the price of IT products in Australia:  
There is no evidence that factors such as wages and labour costs, 
occupancy costs and rent, GST, retail profit margins, and logistics 
and transportation can, even cumulatively, account for some of the 
price differentials identified in IT hardware and software 
products.92 
3.108 Mr Matthew Levey from Choice elaborated on these conclusions in 
evidence before the Committee:  
I do not think we deny that there are factors which are specific to 
doing business in Australia—I am sure there are, just as there are 
factors specific to doing business everywhere—but on the basis of 
what has been put forward, whether it is rent, marketing, labour 
costs or GST, we do not think that the proportionate higher costs 
of doing business in Australia in any of those areas can amount to 
a 50 per cent or greater price difference. Therefore, the only place 
we can look to is the wholesale cost of that product, which would 
be set by the manufacturer, the international copyright holder of 
that product.93 
3.109 In relation to the idea that costs associated with warranty support are 
driving the price of IT goods up in Australia, Mr Levey argued that there 
is evidence that Australian retailers can combine low prices with strong 
warranty support: 
… when you look at some parallel importers like Kogan, the TV 
parallel importer, who, as far as we understand it, has an 
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extremely strong refund/return policy you will see that, even 
though the goods that it is selling are parallel imported so you 
would assume not covered by that manufacturer’s domestic 
warranty requirements, it obviously shows it is quite possible to 
operate here profitably, sell a lot of products and still offer 
significant price savings compared to what, if you like, the official 
supply chains would provide.94 
3.110 Some consumers met the notion of warranty and aftersales support costs 
driving higher prices with scepticism. According to Mr Magnus Stensson: 
I would argue that Australia generally has the worst warranty 
service in existence. I buy IT hardware from the US or Hong Kong 
and get better warranty than here, where the trend is to make 
things as complicated as possible.95 
3.111 Mr Christopher Shain also expressed doubts at the extent to which 
warranty costs could contribute to higher IT prices, in particular pointing 
to the trend toward offshore technical support centres: 
There are obviously some examples where getting physical 
support may incur extra costs, but often to nothing like the extent 
of the price disparity.  
For software products particularly, if the service and support was 
any different, of better quality or easy to obtain then I could 
understand a price difference, but my personal experience over 
many years in getting support and backup for professional 
imaging software related issues is that I’m usually not speaking 
with someone that’s located in Australia anyway.96 
3.112 Evidence from consumers also notes that the multinational IT companies 
with which they do business are able to amortise many of the costs listed 
above by operating centralised support, billing and distribution services 
from a low cost offshore location. Mr Graeme Kitney also expressed 
doubts at the extent to which local costs could influence the price of his 
Adobe software:  
Last year I wanted to upgrade my Adobe Acrobat and Adobe 
Photoshop Elements and went to their web site for the price and to 
order the upgrades. When I put in my address it directed me to 
their Australian site and the price increased two and a half times. 
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However this wasn’t the end of my annoyance with Adobe, when 
the software arrived it had been posted from Singapore and I was 
billed from Dublin.97  
3.113 The Committee remained intrigued throughout the inquiry with regard to 
the apparent mismatch between industry statements and actions: industry 
organisations stated a willingness to assist the Committee but 
demonstrated a clear reluctance to do so. The Committee observed similar 
attitudes towards addressing consumer perceptions. In noting negative 
customer feedback, Apple’s Mr Tony King told the Committee that: 
We are acutely aware of customer feedback in general. …[W]e are 
acutely aware of headlines that might be reported in the 
newspaper, or a letter we may receive from a customer who is 
concerned that a song price on iTunes in Australia may be more 
than in the US. I have a very frank and candid dialogue with my 
counterparts in the US to make sure that they understand this. 
Indeed, at a global level, within our iTunes teams, we do pass the 
observation to the global head office of a music label that we are 
hearing comments in Australia that frankly make us 
uncomfortable.98 
3.114 The Committee notes, however, that according to Dr Matthew Rimmer, an 
academic from the Australian National University, in relation to e-books 
and software sold through Apple’s app store, content is sold under an 
‘agency agreement’, according to which prices are set by the publisher or 
rights holder. In these cases the retailer acts as an agent and takes a 
percentage of each sale, but does not set the price. According to 
Dr Rimmer, Apple and a number of publishers are subject to an antitrust 
investigation in the United States as a result of price fixing concerns 
arising from the agency agreement.99 
Committee comment 
3.115 Submissions to the inquiry indicate that Australian consumers have 
developed a strong impression that they are the subject of international 
price discrimination, in which overseas suppliers of IT products charge 
Australians substantially higher prices without obvious justification other 
than that it is ‘what the market will bear’. The Committee shares this view. 
 
97  Graeme Kitney, Submission 117, p. 1. 
98  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 22 March 2013, p. 13. 
99  Matthew Rimmer, Submission 92, pp. 73-79. 
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3.116 The Committee acknowledges that there are factors specific to the 
Australian market which can make it a higher-cost environment for IT 
vendors compared with other markets. Australia’s population is 
comparatively small and spread over a large geographical area, which 
means that higher distribution, wage and occupancy costs must be 
covered by smaller unit sales than in a market like the US. There are 
therefore many products, primarily hardware products or those with a 
physical distribution model, for which costs are indeed higher than in 
comparable overseas markets. 
3.117 That being the case, however, the Committee is of the view that in many 
instances these higher costs cannot, even cumulatively, explain the price 
differences consumers experience in relation to many IT products, and 
especially those delivered via the internet. 
3.118 The Committee notes the views of some industry groups and major IT 
companies that price differentials are narrowing. The Committee also 
notes that the AIIA submission acknowledged that international price 
discrimination is practiced by some of the AIIA’s members as a matter of 
course. The AIIA referred to this practice as ‘a common business strategy 
necessary to maximise performance in a specific high-cost market such as 
Australia’.100 The Committee is therefore disappointed that the AIIA has 
confused the issue by disputing the validity of consumers’ price 
comparison data and by offering alternative claims about higher costs that 
may contribute to price differentials.  
3.119 The Committee’s view is reinforced by statements made by government 
and industry groups which characterise regional pricing differences as a 
tool used by IT companies and rights holders to maximise profit. The 
Committee acknowledges the argument made by IT companies that 
regional pricing arrangements are a legal business strategy and that 
companies making such arrangements are subject to competitive market 
forces. The Committee notes that Microsoft and Adobe both rejected the 
notion of a global market place and explicitly acknowledged that their 
pricing strategies reflect judgments as to what particular regional and 
national markets will bear. 
3.120 The argument that ‘sticky’ exchange rates continue to affect prices became 
less persuasive as the inquiry proceeded. The Committee considers that 
price disparities that persist two years after parity with the US dollar are 
no longer explicable entirely by reference to exchange rates. Although the 
Committee is aware that a range of IT products, including Apple 
 
100  Australian Information Industry Association, Submission 73, p. 4. 
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hardware, is now priced much closer to parity with the US, it notes that 
significant price discrepancies remain across a range of product categories. 
3.121 The Committee notes the evidence provided by Apple Australia Vice 
President Mr Tony King to the effect that localisation costs for IT 
hardware do not represent a significant additional cost.  
3.122 The Committee notes that despite industry claims that costs exist for the 
creation and marketing of digitally distributed content, vendors have not 
produced any evidence to explain why differentials are so high for such 
content. In relation to games, for example, the Committee has not received 
any evidence which explains why it is almost invariably cheaper for 
Australian gamers to purchase and ship physical media from the United 
Kingdom to Australia than it is to purchase a digital copy of the same 
game. 
3.123 The Committee notes the suggestion from industry groups that price 
differences are in some way ameliorated by ‘non-financial value’ provided 
to consumers through discounts, convenience, or after-sales service. The 
Committee received many submissions from consumers and small 
businesses upset at what they saw as unfairly high prices, and who did 
not feel adequately compensated by the ‘non-financial’ aspects of their 
transactions. Although the Committee acknowledges that in some 
circumstances, non-financial factors may influence purchasing decisions, it 
is clear that in many circumstances they do not. 
3.124 Given the evidence presented to the Committee of very large price 
differentials, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these practices 
amount to international price discrimination to the clear disadvantage of 
Australian consumers and businesses.  
3.125 The Committee acknowledges that there is competition in the sale of IT 
products, however there are also significant barriers to competition and 
choice. Rights and their control also need to be considered. Copyright, 
competition and access are explored in the next chapter. 
 
 4 
Copyright, circumvention, competition, and 
remedies 
4.1 While chapter 3 canvassed some of the reasons provided by industry for 
practicing price discrimination, including higher costs for businesses 
operating in Australia, themes relevant to copyright law and competition 
arose repeatedly in discussions on IT pricing in Australia. Issues of access 
for users, ownership and licensing of content, and managing the impacts 
of infringement were also raised regularly. The development of the 
copyright regime, and its ability to adequately adapt to the challenges 
presented by an environment with increasing amounts of digital content 
were discussed in context with the balance between often competing 
rights of creators, owners or users to access that content.  
4.2 Discussions about copyright and intellectual property inevitably include 
considerations of who benefits: what gives one party an advantage may 
disadvantage another. The Committee notes the many intersecting, and 
often conflicting interests, and that what might appear by one party to be 
solutions to problems, are seen by another party as threats to livelihood. 
The Committee notes that interpretations are often disputed and interests 
are often opaque. 
4.3 This chapter discusses these broad issues of intellectual property as they 
apply to competition and consumer rights. The Committee notes that in 
the current legislative framework, there is tension between treatment of 
physical and digital content, and that current rules are seen by some to be 
inadequate. The Committee acknowledges the development of measures, 
including geoblocking, and methods to circumvent such measures, and 
their different impacts on consumers and industry. The Committee notes 
that some remedies proposed by inquiry participants to alleviate the 
effects of price discrimination are therefore not universally agreed, 
including those relating to the nature of rights and their protection, the 
legality of circumvention measures, the means of maintaining competition 
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in markets, and how to improve clarity for consumers. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of some international aspects: harmonisation 
of warranties and standards, and concerns about trade negotiations. 
4.4 The Committee also notes that several claims from inquiry participants 
relating to price discrimination are not relevant to copyright issues, and 
may simply be business decisions for which there is little observable 
explanation. In its consideration of all of the above issues the Committee 
notes previous and ongoing inquiries into Australia’s copyright regime. 
Balancing copyright interests 
4.5 Many of the IT products which appear to be subject to international price 
discrimination are protected by copyright. According to Dr Nicholas 
Suzor and Ms Paula Dootson, copyright scholars from the Queensland 
University of Technology:  
Copyright operates to provide an incentive for firms to invest in 
the production and distribution of creative expression. As a 
utilitarian statutory monopoly, it operates to balance the 
incentives provided to producers against the interests of the public 
in having rich access to expression. Seen this way, access is the 
goal of copyright – access to culture is a predicate for individuals 
to learn, grow, create, and contribute back to society.1 
4.6 This inquiry has heard evidence suggesting that the balance between 
rights holders and consumers in Australian copyright law has shifted in 
recent years as a consequence of changes in the way content is delivered, 
changes in the terms under which content is acquired, and changes in the 
ways in which consumers are permitted to use the content they have 
purchased. The Committee notes the views of rights holders that these 
changes have at least in part been motivated by the incidence of copyright 
infringement, which is discussed later in this chapter. In the view of some 
observers the balance has swung in favour of rights holders at the expense 
of consumers, reducing competition in copyright markets and generating 
higher prices for copyright material, including through international price 
discrimination.  
4.7 In its submission to the inquiry, the Treasury noted that the rights 
conferred by copyright and intellectual property laws have an inherent 
potential to generate price discrimination:  
 
1  Nicholas Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 2. 
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… intellectual property laws provide various rights for the 
protection of economic investment in innovation and creative 
efforts. To the extent that these rights allow rights holders to 
control the marketing and distribution of goods and services, there 
is a potential for price discrimination, should the rights holder 
choose to do so.2  
4.8 Lack of balance and competition in the copyright system can generate 
excessive prices for copyright material, which represents a significant 
social cost, according to Dr Suzor and Ms Dootson.3 The Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), in its submission to the 
Australian Law Reform Commission’s ongoing Copyright and the Digital 
Economy review highlighted the need for balance in the copyright regime:  
Absent copyright laws, it is possible for users to ‘free-ride’ on 
copyright materials by using them without payment. 
Consequently, there may be inadequate incentives for investment 
in the creation of copyright materials that consumers value… 
[However], the costs for economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare associated with too high or too extensive protections for IP 
rights may be significant.4 
4.9 In its review of the Australian copyright system in 2000, the Intellectual 
Property and Competition Review Committee (the Ergas Committee) also 
noted the importance of balance in copyright.5 The Ergas Committee’s 
report argued that while copyright legislation must seek to ‘redress the 
problems associated with free riding’, it must also ‘address the adverse 
economic effects that a grant of protection itself may create’:  
It is, in this respect, a fallacy to suggest that policies conferring 
more income on copyright owners in and of themselves are 
socially desirable relative to those that confer less. Rather, the goal 
of the intellectual property system is to provide a sufficient 
incentive for socially useful investment in creative effort...Over-
compensating rights owners is as harmful, perhaps even more 
harmful, than under-compensating them.6 
 
2  Treasury, Submission 85, p. 7. 
3  Nicholas Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 2. 
4  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC submission to the ALRC Copyright 
and the Digital Economy Issues Paper, November 2012, p. 2. 
5  Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee (also known as the Ergas 
Committee, after its Chair, Professor Henry Ergas), Review of intellectual property legislation 
under the Competition Principles Agreement, 2000, p. 33. 
6  Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of intellectual property 
legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement, 2000, p. 33. 
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Development of current legislative framework  
4.10 The Committee has considered the development of the copyright regime 
described by industry and consumers throughout the course of this 
inquiry. Clearly the increased presence of a digital IT environment has 
created challenges for interpretation of the balance of rights of access by 
consumers, protections for the artists, and the ability to generate financial 
benefits. It has also meant that ideas of appropriate competition are 
contested. 
Copyright and competition in physical media 
4.11 Many inquiry participants addressed issues of costs and competition, and 
described how these have been managed prior to the advent of the digital 
environment. The issue of parallel imports was raised extensively, and 
demonstrated claims that in a digital world, those rules are rapidly losing 
relevance. 
4.12 The Committee notes the Choice description of parallel importation: 
Parallel imports are legitimately produced goods imported into 
another country. The goods are manufactured with the 
authorisation or consent of the intellectual property rights owner 
and subsequently imported into another country by an 
unauthorised distributor. Unlike pirated (counterfeit) goods, 
parallel goods are genuine and manufactured by the intellectual 
property owners, or licensee of the owner.7 
4.13 Parallel importation of copyright material is prohibited by sections 37 and 
102 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). For much of the last century these 
sections effectively shielded copyright holders in Australia from 
international competition by preventing consumers and business from 
importing copyright material from cheaper overseas markets.  
4.14 From the late 1980s, however, the Australian Government progressively 
removed parallel import restrictions (PIRs) for certain products after 
reviews by the Prices Surveillance Authority and the Copyright Law 
Reform Committee. In response to these reports the Copyright Act was 
amended in 1990 to permit the parallel importation of books in limited 
circumstances, and again in 1997 to permit the parallel importation of 
CDs.8 
4.15 The Ergas Committee observed in 2000 that PIRs ‘are likely to confer on 
the owners of copyrighted material the power to charge higher prices to 
 
7  Choice, Submission 75, p. 36. 
8  Matthew Rimmer, Submission 92, pp. 16-19. 
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Australian consumers than would otherwise be the case’.9 In relation to 
PIRs, the report said:  
The Committee’s considered view is that the restrictions do allow 
higher prices to be charged for the protected material than would 
otherwise prevail. A significant proportion of the benefits from 
these higher prices flow to foreign rights holders. The 
corresponding costs are borne in Australia, by Australian 
consumers and industries - such as the domestic software industry 
- that use imported protected material as an input in their 
production process. The Committee does not believe the gains to 
Australia from these restrictions outweigh their costs.10 
4.16 Subsequently, PIRs on e-books, periodicals, sheet music and ‘legitimate 
software’ were removed by the Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) 
Act 2003 (Cth).11 In 2009 the Productivity Commission was asked to 
review the effects of continuing PIRs on books, concluded that reform is 
necessary, and therefore recommended that PIRs be terminated.12 The 
ACCC has also advocated the removal of PIRs, most recently in its 
submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission’s review of 
copyright law. In its submission to the ALRC, the ACCC emphasised its 
long-held opposition to PIRs:  
[The ACCC] has consistently held the view that parallel import 
restrictions extend rights to copyright owners beyond what is 
necessary to address the ‘free-rider’ problem...[G]ranting a 
monopoly right to import creates the potential for market power 
to be conferred on copyright owners.13 
4.17 Submissions to this committee indicate that parallel importation of 
physical media is one of the most effective ways for Australian consumers 
to mitigate international price discrimination in relation to copyright 
material. Mr Philip Noonan, Director-General of IP Australia, advised the 
Committee that the organisation ‘favour[s] the retention of the capacity for 
parallel importation’,14 and the Committee notes Choice’s arguments that 
 
9  Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of intellectual property 
legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement, 2000, p. 62. 
10  Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of intellectual property 
legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement, 2000, p. 7. 
11  Matthew Rimmer, Submission 92, p. 24. 
12  Productivity Commission, Restrictions on the Parallel Importation of Books, 2009, p. 7.19. 
13  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC submission to the ALRC Copyright 
and the Digital Economy Issues Paper, November 2012, p. 11. 
14  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 February 2013, p. 2. 
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this can be a useful mechanism in reducing international price 
discrimination:  
Parallel imports help overcome IT price disparities in two main 
ways: 
 presenting consumers with lower-priced options for goods; and 
 putting competitive pressure on copyright owners to reduce 
their Australian prices. 
If more consumers engaged in parallel importing, this would 
pressure copyright owners to reduce prices in the Australian 
market.15 
4.18 Several inquiry participants have noted the benefits Australian consumers 
derive from parallel imports and have called for remaining restrictions to 
be abolished. The Australian Digital Alliance and the Australian Libraries 
Copyright Committee (ADA/ALCC), for example, argued in its 
submission that the remaining PIRs on books should be removed. Citing 
the history of independent reviews which have found PIRs to be 
ineffective and inefficient, and noting the negative effects of the remaining 
PIRs on Australian libraries, the ADA/ALCC recommended that: 
Existing parallel importation restrictions in Australian copyright 
law should be repealed, to facilitate more competitive pricing of 
content by domestic retailers and increase consumer choice.16 
4.19 After surveying the history of independent reports and subsequent 
amendments to the Copyright Act, Dr Matthew Rimmer, a copyright 
scholar at the Australian National University, concluded that PIRs should 
be repealed, in order to ‘promote consumer choice, competition, and 
innovation’.17 Dr Rimmer’s views were supported by Dr Suzor and Ms 
Dootson.18 
4.20 Although Assoc Prof Weatherall argued that lifting remaining PIRs in 
relation to books and movies would increase competition, the precise 
extent to which this might translate into lower prices was uncertain: 
If local retailers were able, by sourcing parallel imports, to charge 
a lower price (closer to cheaper prices being charged overseas) this 
could, indirectly, put pressure on high prices charged to 
Australians seeking to purchase online. Whether this would in fact 
occur would depend on all kinds of qualifications and 
 
15  Choice, Submission 75, p. 36. 
16  Australian Digital Alliance/Australian Libraries Copyright Committee, Submission 95, p. 3. 
17  Matthew Rimmer, Submission 92, p. 29. 
18  Nichols Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 4. 
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complications (such as local reluctance to source parallel imported 
goods in order to preserve relationships with suppliers.)19 
4.21 Although the publishing industry did not directly address the issue of 
parallel import restrictions, industry representatives noted that the 
industry has been subject to frequent government reviews.20 Evidence 
from the movie and music industries did not directly address the issue of 
PIRs, instead stressing the ‘dynamic and highly competitive’ state of home 
entertainment markets.21 
Copyright and competition impacts of the shift to digital content  
4.22 The shift to digital content has transformed the market for copyright 
material in fundamental ways, including impacts on business models, and 
access to copyright material by consumers. According to Mr Matt 
Minogue, First Assistant Secretary of the Civil Law Division at the 
Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), digitally distributed content is 
treated differently to content on physical media in terms of copyright law:  
The whole issue of parallel importation was very much a 
paradigm in the context of physical supply. It does not really 
apply in the digital world…22 
4.23 The Committee notes that digital distribution of copyright content is 
governed to a much greater extent by contractual and licensing 
agreements which can effectively prevent consumers and businesses from 
accessing content in cheaper overseas markets. Mr Minogue noted that 
these licenses can be regarded as a right in themselves and acknowledged 
that they can be used to defeat parallel importation:  
If the original owner has divided the market up in such a way that 
you can sell to one market and someone else can sell to another, 
leaving each licensee to exploit it as they can in a different market, 
it also means that contractually you may not be able to sell at all to 
the other market.23 
4.24 The Committee has heard concerns that the terms under which digital 
copyright content is distributed, combined with recent expansions in the 
rights of copyright holders, may limit competition in copyright markets. 
The ACCC noted that situations can arise in which the extent of the rights 
provided by copyright may cause competition issues: 
 
19  Kimberlee Weatherall, Submission 127, p. 4. 
20  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 8. 
21  Australian Home Entertainment Distributors Association, Submission 58, p. 1. 
22  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 February 2013, p. 10. 
23  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 February 2013, p. 8. 
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Although the mere grant and use of copyright seldom conflicts 
with competition laws, in some circumstances, the extent and use 
of those rights may give rise to competition concerns and be 
detrimental to efficiency and welfare... [G]ranting a monopoly 
right to import creates the potential for market power to be 
conferred on copyright owners.24 
4.25 The ACCC further observed in its supplementary submission to the 
inquiry that:  
… a monopoly right to import, or a monopoly which is analogous 
to a monopoly right to import through exclusive digital delivery, 
is only one way in which market power might be conferred on 
copyright holders. Market power might also, but not necessarily, 
arise through licensing practices such as collective or exclusive 
licensing.25 
4.26 This evidence suggests that in markets for digitally delivered content, 
rights holders may enforce regional pricing arrangements, creating a 
monopoly right of sale and substantially lessening competition. The 
Committee notes that the evidence it has received highlighting high price 
differentials for digitally delivered copyright material may be an early 
sign that competition in copyright markets is lessening. 
Access to digital works 
4.27 As noted at the beginning of this chapter, impacts of copyright provisions 
over digital content on consumers and industry are contested, as are views 
as to how an appropriate level of competition is achieved. Some inquiry 
participants disagree with industry claims that more choice means more 
competition in copyright markets; the Committee also notes conflicting 
views as to effects on pricing, including for IT products. The following 
section canvasses some of the views on the benefits and disadvantages to 
stakeholders in a digital market. 
Choice and immediacy of access 
4.28 The Committee acknowledges evidence from rights holders and industry 
groups as to the advantages for consumers of copyright content; for 
example, more choices as to how copyright content is accessed. Mr Dan 
 
24  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC submission to the ALRC Copyright 
and the Digital Economy Issues Paper, November 2012, p. 11. 
25  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission 100.1, pp. 1-2. 
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Rosen, CEO of the Australian Recording Industry Association (ARIA), 
highlighted ‘a huge range of options’ available to music consumers, noting 
that ‘a music fan in Australia has more opportunity to purchase music in 
different ways than at any time throughout history.26 
4.29 Mr Jose Borghino of the Australian Publishers Association also 
emphasised the variety of options Australian consumers have in accessing 
written content: 
Apart from new e-book platforms… consumers can now log onto 
the search engines like booko.com.au and choose between 
American or British hardback editions mailed to them with free 
freight through Book Depository UK and US… They can buy 
second-hand books from AbeBooks or de-accessioned library 
books from Better World Books… They can go online and buy the 
book direct from the publisher…. The Australian book market is 
extremely competitive, with Australian consumers having more 
access to a greater diversity of titles than ever.27 
4.30 The Committee acknowledges that digitally delivered content can also 
offer advantages over physical media in terms of near-immediate access to 
content, and notes that this may be an advantage for which consumers 
may elect to pay a higher price. The Committee notes that with this 
increased level of immediate access, there is arguably an even greater 
focus on copyright protection and industry claims about the need for 
protective actions. Justifications for these claims are considered below. 
IT pricing and copyright infringement 
4.31 The Committee notes that there are many reasons for industry to take 
action against copyright infringement, and not all will be canvassed here. 
The Committee is also aware that consumers do not necessarily accept 
industry explanations that price discrimination can, at least in part, be 
defended by a need to protect against copyright infringement. The 
Committee understands that consumers will often seek to access material 
in the most cost-effective way possible. 
4.32 Rights holders may seek to justify the use of contractual and technical 
devices, which may have the potential to affect competition, on the basis 
that such devices prevent copyright infringement. Rights holders have 
argued in submissions and in evidence before the Committee that 
 
26  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 5 October 2012, p. 4. 
27  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 9. 
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copyright infringement threatens creative industries and that government 
action is needed to address it. The Committee has also heard evidence, 
however, which suggests that high prices for copyright material and 
anachronistic business practices may undermine the copyright regime 
generally and may also serve to generate infringement. This section will 
outline the evidence presented to the Committee in support of these 
competing claims. 
4.33 In relation to the issue of copyright infringement, the Committee 
acknowledges concerns of rights holder organisations in the music, movie 
and publishing industries about the ongoing unauthorised access to 
copyright works made possible by the internet. The Committee received 
contrasting evidence as to the impacts on revenues for industry or costs to 
consumers.  
4.34 Submissions from the music, movie and publishing industries 
demonstrated that copyright infringement is of concern to rights holders, 
and has a serious negative impact on industry revenue. ARIA, for 
example, indicated in its submission that copyright infringement is a 
serious issue for its members:  
… a major issue for the Australian recorded music sector today is 
the impact of piracy. … Unlike some other jurisdictions, there is no 
coherent industry or legislative framework in Australia to deal 
with the problem of unauthorised access to music.28 
4.35 As noted in chapter 3, Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (UMA) stated 
that the prevalence of illegitimate music downloads and streaming has led 
to ‘a rapid decline in willingness to pay for recorded music’.29 In 
describing the impacts of piracy, UMA stated: 
The enormous impact of piracy on the supply of authorised 
recorded music has dramatically reduced the resources available 
to UMA and other record companies to invest in new music. It has 
also fundamentally affected the way in which record companies 
make music available to consumers… 
Piracy has already irreparably damaged the recorded music 
industry and will continue to be a major competitor to legitimate 
sales for as long as it remains unchecked.30 
4.36 The Australian Home Entertainment Distributors Association (AHEDA) 
made a similar argument in its submission: 
 
28  Australian Recording Industry Association, Submission 93, p. 2. 
29  Universal Music Australia, Submission 129, p. 2. 
30  Universal Music Australia, Submission 129, p. 2. 
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It is important for the Committee to recognise that Australia has 
some of the highest rates of online piracy (both peer-2-peer and 
streaming) infringements in the world and 90 per cent of P2P 
piracy in Australia is infringing. Australia is currently exposed 
without a legislative regime to counter such behaviour.31 
4.37 Mr Ross Gibb, Group Managing Director at Macmillan Publishers 
Australia noted that the publishing industry increasingly regards 
copyright infringement as a significant problem: 
The main issue that we have with piracy is that people can 
circulate one digital file in very large numbers very quickly, and of 
course it removes the commercial value for that book.32 
4.38 Mr Jose Borghino of the Australian Publishers Association elaborated:  
It is a growing problem, and we estimate that once the NBN is up 
and running it will become a bigger problem. All the content 
industries in Australia are very worried about the increase in 
piracy that we are facing in the future.33 
4.39 While copyright holders are clearly concerned about the impact of 
infringement on their industries, the Committee heard evidence that the 
impact of infringement may be less severe than rights holders claim. 
Mr John Stanton, from the Communications Alliance, advised the 
Committee that in contrast to the claims of rights holders, the 
entertainment industry grew significantly over the last decade. In 
describing the overall state of the entertainment industry, a 2012 report 
notes that: 
… you wouldn’t know it, just listening to the entertainment 
industry talk about how much the entertainment industry is 
‘dying’, but data from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and iDATE 
show that from 1998 to 2010 the value of the worldwide 
entertainment industry grew from $449 billion...to $745 billion. 
That’s quite a leap for a market supposedly being decimated by 
technological change.34 
4.40 The report cites statistics demonstrating growth in world-wide box-office 
receipts and broader film industry revenue, as well as growth in the global 
music industry.35 In addition, the report cites US government statistics 
which indicate growth in the last decade of household spending on 
 
31  Australian Home Entertainment Distributors Association, Submission 58, pp. 3-4. 
32  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 15. 
33  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 15. 
34  The Sky is Rising, 2012, Michael Masnick and Michael Ho, Exhibit 1, p. 2. 
35  The Sky is Rising, 2012, Michael Masnick and Michael Ho, Exhibit 1, p. 9.  
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entertainment, and growth in employment in the entertainment industry, 
and suggest that the number of creative works being produced has grown 
‘at a tremendous rate’.36 
4.41 In relation to the problem of widespread copyright infringement, Mr John 
Stanton, CEO of the Communications Alliance, stated that, while there are 
several reasons behind high rates of infringement, ‘one of the most 
obvious of those is the lack in some cases of availability of legal and 
affordable online content’.37 Mr Stanton also argued that artificial barriers 
to content created by rights holders can have a huge impact on the level of 
copyright infringement, and that geoblocking is a ‘classic generator of 
online piracy’.38 
4.42 Mr Stanton advised that the price of copyright material can have a 
significant impact on infringement, and cited a pricing experiment 
conducted by computer game vendor Valve (owner of the distribution 
platform Steam), where the price of one of its most successful games was 
reduced by 75 per cent, and sales revenues skyrocketed.39  
4.43 The Committee received evidence that high prices and limited availability 
of content can also undermine the ‘the legitimacy of Australian copyright 
law’. 40 Dr Suzor and Ms Dootson cited research which explored consumer 
perceptions of fairness, and how content restrictions and price 
discrimination affected the perceived legitimacy of illegal downloading:  
The more that Australian copyright law is seen as anachronistic 
and supportive of perceived unfair business practices, the less 
likely it is to be followed. The apparently unjustifiable difference 
between prices in Australia and comparable European and US 
markets is likely to lead consumers to infringement. 41 
4.44 The study found that Australian consumers consider higher prices to be 
‘discriminatory’, that they make them feel like ‘second-class citizens’, and 
that this can create a mindset in which infringement is seen as more 
legitimate.42 Consumer submissions to this inquiry overwhelmingly 
support this view.43 Dr Suzor and Ms Dootson went on to argue that high 
 
36  The Sky is Rising, 2012, Michael Masnick and Michael Ho, Exhibit 1, pp. 2-3. 
37  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 32. 
38  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 34. 
39  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 33. 
40  Nicholas Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 3. 
41  Nicholas Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, pp. 2-3. 
42  Nicholas Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, pp. 2-3. 
43  Including Kye Ridley-Smith, Submission 61, p. 1. As mentioned earlier in this report, more than 
half of the submissions to the inquiry were from consumers, many of whom expressed these 
concerns. 
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prices and limited availability of copyright material can generate 
infringement and undermine the copyright system as a whole, and 
concluded that: 
… by failing to provide reasonably priced, effective, and 
convenient legal distribution channels, some copyright owners are 
contributing to infringement and the growing disregard for 
copyright law. In this context, recent attempts by copyright 
owners to shift the burden of enforcing copyright law to taxpayers 
(through criminal copyright regimes) and to internet 
intermediaries (through litigation against ISPs and lobbying for 
graduated response regimes) should be treated with strong 
scepticism.44 
Measures to limit access to content 
4.45 From the above discussion, the Committee notes that despite industry 
claims about the costs of copyright infringement, consumers insist that 
their rights to access copyright material are being unfairly limited by 
methods such as copyright law provisions, or mechanisms such as 
geoblocking, which as discussed in earlier chapters can take various 
forms. The Committee also notes suggestions that copyright provisions 
can have a practical effect of reducing competition. The Committee 
acknowledges claims that access to content is sought in various ways, and 
notes that these claims are often the subject of debate about legitimacy. 
4.46 The Committee notes the distinction between technological protection 
measures (TPMs) and geoblocking technologies. Mr Minogue of AGD, 
explained that:  
… general geoblocking devices that allow market segmentation 
would not of themselves be a technological protection measure...to 
the extent that the Copyright Act allows an owner or assignee of 
property to impose a TPM over the content, that is not the same 
thing as geoblocking.45 
4.47 AGD suggested that it is unlikely that geoblocking mechanisms could be 
considered to be TPMs. The department observed that a particular 
geoblocking technology would only be protected under the Copyright Act 
if it falls within the definition of a TPM in section 10(1) of the Copyright 
Act, which requires the TPM to be used:  
 
44  Nicholas Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 4. 
45  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 February 2013, p. 4. 
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 in connection with the exercise of the copyright;  
 by or with the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright in the material, and  
 to control access to the work or other subject matter.46 
Technological protection measures  
4.48 TPMs (also referred to as effective technological measures, or ETMs) and 
digital rights management systems (DRM) are measures designed to 
prevent unauthorised access to or copying of copyright protected content. 
TPMs initially appeared in the 1990s, in response to concerns held by 
copyright owners about the rise of easily reproducible digital media. The 
Australian Copyright Council, in its submission to the current review of 
the TPM regime, has described access control TPMs as: 
… a type of technological lock that prevents a person from 
accessing copyright material without permission...Technological 
protection measures are vital in enabling copyright owners to 
develop new business models and make their material available in 
digital formats.47 
4.49 TPMs are justified by some rights holders as necessary to protect content 
from copyright infringement,48 but the Committee notes that some TPMs 
are easily circumvented. The 1996 World Intellectual Property 
Organisation copyright treaty provided for legal remedies to make 
circumventing TPMs illegal.49 Subsequently, legal protections for TPMs 
were introduced in many international jurisdictions in the late 1990s. 
Australia enacted measures in the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) 
Act 2000 (Cth). As a consequence, as Assoc Prof Weatherall noted in her 
submission: 
Australian copyright law makes it illegal to circumvent certain 
(access control) TPMs, to manufacture/provide/transmit a device 
for circumventing TPMs, or to provide or offer a service for 
circumventing TPMs. Circumvention of access control TPMs for a 
commercial offence is a criminal offence – a provision that would 
 
46  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 124, p. 2.  
47  Australian Copyright Council, Submission to the Attorney-General’s Department on Technological 
Protection Measures, August 2012, p. 3.  
48  As an example, the Advanced Access Content Licensing System Licensing Administrator, in 
Re: Review of Technological Protection Measure exceptions, October 2012, p. 1, argues that 
copyright holders would not be willing to offer content for consumers’ enjoyment without 
protection against ready infringement. 
49  Matthew Rimmer, Submission 92, p. 30.  
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not impact on individual consumers but could impact on 
Australian businesses seeking lower prices for software.50 
4.50 The Committee notes Dr Rimmer’s observation that laws around TPMs 
are a form of ‘paracopyright’ – it is illegal to circumvent a TPM which has 
been applied to content, even when that content would otherwise be in the 
public domain. Under TPM laws, copyright holders effectively have the 
ability to control access to works, whereas previous copyright only allowed 
control of the uses falling within exclusive rights.51 
4.51 Industry groups did not provide any evidence to this inquiry in relation to 
TPMs. However, concerns about TPMs were raised in several submissions 
to this inquiry. Dr Suzor and Ms Dootson argue that while TPMs were 
developed to protect the interests of copyright holders and should not 
protect market segmentation, ‘the reality of TPMs has turned out much 
differently’. Dr Suzor and Ms Dootson observe: 
TPMs now appear to impose significant costs on legitimate but 
technically unsophisticated users. They prevent users from 
making backups of their software as permitted by the copyright 
act. They prevent blind people from using software to read books 
aloud. They cause untold headaches for consumers who purchase 
content only to find that the copy protection is faulty, rendering 
their purchase useless. If and when Australia introduces new 
copyright exceptions to allow commonplace activities like making 
backups of digital copies of films, books, games and music; and 
making copies of each of these for viewing on portable devices or 
over cloud services, these activities will also be hampered by 
TPMs. They do not, however, prevent technically sophisticated 
individuals from breaking the locks and engaging in large-scale 
infringement.52 
4.52 Dr Rimmer argues that not only have TPMs been largely ineffective in 
preventing copyright infringement (thereby failing at the task that is their 
primary justification), there is also evidence that: 
… TPMs have been used for anti-competitive purposes in attempts 
to control secondary markets for remote controls, printer 
cartridges, data storage, and wireless telephone services. There 
have also been a number of cases in which there have been 
 
50  Kimberlee Weatherall, Submission 127, pp. 7-8. 
51  Matthew Rimmer, Submission 92, p. 44; Ariel Bogle, Exhibit 2, p. 9. 
52  Nicholas Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 4. 
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difficulties engaging in security testing and reverse engineering 
because of the use of TPMs.53  
4.53 The ADA/ALCC submission notes that TPMs can limit or prevent a 
number of legitimate uses of content by libraries, schools and universities. 
The submission cites a list provided by the Copyright Advisory Group of 
the Standing Council on School Education and Early Childhood 
representing Australian schools and TAFES, which highlights: 
… circumstances in which teachers are prevented from using 
content because of TPMs, even where the intended use of that 
content is non-infringing under copyright law. Where TPMs are 
attached, educators cannot: 
 Create subtitled versions of films for hearing impaired students  
 Use devices other than a DVD player (like iPads, laptops, 
content management systems) to play protected DVDs in the 
course of classroom instruction  
 Compile film clips and other snippets of content protected by 
TPMs to aid student analysis or classroom discussion.54  
4.54 The ADA/ALCC also describes practical challenges for legitimate users: 
Even where copyright law recognises a specific situation in which 
TPMs can be circumvented or removed, in practice this may be 
difficult to achieve… Digital locks attached to content can restrict a 
user’s ability to print, copy or email portions of the text as 
permitted under copyright law, and in some circumstances, library 
staff do not have the technical expertise or circumvention device to 
remove the lock.55 
4.55 This evidence indicates that TPMs can restrict competition in copyright 
markets by preventing consumers from accessing and using legally 
acquired content in legitimate ways. The Committee is also aware that 
TPMs have been used in some circumstances to enforce geographic 
market segmentation (that is, as a form of geoblocking). 
Geoblocking 
4.56 As discussed earlier in this report, geoblocking is the term given to the 
methods vendors have adopted to differentiate between regions and to 
keep customers separate (see chapter 2). From the perspective of industry, 
it can be a legal means of conducting business. From the perspective of 
 
53  Matthew Rimmer, Submission 92, pp. 31-32. 
54  Australian Digital Alliance/Australian Libraries Copyright Committee, Submission 95, pp. 12-
13. 
55  Australian Digital Alliance/Australian Libraries Copyright Committee, Submission 95, p. 13. 
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consumers (see chapter 3), it can mean being unfairly overcharged for IT 
products or discriminated against based on geographical location. The 
Committee heard about interpretations of geoblocking practices as they 
relate to copyright and debates about access to intellectual property, 
including the way in which it has been suggested that practices have 
unintended consequences for consumers, markets and the copyright 
regime. 
4.57 Despite positive developments in terms of the choices offered by rights 
holders to consumers to access content, Dr Suzor and Ms Dootson 
elaborated on content vendors’ attempts to limit competition by capturing 
consumers within ‘walled gardens’: 
The recent trend has been towards the creation of locked digital 
ecosystems: phones locked to app stores, book readers locked to 
single retailers, music and films only playable on the retailing 
company’s devices, computer games only available through a 
single digital distributor. One of the unfortunate results of this 
trend is to drive up prices for consumers and to enable publishers 
to exercise unprecedented control over how and where cultural 
goods are enjoyed. This is bad for three reasons: increased control 
over how media is used limits legitimate acts of consumption, 
expression, learning, sharing, and cultural play; increased prices 
and closed ecosystems limit consumer access to cultural goods; 
and perceived unfairness challenges the legitimacy of copyright 
law.56 
4.58 Another way in which rights holders exercise control is through the 
license agreements under which copyright content is acquired. 
Cyberworld Publishing explained that digital content is not purchased in 
the same sense that physical media are purchased. Instead, consumers 
purchase a license to access that content: 
An e-book may be accessed electronically but it always remains 
the property of the publisher. An e-book purchaser merely 
acquires a license or the right to access and read the contents of a 
file they download. They cannot perform any actual process or 
manipulation with the contents of the e-book file and should not 
transfer it or its contents - which are subject to copyright - to 
anyone else.57 
4.59 Similar licensing conditions are attached to the acquisition of other digital 
media. Conditional licenses to access copyright content contrast sharply 
 
56  Nicholas Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 5. 
57  Cyberworld Publishing, Submission 34, p. 2. 
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with the traditional rights of consumers over purchased copyright content 
and have broad flow-on effects in relation to the cost of copyright 
material. The Committee notes views regarding impacts of restrictive 
licenses, for example, the prevention of resale, on competition. According 
to Dr Suzor and Ms Dootson, the lack of a robust secondary market 
entrenches the monopoly power of distributors.58 
Limits to geoblocking strategies  
4.60 Dr Rimmer noted that for copyright owners who may have hoped that 
their business models would be protected by elements of ‘technological 
protection measures, digital locks, strong economic rights [and] strong 
enforcement’, this hadn’t occurred. 59 In his submission, Dr Rimmer states: 
Australian consumers have been locked out by technological 
protection measures; subject to surveillance, privacy intrusions 
and security breaches; locked into walled gardens by digital rights 
management systems; and geoblocked.60 
4.61 At a public hearing, Dr Rimmer told the Committee: 
You would have to say over the last decade the choices by the big 
copyright owners in publishing, music and film have been to try to 
rely on exclusive rights, to have a very tight control of that regime 
through peer networks, but that strategy has not necessarily been 
effective. Really in the void these other intermediaries have 
appeared because they have helped satisfy consumer demand for 
legitimate products in an accessible way.61 
Methods of accessing cheaper goods 
4.62 As the Committee has been advised, consumers have developed many 
ways to improve their ability to access content despite geoblocking 
mechanisms. According to Ms Erin Turner from the Australian 
Communications Consumer Action Network:  
… consumers, due to the high prices in Australia, use a number of 
methods to purchase overseas—or at least the particularly savvy 
consumers do. They might shop while they are travelling; they 
might purchase through online stores that know they are selling to 
 
58  Nicholas Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 6. 
59  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 19 September 2012, p. 14. 
60  Matthew Rimmer, Submission 92, p. 6. 
61  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 19 September 2012, p. 14. 
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Australia; or, as we are increasingly seeing, services are offered on 
online—virtual private networks or even stores—that give you a 
fake US address and then courier products to Australia. They 
allow you to access those cheaper products.62 
4.63 Consumers may use a proxy server or a virtual private network (VPN) to 
bypass IP address-based geoblocking. Proxy servers and VPNs create an 
encrypted tunnel between a customer’s computer and a server elsewhere, 
usually in another country. The customer’s internet traffic is routed 
through that server and as a result vendor websites recognise the IP 
address of the server, rather than that of the customer, which may enable 
consumers to access content that would otherwise be region-blocked. 
4.64 Many IT vendors seek to further enforce geoblocking by checking 
customers’ credit cards at the point of sale, or by only shipping to 
addresses within a certain region. These geoblocking methods can be 
challenging for consumers to circumvent. The Committee notes however, 
that other options are available to consumers seeking to access lower 
overseas prices. These include the purchasing of US iTunes store gift cards 
through intermediaries set up for that purpose and by making use of 
‘freight-forwarding’ companies which ship goods from the US on behalf of 
overseas customers.  
4.65 The Committee was made aware of various ways which enable access to 
cheaper computer games. Many consumers expressed a preference for 
parallel importation of physical media from online stores based in cheaper 
jurisdictions – the UK-based ozgameshop.com being among the most 
popular.63 The Committee is also aware of means by which consumers can 
access CD keys re-sold from cheaper markets – a practice not generally 
approved by games publishers, who have been known to remove English-
language support from those games, making them unplayable.64 The 
Committee also notes that some vendors may terminate a user’s account 
and confiscate that user’s legally purchased items if it decides they have 
breached the terms and conditions which enable geoblocking.65 
Legality of circumvention methods 
4.66 While many submissions strongly support the avoidance of geoblocking 
mechanisms put in place by IT companies and vendors, there is also 
uncertainty as to whether such actions are legal in all circumstances, 
 
62  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 19 September 2012, p. 7. 
63  Stuart Skene, Submission 52 , p. 1; Scott Nelson, Submission 4, p. 1; Dmitry Brizhinev, Submission 
30, p. 1. 
64  Daniel Myles, Submission 33, p. 5. 
65  Nicholas Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 6. 
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including as a possible breach of the Copyright Act’s anti-circumvention 
provisions in relation to access control TPMs. 
4.67 AGD noted that ‘the relevant provisions of the Copyright Act have not 
been tested by a court. There are no judicial decisions that provide any 
further guidance as to whether a particular technology would be 
considered a TPM or not.’66 However on the basis of a plain English 
reading of the definition, AGD:  
… considers it unlikely that the technologies discussed would fall 
within the definition of an ‘access control technological protection 
measure’. Where a geoblocking technology is not a technological 
protection measure, the Copyright Act does not prevent a person 
bypassing that geoblocking technology.67 
4.68 Assoc Prof Weatherall, while agreeing with AGD in some respects, 
reached a less definite conclusion on whether geoblocking mechanisms 
could be considered to be TPMs: 
Determining whether geoblocking is prohibited turns on deciding 
whether technologies used to enforce geographical market 
segmentation fall within the definition of an ‘access control 
technological protection measure’ (ACTPM) under section 10 of 
the Australian Copyright Act.68 
4.69 According to Assoc Prof Weatherall, it is ‘far from straightforward’ to 
determine whether a particular form of geoblocking is protected under the 
Copyright Act. Such a determination would need to consider: 
 the way the technology works  
 how Australian courts could interpret the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the Copyright Act, and  
 the language of the Act itself, which is ‘complicated and opaque’.69  
4.70 Assoc Prof Weatherall considered it ‘unlikely’ that requiring a US credit 
card or US mailing address could ever be considered as an TPM because 
‘such measures are too distant from the exercise of copyright rights’. 
However geoblocking technology on the basis of IP address raises 
‘questions of legal interpretation for which we have no guidance from the 
legislative history or court decisions’.70 
 
66  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 124 , p. 2. 
67  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 124, p. 2. 
68  Kimberlee Weatherall, Submission 127, p. 9. 
69  Kimberlee Weatherall, Submission 127, p. 9. 
70  Kimberlee Weatherall, Submission 127, p. 10. 
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4.71 In addition to uncertainty over the extent to which geoblocking 
mechanisms can be considered TPMs, the Committee has heard that there 
is some uncertainty surrounding the extent to which Australians are 
permitted to circumvent geoblocking TPMs.  
4.72 The Committee understands that section 10(1) contains an exception 
which permits Australians to circumvent some TPMs. The exception arose 
as a consequence of the High Court’s decision in Stevens v Kabushiki 
Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (Stevens v Sony).71 In that case the 
High Court ruled that the circumvention of TPMs designed to enforce 
geographical market segmentation – specifically, the installation of ‘mod 
chips’ in PlayStation gaming consoles – was permitted. In his analysis of 
the case, Dr Rimmer notes that: 
… the High Court was concerned that an expansive interpretation 
of ‘TPMs’ would provide unwarranted protection to regional 
coding devices, which would allow copyright owners to engage in 
price discrimination between markets.72 
4.73 As a consequence of the High Court’s decision in Stevens v Sony, the 
Copyright Act was amended to permit the circumvention of some TPMs. 
Section 10(1) provides that Australians are permitted to circumvent a TPM 
if it is applied to a ‘film or computer program (including a computer 
game)’ and if the TPM ‘controls geographic market segmentation by 
preventing the playback in Australia of a non-infringing copy of the 
[content] acquired outside of Australia’.73 
4.74 The ADA/ALCC noted that the application of the section 10(1) exception 
is not clear, as it may exclude geoblocking TPMs which: are applied to 
books, music or other content; are applied to content acquired in 
Australia; do not ‘prevent playback’; or which have a dual purpose.74 
4.75 This evidence may suggest that the TPM provisions of the Copyright Act 
are not intended to protect geoblocking mechanisms. The Committee 
notes the views of Assoc Prof Weatherall that: 
… the law in this area is plagued by uncertainty. Thus submissions 
suggesting that the legal status of circumvention of geoblocking 
mechanisms is a grey area are correct.75 
 
71  Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 221 ALR 448. 
72  Matthew Rimmer, Submission 92, p. 41. 
73  Matthew Rimmer, Submission 92, pp. 49-50. 
74  Australian Digital Alliance/Australian Libraries Copyright Committee, Submission 95.1, pp. 1-
2. 
75  Kimberlee Weatherall, Submission 127, p. 12. 
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4.76 Considering the evidence above, and earlier in this chapter, the 
Committee has considered areas where remedies have been proposed, or 
may be desirable.  
Possible remedies to address IT price discrimination 
4.77 This chapter has considered the issue of price discrimination in the context 
of legal frameworks and formal pricing mechanisms. It has considered the 
competing and often overlapping interests of industry and consumers, 
based on evidence received during the course of the inquiry. The 
Committee received various suggestions as to possible remedies to 
matters which affect the cost burden on Australian consumers, as well as 
the challenges of providing a sustainable and competitive market. In this 
section, the Committee deliberates on some areas for possible remedy, 
including some of the conflicting claims and predictions about their 
success, and makes recommendations accordingly. 
Parallel importation restrictions 
4.78 The Committee notes views of inquiry participants that the shift to 
digitally delivered content has altered the balance between the interests of 
rights holders and those of consumers. The Committee notes concerns 
about finding a balance in the copyright regime and that, in order to 
address this challenge, remaining restrictions to parallel importation of 
goods should be removed. The Committee concurs with views that the 
remaining restrictions on parallel imports are neither appropriate nor 
necessary.76 
 
Recommendation 4 
 The Committee recommends that the parallel importation restrictions 
still found in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) be lifted, and that the parallel 
importation defence in the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) be reviewed and 
broadened to ensure it is effective in allowing the importation of 
genuine goods. 
 
 
 
76  Kimberlee Weatherall, Submission 127, p. 5.  
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Clarification of legality of measures  
4.79 The Committee notes that there is a degree of uncertainty about the 
legality of methods used to avoid geoblocking mechanisms, and whether 
those methods could be considered to circumvent TPMs, and possibly be 
liable for prosecution. Consumer group Choice was among many inquiry 
participants who expressed the view that the government should act to 
remove doubts about the legality of circumventing geoblocking:  
The confusion surrounding IP address lockouts means that many 
consumers may be civilly or criminally liable by circumventing 
‘access control’ TPMs… Choice believes that such circumvention 
should be exempt because consumers are merely accessing 
products and services which are being provided knowingly and 
willingly by the copyright holder.77 
4.80 The ADA/ALCC suggested that the Copyright Act could be amended to 
ensure that Australian consumers who remove, disable or circumvent 
geoblocking mechanisms should not be subject to civil or criminal 
sanctions.78 In her submission, Assoc Prof Weatherall canvassed the 
possibility of drafting legislative amendments to ensure that Australian 
consumers who do take steps to circumvent geoblocking are not acting in 
breach of the Copyright Act: 
In my opinion it would be possible to draft an exclusion to ensure 
that Australian consumers who take steps to evade technical 
measures used to enforce market segmentation on the basis of 
geographical location are not at risk of infringing the Copyright 
Act 1968. Such measures should be excluded from the definition of 
ACTPM [an access control TPM]. This would protect consumers, 
although individual consumers are unlikely to be sued. More 
importantly it would have the effect of ensuring that commercial 
providers of services for evading geoblocking do not risk liability 
under the Copyright Act 1968; either civil liability under the 
manufacturing or services provisions of anti-circumvention law, or 
accessorial liability for assisting others to undertake a criminal 
act.79 
4.81 Assoc Prof Weatherall further expressed the view that such amendments 
could be adopted consistent with Australia’s international obligations and 
 
77  Choice, Submission to the Review of Technological Protection Measure Exceptions Made Under the 
Copyright Act 1968, available at www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/Choice%20 
Submission.doc, viewed 23 January 2013. 
78  Australian Digital Alliance/Australian Libraries Copyright Committee, Submission 95.1, p. 1. 
79  Kimberlee Weatherall, Submission 127, p. 12. 
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would have the effect of removing any doubt regarding the potential 
liability of consumers for circumventing geoblocking technology.80 
4.82 The Committee notes evidence from AGD that geoblocking devices which 
allow market segmentation are not of themselves a TPM.81 The Committee 
also notes AGD’s view that ‘the Copyright Act is not the appropriate 
vehicle to consider any such proposed amendment’.82  
 
Recommendation 5 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Government amend the 
Copyright Act’s section 10(1) anti-circumvention provisions to clarify 
and secure consumers’ rights to circumvent technological protection 
measures that control geographic market segmentation.  
 
Recommendation 6 
 The Committee further recommends that the Australian Government 
investigate options to educate Australian consumers and businesses as 
to:  
 the extent to which they may circumvent geoblocking 
mechanisms in order to access cheaper legitimate goods;  
 the tools and techniques which they may use to do so; and  
 the way in which their rights under the Australian Consumer 
Law may be affected should they choose to do so. 
 
Increasing competition and protecting consumer rights 
4.83 While some inquiry participants suggested that current levels of 
competition are adequate, the Committee notes that not all share the view 
of ARIA that no change is needed as ‘very considerable choice’ exists for 
consumers. Referring to the number of services currently operating in the 
digital sector of the retail segment of the market, and the abundance of 
free or near-free services, ‘there is no policy justification for governmental 
 
80  Kimberlee Weatherall, Submission 127, pp. 12-13. 
81  Matt Minogue, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 February 2013, p. 4. 
82  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 124, p. 3. 
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intervention by price regulation or by trying to prohibit national 
differential pricing’.83 
4.84 The Committee notes that evidence was received from inquiry 
participants which suggested that several aspects influencing competition 
should be considered for possible remedies: 
 competition in digital-only markets 
 mobility and rights in ‘locked’ environments, and 
 powers of the ACCC to operate in IP markets. 
Copyright in a digital-only environment 
4.85 The Committee received evidence noting that existing competition 
pressures in copyright markets may only be exacerbated if content is only 
available in digital form. Consumers’ ability to access content at 
internationally competitive prices may be severely constrained. If content 
is no longer distributed via physical media which can be parallel 
imported, evidence from some inquiry participants suggested that 
competition would likely be adversely affected, and rights holders may 
come to exercise significantly increased market power.  
4.86 The Committee notes the views of the ACCC and others that this may 
result in negative outcomes for consumers and the Australian economy 
more generally, owing to the greater cost burden on Australian 
consumers. The Committee sought additional advice from AGD as to 
whether the potential loss of the ability to parallel import warranted any 
government action to maintain competitive markets. In its response, AGD 
noted that the ‘marketplace is evolving very quickly, in terms of method 
of content delivery, physical or digital form and domestic and 
international markets’, and that: 
Buying content in an electronic form is ultimately a consumer’s 
decision. While ever content exists in a physical form such as CDs 
and DVDs, parallel importation may still be a relevant option. 
However, parallel importation applies only to hard copies, as the 
focus is on goods that are imported at the border.84 
4.87 The Committee notes that the ACCC has stated that it is aware of, and 
adopting a watching brief in relation to, potential competition issues 
arising from technological changes in respect of copyright markets: 
Given there remains some uncertainty about whether exclusive 
digital delivery models will become the only mode of delivery in 
the future, the ACCC has not formed a view at this time as to 
 
83  Australian Recording Industry Association, Submission 93, p. 2. 
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whether such a move would necessarily raise competition 
concerns. The ACCC notes that technological change, including 
the emergence of exclusive digital delivery models may raise 
concerns about the nature and extent of copyright. The ACCC 
considers that, to the extent possible, copyright protection and 
exceptions should operate on a technology neutral basis. The 
ACCC will continue to monitor developments in relevant markets 
carefully to ensure that competition is not restricted.85 
Mobility and rights in ‘locked’ environments 
4.88 The Committee heard evidence to suggest that in order to increase 
competition, some mobility in digital markets is necessary. Dr Suzor and 
Ms Dootson suggest that in order to ensure that distributors do not engage 
in anti-competitive behaviour, it is critical to limit their monopolies: 
Consumers should be able to access digital content from a range of 
suppliers, and creators should have a range of distribution 
channels available to them.86 
4.89 Dr Rimmer also addressed these issues in his submission, which contained 
a quote from IT consumer activist Cory Doctrow in relation to Amazon’s 
e-book cloud service: 
...the Kindle is a ‘roach motel’ device: its license terms and DRM 
[Digital Rights Management] ensure that books can check in, but 
they can’t check out. Readers are contractually prohibited from 
moving their books to competing devices; DRM makes that 
technically challenging; and competitors are legally enjoined from 
offering tools that would allow readers to break Kindle’s DRM 
and move their books to other devices.87 
4.90 The Committee notes the views of Dr Suzor and Ms Dootson about the 
need for the ACCC to take a more active role in investigating whether the 
contractual restrictions vendors and distributors attach to content do not 
limit competition or consumer rights. They also recommend that the 
government establish a legally protected right of resale for digital 
content.88 
4.91 The Committee notes the Australian Law Reform Commission’s ongoing 
review of copyright in the digital economy, and AGD’s review of TPM 
exceptions, and will continue to monitor developments in this area with 
 
85  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission 100.1, p. 2. 
86  Nichols Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 5. 
87  Matthew Rimmer, Submission 92, p. 94. 
88  Nichols Suzor and Paula Dootson, Submission 121, p. 6. 
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interest, especially with regard to the way in which consumers’ rights to 
legitimately use legally acquired copyright material are affected. 
 
Recommendation 7 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Government, in 
conjunction with relevant agencies, consider the creation of a ‘right of 
resale’ in relation to digitally distributed content, and clarification of 
‘fair use’ rights for consumers, businesses, and educational institutions, 
including restrictions on vendors’ ability to ‘lock’ digital content into a 
particular ecosystem. 
Powers of the ACCC to operate in IP markets 
4.92 The Committee was interested during the course of the inquiry in the 
effects of changing demands of markets, and ongoing suitability of 
legislative frameworks. The Committee was advised that section 51(3) of 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) exempts intellectual 
property (IP) licenses from some parts of Australia’s competition law. 
While limited, the exemptions are potentially significant. According to the 
ACCC: 
Section 51(3) … provides a limited exception for certain licence 
conditions from the competition provisions of the CCA (misuse of 
market power and resale price maintenance are not exempted). 
While the extent of the exception is unclear, it potentially excludes 
significant anti-competitive conduct, with substantial detrimental 
effects on efficiency and welfare, from the application of the 
CCA.89 
4.93 The Committee notes the views of Dr Rimmer, who argued the section 
acts to ‘constrain the circumstances in which the ACCC can investigate 
instances in which there are restrictive trade practices in relation to 
intellectual property rights’.90 The Committee also notes suggestions made 
by some inquiry participants that the section has the potential to permit 
copyright holders to engage in anti-competitive behaviour. According to 
the ACCC: 
… section 51(3) has the effect of exempting the imposing, or giving 
effect to, conditions of IP licences and assignments from the 
competition provisions of Part IV of the CCA (except sections 46, 
 
89  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission 100, p. 1. 
90  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 19 September 2012, p. 15. 
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46A and 48) to the extent that the condition relates to the subject 
matter of the IP.91 
4.94 The section 51(3) IP exceptions were enacted with the then Trade Practices 
Act (now the CCA) in 1974. At the time, according to the ACCC:  
… it was likely that IP laws were believed to confer on the owners 
of IP a limited economic monopoly. This led to a concern that the 
unrestrained application of competition law to IP could 
undermine IP rights. This original rationale is no longer relevant. 
It is now accepted that, generally, IP laws do not create legal or 
economic monopolies.92 
4.95 The ACCC has a long-standing position in favour of repealing section 
51(3). In its submission, the Commission said that: 
The object of the CCA is to enhance the welfare of Australians 
through the promotion of competition and fair trading, and 
provision for consumer protection. While recognising the 
importance of granting and protecting exclusive intellectual 
property rights, the ACCC considers that the subsequent licensing 
or assignment of those intellectual property rights should be 
subject to the same treatment under the CCA as any other 
property rights.93 
 
Recommendation 8 
 The Committee recommends the repeal of section 51(3) of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010.  
Options for removing geoblocking restrictions 
4.96 Consumer groups have argued for the removal of geoblocking to reduce 
pricing discrepancies between Australian and overseas markets. Choice, 
the Australian Retailers Association and the Communications Alliance all 
supported such a change, and the Committee notes the view of the 
Australian Information Industry Association that geoblocking 
mechanisms ‘warrant scrutiny’.94 
 
91  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC submission to the ALRC Copyright 
and the Digital Economy Issues Paper, November 2012, p. 31. 
92  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC submission to the ALRC Copyright 
and the Digital Economy Issues Paper, November 2012, pp. 31-32. 
93  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission 100, p. 1. 
94  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 6. 
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4.97 Mr Matthew Levey of Choice told the Committee that geographical 
restrictions are ‘increasingly making no sense’ in a global marketplace. 
Choice recommended further investigation and potential removal of such 
restrictions, labelling the measures ‘anti-competitive when they result in 
significant price differentials for Australian consumers’.95 
4.98 The ADA/ALCC submitted that there should be ‘a general prohibition on 
all geoblocking mechanisms … where these mechanisms serve to enforce 
different prices and associated conditions of use of content by Australian 
consumers’.96 
4.99 Industry groups argued that the government should be cautious in 
framing a response to geoblocking. AIIA CEO Suzanne Campbell noted 
that: 
The challenge for us though is that these arrangements are legacies 
from other times when we were seeking to protect Australian 
content … To the extent where we were prepared to be exposed to 
a global market, then there may be a basis for negotiating a 
different outcome with international providers of comparable 
content.97 
4.100 Adobe’s Mr Paul Robson argued that government should be conscious of 
how its policy on geoblocking could affect business confidence:  
In relation to the first question on geoblocking I think that as 
representatives of the people of this country and in relation to 
running and governing the country you would need to take into 
account the impact that would have on organisations globally 
being willing to invest in the country and run a local operation 
employing staff and building an ecosystem that delivers inputs 
and adds value to the economy.98 
4.101 In response to consumer calls for action to remove geoblocking 
mechanisms, and in its consideration of possible remedies, the Committee 
sought input from three relevant government stakeholder agencies, and 
notes their responses. Treasury cautioned against interventions in the 
market. Mr Geoff Francis advised the Committee that: 
Treasury is not a fan of geoblocking technology. We are certainly 
not enthusiastic about price discrimination where it results in 
 
95  Choice, Submission 75, p. 5. 
96  Australian Digital Alliance/Australian Libraries Copyright Committee, Submission 95.1, p. 1. 
97  Committee Hansard, Sydney, 30 July 2012, p. 6. 
98  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 22 March 2013, p. 30. 
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Australians paying higher prices. But we are wary of forms of 
intervention which may end up being counterproductive.99  
4.102 Mr Francis noted that legislation which seeks to ban geoblocking may be 
counterproductive: 
We would be very wary of more interventionist measures that 
seek to dictate the terms on which consumer and business 
transactions take place. We believe that they may stifle innovation 
and reduce competition further … Those types of measures should 
only be considered if there is a significant market failure that 
would cause what we would term a substantial and persistent 
consumer detriment. We do not believe that such a market failure 
has yet been demonstrated in this space.100 
4.103 AGD also cautioned against an attempt to ban geoblocking. To prevent the 
use of geoblocking it would be necessary ‘to be satisfied that such 
legislation would not introduce adverse or unintended consequences such 
as having the effect of limiting content available to Australians’.101 The 
AGD noted that any legislation would only impact geoblocking used on 
Australian websites, and that a possible outcome of a move to ban 
geoblocking would be ‘that offshore suppliers may not provide goods to 
Australia, or there may not be any local distributors, which may 
ultimately drive up prices for Australian consumers and lead to further 
online piracy’.102 
4.104 Mr Marcus Bezzi from the ACCC argued that Australian consumers’ 
efforts to circumvent geoblocking – including through illegal downloads – 
would tend to undermine geoblocking over time, and that this might 
make a legislative response unnecessary: 
From our point of view as a competition regulator, these things—
and I should say the illegal downloading capacity, which is well-
known to many Australians, including probably the majority of 
teenagers—operate to put some competitive tension into the 
market. If the methods start to become a big enough way in which 
consumers are circumventing the limitations that are imposed by 
the companies on consumers, those methods can start to have an 
impact on sales, and we are aware that that can have an impact in 
the market.103 
 
99  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31 October 2012, p. 16. 
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4.105 While the Committee acknowledges that in some cases geoblocking is a 
necessary business practice, it also notes that many IT vendors appear to 
use geoblocking as a means to raise prices by constraining consumers’ 
ability to access the global marketplace. The Committee considers this 
form of geoblocking to be a significant constraint on consumer choice.  
 
Recommendation 9 
 The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider 
enacting a ban on geoblocking as an option of last resort, should 
persistent market failure exist in spite of the changes to the Competition 
and Consumer Act and the Copyright Act recommended in this report.  
Options for voiding contractual arrangements 
4.106 The Committee notes that AGD also addressed suggestions from 
consumers and consumer groups that Australia should deny copyright 
protection to products sold on websites utilising geoblocking technology:  
From a copyright perspective, Australia has obligations to provide 
copyright protection in most circumstances where a work satisfies 
the basic elements required for copyright to subsist. Where 
copyright would otherwise subsist in material, the international 
agreements to which Australia is a party would not allow 
Australia to deny copyright protection to a copyright owner 
purely because geoblocking was used in the sale of a work (most 
likely by someone other than the copyright owner such as a 
licensee or distributor).104 
4.107 The possibility of using the unfair contract provisions of the Australian 
Consumer Law (ACL) to void contractual terms that seek to enforce 
geoblocking was also raised during the inquiry. In response, the Treasury 
noted that such measures may not be easily enforceable: 
It may be possible to draft a specific law that voids contract terms 
that seek to enforce geoblocking. However, as with any Australian 
law, the effectiveness of such a measure on the rights of Australian 
consumers engaging in contracts internationally may be impacted 
by the laws applying in the relevant international jurisdiction. This 
may include: where the foreign law was the proper law governing 
the contract in question; when the requirement was imposed on an 
Australian distributor by an international IP rights holder (such as 
 
104  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 124, p. 3. 
116 AT WHAT COST? IT PRICING AND THE AUSTRALIA TAX 
 
through an exclusive licensing agreement); or if the geoblocking 
mechanism was already embedded in the product prior to sale in 
Australia. In such circumstances an Australian law voiding 
contract terms may be ineffective.105 
4.108 The Committee notes, however, evidence from the ACCC suggesting that 
it is possible to regulate aspects of international trade. Mr Marcus Bezzi of 
the ACCC said: 
If there is any anticompetitive purpose associated with the policies 
that the companies are applying then there is something that can 
be done, from our point of view. And that is the case whether the 
supplier is in Barton or in Botswana. From our point of view, if the 
supplier is engaging in business in Australia, supplying services to 
Australians, and it is doing things to stop people from getting 
access to lower priced goods and it is doing it for an 
anticompetitive purpose, then action can be taken against them.106 
 
Recommendation 10 
 That the Australian Government investigate the feasibility of amending 
the Competition and Consumer Act so that contracts or terms of service 
which seek to enforce geoblocking are considered void. 
Banning price discrimination 
4.109 In response to views from consumers which suggested that price 
discrimination could be removed by legislative change, the Committee 
investigated options, noting a former legislative provision which 
prohibited price discrimination.  
4.110 Section 49 of the Competition and Consumer Act (the CCA, known at the 
time as the Trade Practices Act 1974), ‘made it illegal to offer or attempt to 
induce discriminatory pricing if the discrimination was of such magnitude 
or was of such a recurring or systematic character that it was likely to have 
the effect of substantially lessening competition’.107 
4.111 Section 49 was repealed after a number of reviews found that it operated 
to reduce price flexibility, had inflationary effects, and that other sections 
of the act (especially the provisions on anti-competitive agreements and 
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misuse of market power in sections 45 and 46 of the CCA) would likely 
address breaches of the section.108  
4.112 Treasury’s Mr Geoff Francis noted that price discrimination laws may 
function differently to the way they are intended: 
Anecdotally, the suspicion is that it [a price discrimination ban] 
reduces price flexibility rather than increasing it, because typically 
the activity you see is one company taking another company to 
court to stop them from discounting.109 
4.113 Consequently the Treasury recommended against reintroducing a 
provision similar to section 49. The Committee concurs with this view. 
Prospects for international cooperation 
International warranties and standards 
4.114 Consumer groups argued in submissions to the inquiry that more 
Australian consumers would shop online if they had confidence that 
goods they bought overseas were still covered by a warranty. At present, 
in many cases, such products are either not covered or warranties are 
difficult to enforce. While chapter 2 looked at consumer perceptions of 
warranties, and chapter 3 described cost impacts on industry, in this 
chapter they are considered in terms of international harmonisation.  
4.115 Mr Madison Cartwright from Choice advised the Committee that some 
larger IT companies, particularly Apple and Dell, already provide 
international warranties,110 but Ms Erin Turner from ACCAN warned that 
making overseas purchases can also involve some risk:  
What these consumers may not know is that Australian consumer 
law possibly does not extend to these international purchases or, if 
it does, the law would be extremely difficult to enforce. This 
matters because if something goes wrong it can be difficult to seek 
redress. These consumers may not have access to repairs, refunds 
or replacements, as they would if they had purchased the product 
in Australia.111 
4.116 Ms Turner called for an international warranty regime to be developed, to 
provide ‘at least some security in shopping elsewhere and accessing lower 
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prices—hopefully, bringing competition to Australia’.112 Ms Turner also 
acknowledged that: 
Not every consumer at the moment feels competent about 
shopping online. … Knowing that there is an international 
warranty for a purchase can go to help ease some of that stress and 
nervousness.113 
4.117 Warranty protection is of particular concern for businesses that are heavily 
reliant on IT products to operate. Mr Russell Zimmerman from the 
Australian Retailers Association (ARA) told the Committee that in search 
of cheaper prices, many businesses would look overseas for their 
hardware and software needs. However, the after sales service and 
support offered by Australian suppliers is a major issue for businesses that 
are dependent on IT products for their operation.114 
4.118 Choice argued that warranties provide an indirect mechanism for IT 
suppliers to reinforce regional market segregation, and that ‘some 
companies explicitly state that that will not recognise a product’s warranty 
if it was not bought in Australia’.115  
4.119 In its submission to the Committee, ACCAN urged the Australian 
Government to encourage the ‘development of international warranties, 
product repair and replacement rights through international trade 
agreements and discussions with international companies’. ACCAN 
further recommended that ‘education campaigns to inform consumers 
about the limits of Australian Consumer Law for international purchases’ 
be undertaken by the ACCC and consumer protection bodies.116 
4.120 The Committee also heard evidence suggesting that the Australian 
Government could relieve some pressure on IT prices by pursuing 
international agreements that would reduce localisation costs for IT 
products. The Australian Industry Group (Ai Group) argued that the 
government should: 
… ensure that Australian regulation harmonises with international 
approaches where possible to reduce the need for Australian 
specific product requirements.117 
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The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
4.121 The TPP is a proposed trade agreement being negotiated by Pacific Rim 
countries including Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Singapore, 
Mexico, Peru, Canada and Chile. It is envisioned that the treaty will cover 
around 20 subject-matter areas, including competition, customs, 
e-commerce, intellectual property, investment, industrial relations and 
trade.118 
4.122 Although no official draft text has been released, a draft of the TPP’s 
proposed intellectual property chapter was disclosed by US Congressman 
Darrel Issa in February 2011, and has caused widespread concern 
particularly among intellectual property academics, including Dr Rimmer. 
Dr Rimmer describes the content of the leaked draft chapter as ‘alarming 
in terms of the impact in respect of copyright law and exceptions, parallel 
importation restrictions, technological protection measures, and, more 
generally, consumer rights’.119 
4.123 Given that the draft IP chapter contains provisions which would appear to 
require legislative changes to enact in Australia, the Committee wrote to 
the AGD seeking clarification on the Department’s statement that the TPP 
would not require legislative change and did not represent an expansion 
of copyright protections. AGD responded: 
Your letter refers to a document made public by US Congressman 
Darrell Issa which purports to contain text of the intellectual 
property (IP) chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This 
document has not been acknowledged by the US Government as 
official text. As such, and as the IP negotiations are ongoing, it 
would not be possible or appropriate for me to address the clauses 
identified in your letter or speculative comments made by 
academics on the purported text.120 
4.124 The Committee notes concerns about the potential impact of the TPP on 
the Australian copyright regime. Article 4.2 of the draft TPP IP chapter, if 
adopted, would appear to entrench parallel import restrictions in an 
international agreement.121 It has also been suggested it would more 
tightly constrain Australia’s freedom to adopt its own regime governing 
the use of technological protection measures (TPMs).  
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4.125 The Committee sought a response to these concerns from the AGD, as the 
agency that administers the Copyright Act. In response, Mr Matt 
Minogue, First Assistant Secretary of AGD’s Civil Law division, said: 
We are aware of those views. Our position is that the TPP in terms 
of copyright would not require any amendment to the Copyright 
Act for Australia to implement—subject to it still being negotiated. 
So they are not views that we share.122 
4.126 The Committee notes failed attempts in the US to enact expansive 
copyright regimes similar to that suggested by the leaked draft chapter. 
In 2011 and early 2012, two pieces of IP-focused legislation – the Stop 
Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) 
– were abandoned after significant public protest against them. Similarly 
expansive provisions were contained in the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) which foundered after the EU refused to ratify 
it and the Australian Parliament highlighted significant problems with the 
treaty.123  
4.127 The Committee notes the observation made by the Joint Standing 
Committee on Treaties in relation to the secrecy with which DFAT 
conducted negotiations for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: 
…confidentiality is not common or appropriate in IP negotiations 
which impact directly and in minute detail on domestic law and 
domestic innovation policy.124 
4.128 The Committee further notes that the Australian Law Reform Commission 
is currently conducting a review into copyright and the digital economy, 
and that the Attorney-General’s Department is currently reviewing 
Australia’s TPM exception regime. The Committee agrees with the Joint 
Standing Committee on Treaties that any international agreement relating 
to intellectual property should not pre-empt the outcome of, nor be 
incompatible with, those reviews.125 
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1 Mr Owen Hoogvliet 
2 Mr Zhiliang Huang 
3 Mr Andrew Boisen 
4 Mr Scott Nelson 
5 Mr Daniel Prosser 
6 Pioneer Computers, Ms Molly Lai 
7 Mr Isaac Hendry 
8 Mr Dane Weber 
9 Mr Michael Zeng 
10 Mr Bane Williams 
11 Mr Jeremy King 
12 Mr Stephen Delvecchio 
13 Applied PC Systems Pty Ltd 
14 Mr Matthew Wyatt 
15 Mr Kevin Danher 
16 Nuclear Fruit Salad 
17 Mr David Smith 
18 Mr Chris Wong 
19 Mr Duncan Wallace 
20 Mr Phil Festa 
21 Ms Clytie Siddall 
22 Mr Jason Austin 
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23 Mr Mark Sinclair 
24 Mr David Mathews 
25 Mr Barry Napthine 
26 Mr Andrew Tozer 
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28 Mr Cameron Holland 
29 Mr Brendan Sherrin 
30 Mr Dmitry Brizhinev 
31 Mr Stuart Kenyon 
32 Mr Alex Talbot 
33 Mr Daniel Myles 
34 Cyberworld Publishing 
35 CyberText Consulting Pty Ltd 
36 Ms Christine Hughes 
37 Mr Derek Brooke 
38 Mr Michael Clark 
39 Mr Paul Bicknell 
40 Mr James Rudd 
41 Mr Luke Matheson 
42 Mr Joshua Preston 
43 Mr Charles Gutjahr 
44 Mr John Dulley 
45 Ms Elizabeth Litster 
46 Mr Scott Sutherland 
47 Ms Julie Jester 
48 Mr Matthew Kermeen 
49 Mr Jeff Burgess 
50 Mr Tim Greig 
51 Mr Samuel Lymn 
52 Mr Stuart Skene 
53 Mr Peter Larkins 
54 Australian Commercial and Media Photographers 
55 Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 
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56 Australian Industry Group 
57 Mr Christopher Shain 
58 Australian Home Entertainment Distributors Association 
59 Mr Daniel Nicholson 
60 Mr Scott Williamson 
61 Mr Kye Ridley-Smith 
62 Apple Pty Ltd 
62.1 Supplementary  
63 Mr Greg Bell 
64 CONFIDENTIAL 
65 CONFIDENTIAL 
66 Australian Publishers Association 
67 Microsoft 
67.1 Supplementary  
67.2 Supplementary 
67.3 Supplementary  
68 J Mahuika 
69 Ms Carol Bruce 
70 Mr Paul Barker 
71 Mr Magnus Stensson 
72 Mr Garth Strong 
73 Australian Information Industry Association 
73.1 Supplementary 
74 Australian Communications Consumer Action Network 
75 Choice 
76 Dr Andrew Leigh MP 
77 Mr David Poole 
78 Ms Faye Galbraith 
79 Department of Finance and Deregulation 
80 Mr Bret Salinger 
81 Adobe Pty Ltd 
81.1 Supplementary 
81.2 Supplementary  
82 Mr Ken Wilson 
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85 The Treasury 
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86 Mr Robert Webber 
87 Monash University 
88 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
89 Mr Mike Smith 
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91 Mr Mateusz Michalik 
92 Dr Matthew Rimmer 
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93.1 Supplementary 
93.2 Supplementary 
94 Mr Kevin Cobley 
95 Australian Digital Alliance and Australian Libraries Copyright Committee 
95.1 Supplementary  
96 CONFIDENTIAL 
97 Mr Michael Cunningham 
98 Dr Jamie French 
99 Mr Leonard Cronin 
100 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
100.1 Supplementary  
101 Mr David Bannister 
102 Mr Greg Keeley 
103 Mr Douglas Linacre 
104 Ron Rennex Drawing Services Pty Ltd 
105 Mr David Hepple 
106 Mr Shane Priddle 
107 Mr Andrew Whitwell 
108 Macpherson Greenleaf Lawyers 
109 Mr John Uri 
110 Mr Pierre Rousseau 
111 Connecting Up 
APPENDIX A – SUBMISSIONS AND EXHIBITS 127 
 
112 Mr Corey Beagley 
113 IP Australia 
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118 Mr George Tasker 
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129 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd 
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1 Communications Alliance Ltd 
 The Sky is Rising: a detailed look at the state of the entertainment industry – A 
detailed look at the state of the entertainment industry.  
By Michael Masnick and Michael Ho 
2 Dr Matthew Rimmer, Australian National University 
 The Tethered Utility – The Amazon kindle and the right to read.  
By Ariel Bogle 
 (Related to Submission No. 92) 
3 Australian Communications Consumer Action Network 
 Public Procurement Policy for Accessible Information and Communications 
Technology 
4 Australian Digital Alliance and Australian Libraries Copyright Committee 
 E-Book Prices 
 (Related to Submission No. 95) 
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 Comments on submissions to the Attorney-General's Department – On technical 
protection measures 
 (Related to Submission No. 124) 
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Mr Ross Gibb, Group Managing Director, Macmillan Publishers Australia 
Mr Ian McDonald, Special Counsel, Copyright, Simpsons Solicitors 
Mr Peter Saffin, Convenor, Schools Committee 
Australasian Performing Rights Association-Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners 
Society Ltd 
Mr Richard Mallett, Head of Revenue 
Choice 
Mr Matt Levey, Head of Campaigns 
Mr Madison Cartwright, Campaigns Coordinator 
Ms Katrina Lee, Strategic Policy Adviser 
Australian Retail Association 
Mr Russell Zimmerman, Executive Director 
Communications Alliance Ltd 
Mr John Stanton, Chief Executive Officer 
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Wednesday, 19 September 2012 - Canberra 
Australian Communications Consumer Action Network 
Ms Una Lawrence, Director, Policy and Campaigns 
Ms Erin Turner, Policy and Campaigns Officer 
Mr Wayne Hawkins, Disability Policy Advisor 
Individuals 
Dr Matthew Rimmer, Future Fellow, Australian Research Council; A/Prof, 
Australian National University College of Law 
Friday, 5 October 2012 - Canberra 
Australian Industry Recording Association 
Mr Dan Rosen, Chief Executive Officer 
Mr Brent Fisse, Adviser 
Wednesday, 31 October 2012 - Canberra 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
Mr Marcus Bezzi, Executive General Manager, Enforcement and Compliance 
Mr Richard Fleming, Deputy General Manager, Executive Office, Enforcement and 
Compliance Division 
Ms Linley Johnson, Economic Adviser, Competition and Consumer Economic 
Unit 
Treasury 
Mr Geoff Francis, General Manager, Competition and Consumer Division 
Ms Ann Bounds, Unit Manager, Consumer Policy Framework Unit, CCPD 
Ms Gillie Kirk, Unit Manager, Competition Policy Unit, CCPD 
Wednesday, 28 November 2012 - Canberra 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Mr Hamish McCormick, First Assistant Secretary, Office of Trade Negotiations 
Wednesday, 13 February 2013 - Canberra 
IP Australia 
Mr Philip Noonan, Director General 
Dr Benjamin Mitra-Kahn, Chief Economist 
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Mr Matt Minogue, First Assistant Secretary, Civil Law Division 
Ms Kirsti Haipola, Principal Legal Officer, Business and Information Law Branch 
Wednesday, 13 March 2013 - Canberra 
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 
Mr Keith Besgrove, First Assistant Secretary, Digital Services Division 
Mr Richard Windeyer, First Assistant Secretary, Digital Strategy Division 
Friday, 22 March 2013 - Canberra 
Apple 
Mr Tony King, Vice President 
Adobe Systems 
Mr Paul Robson, Managing Director 
Microsoft Australia 
Ms Pip Marlow, Managing Director 
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